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DEFINING HAN IDENTITY IN CHINESE ETHNOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY 
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According to the People’s Republic of China, fifty-six ethnic groups combine to form the 
Chinese nation although the Han, at over ninety percent of the population, constitute 
China’s overwhelming majority. Their numbers now exceed one billion, the largest 
ethnic group on earth and twenty percent of the world’s population. My dissertation 
project, entitled “Making the Majority: Defining Han Identity in Chinese Ethnology and 
Archaeology,” challenges the putative authenticity of this official category by critically 
examining its creation and evolution in the modern period. In the early twentieth century 
anthropology became instrumental in defining the Chinese as a people and composing 
China’s national narrative, or what Benedict Anderson calls the “biography of the 
nation.” While archaeologists searched for Chinese racial and cultural origins in the 
Yellow River valley of the Central Plain, ethnologists studied non-Han minorities in the 
rugged and remote frontiers. These scholars linked contemporary minorities to 
ethnonyms from classical texts, thus imposing on them a legacy of barbarism while Han 
assumed the role of ethnic Chinese, heirs of historic Chinese civilization, and the heart of 
the modern Chinese nation. Over the course of the past century social changes and 
political expediency necessitated revisions of the Han narrative, and popular conceptions 
evolved accordingly. Today the various Chinese political communities of Taiwan, Hong 
 iv
 v
Kong, Macao, and the PRC all perceive the Han differently, reflecting their divergent 
visions of the Chinese nation. On the whole, examining interpretations and 
representations of Han identity across heuristic and spatial boundaries shows that the 
concept of Han is in fact fluid, evolving, and ultimately political. This study concludes 
that Han, like “white” or Caucasian in the US, represents an imagined majority—a social 
construct that continues to inform the negotiation of Chinese identities. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
PREFACE ……………………………………………………………………………… vii 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: HAN AS CHINA’S WHITE …………………………….… 1 
 
II. ARCHAEOLOGY: THE SHANG DYNASTY AS HAN HERITAGE, 1923-
 1930 …………………………………………………………………………….. 18 
 
III. ETHNOLOGY: FRONTIER STUDIES AND CHINA’S OTHER, 1926-1945 . 56 
 
IV. LI CHI AND EVOLVING NARRATIVES OF THE CHINESE RACE, 1950-
 1977 …………………………………………………………………………….. 91 
 
V. FEI XIAOTONG AND THE CHINESE SNOWBALL: OFFICIAL 
 NARRATIVES OF HAN AND THE CHINESE NATION IN THE PRC AND 
 BEYOND, 1950-2007 ……………………………………………………..….. 123  
 
VI. FRACTURED NARRATIVE: POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF HAN, 2004-
 2008 ………………………………………………………………………….... 155 
 
VII. CONCLUSION: DISAPPEARANCE OF THE HAN ……………………….. 183 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………….…………. 190 
 vi
 
PREFACE 
 
  
 It seems that in challenging Han identity I have taken on the role of the foolish old 
man from Chinese folklore who, armed only with a shovel, dedicated himself to the 
Sisyphean task of removing the mountain. Certainly this present work offers little more 
than a miniscule effort—a metaphorical shovelful—but hopefully one that in conjunction 
with the efforts of others will accomplish something great. In any case, it is not an 
individual effort, either for the old man, who succeeded with the help of his progeny, or 
for me.  
 I am profoundly indebted to a number of individuals and institutions for their 
assistance with this study. At the University of Pittsburgh I have enjoyed the very good 
fortune of working with a committee that has both encouraged independent work and 
creativity while providing inspiration and much needed guidance for the project. My 
thanks especially to Evelyn Rawski for conceding to take me on as a doctoral student, 
and to Nicole Constable, Tony Barbieri-Low and Dick Smethurst for investing 
themselves in a naïve graduate student’s overly ambitious project. I am certain that the 
diversity of interests and backgrounds among committee members greatly enriched the 
study. Even so, the final product is my own, including the inevitable errors. 
 I have also been fortunate to work with Hsu Cho-yun, professor emeritus of the 
University of Pittsburgh and senior fellow of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, who proved 
to be an important connection with the past. Other senior scholars at the Academia Sinica, 
including Li Yih-yuan and Wang Fan-sen, as well as staff at the Institute of History and 
Philology and the Archaeology Section, provided access to relevant archives and other 
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rare materials. My thanks also to Huang Ying-kuei and Guo Peiyi at the Institute of 
Ethnology for affiliation and other assistance.  
 In Beijing, a number of individuals at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
including He Xingliang and Du Rongkun of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology 
and Chen Xingcan of the Institute of Archaeology, shared their insights and experiences, 
as did Wang Qingren and Wang Jianmin of the Central University for Nationalities. 
Additionally I am grateful to Li Guangmo and Zou Heng for their exceptional hospitality 
and willingness to reminisce. In Guangzhou I appreciated working briefly with the 
Anthropology Department faculty of Zhongshan University, and particularly Liu Wensuo 
with whom I have been able to continue collaboration. My thanks also to the Xiamen 
University Anthropological Research Institute and the Smithsonian Institution archives 
each for hosting me on short visits. 
 I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the many generous sources of 
research funding, beginning with the University of Pittsburgh Department of History, the 
University Center for International Studies, and the China Council. The project was also 
supported by Title VI funding from the Department of Education, the Fulbright program, 
the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, 
the National Security Education Program, the American Historical Association, and the 
American Council of Learned Societies. Discrete portions of the dissertation were 
presented at conferences hosted by Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Concordia 
Universities as well as at annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association 
and the American Historical Association, all of which aided me in vastly improving the 
manuscript.  
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 Li Yi-tze, currently a doctoral candidate in the Anthropology Department at Pitt, 
exercised great patience in explicating handwritten archive documents on abstruse 
academic topics and I hope my attempts at reciprocation did him some service. Finally, I 
dedicate this dissertation to Ian and Anya, without whom I would have finished in half 
the time. I have no regrets. 
 
Clayton D. Brown 
Pittsburgh 
4/ 21/08 
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INTRODUCTION: HAN AS CHINA’S WHITE 
 
 
 According to the People’s Republic of China, fifty-six ethnic groups unite to form 
the prodigious Chinese nation. Within this diverse mix, however, the Han constitute an 
overwhelming majority, with 91.96 percent of the population. The number of Han now 
exceeds one billion, or twenty percent of the world population, making Han the largest 
ethnic group not only in China but on the face of the earth.1 
 A diminutive Western analogue is found in the category White or Caucasian. 
According to the latest figures from the United States Census Bureau, exactly 
211,460,626 people fall within the racial category “White,” making this the official US 
majority at 75.1 percent of the overall national population.2 Both Han and White share 
the dubious distinction of being the majority within their respective sphere, but ironically 
they also share an obscurity wholly incongruous with their numbers. While racial and 
ethnic studies have tended to focus narrowly on minorities, only recently has the 
monolithic, undefined majority become a viable subject for critical analysis. 
 
Critical Race Theory and Critical White Studies 
 
 Precise demographic statistics like those cited above imply that race and ethnicity 
are objective and quantifiable, yet social critics have recently drawn attention to what 
                                                
1 White Papers of the Chinese Government (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2000), 450. 
2 This census was taken in 2000, the same year as the PRC census. See US Census Bureau statistics online 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf.  
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Benedict Anderson called “the fiction of the census.”3 Michel Foucault has reminded us 
that our classificatory schemes are neither timeless nor natural; they are, in fact, created.4  
Likewise, Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu both discussed how such “practical taxonomies,” 
in imposing order on the world, offer a means of exercising power.5 By tracing the 
histories of these established taxonomies, we may discover how and when categories 
were first created and, most importantly, why—what purpose they served and for whom. 
 Ironically, while history was once invoked to construct racial typologies, it has 
now become the key to deconstructing race. As early as 1964, the historian Dante Puzzo 
suggested that because race is a modern concept, historical rather than social analysis 
offers the surest means of discrediting race and, by extension, racism.6 In the 1970s, in 
the wake of the American Civil Rights movement, what came to be called Critical Race 
Theory grew out of the convergence of Critical Legal Studies and radical feminism to 
pose a concerted challenge to racial thinking. The historical method became imperative 
as CRT scholars worked to prove that “race and races are products of social thought and 
relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to no biological or genetic 
reality; rather, races are categories that society invents, manipulates, or retires when 
convenient.”7  
                                                
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 166. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990). 
5 For a discussion of power exercised through taxonomy see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 159-97. 
6 Most notably, Dante Puzzo encouraged historical rather than merely social analysis of race. In offering a 
brief historical overview of the development of racism, he argued that race, unlike ethnocentrism, is a 
modern concept. See Dante A. Puzzo, “Racism and the Western Tradition,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
25.4 (1964): 579-586.  
7 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York 
University Press, 2001), 7. For an overview of Critical Race Theory see the introduction to this work as 
well as Kimberlé Crenshaw, ed., Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement (New 
York: New Press, 1995). 
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 Dru Gladney pointed out that majorities are no exception; they too “are made, not 
born.”8 In a movement that gained notoriety in the 1990s, Critical White Studies, once 
hailed as the “cutting edge” of Critical Race Theory, spearheaded an exploration of the 
origins, historical construction, and evolution of the category White or Caucasian.9 
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado and, more recently, John P. Jackson Jr., have explored the 
legal construction of White through US court decisions.10 Like its CRT parent, however, 
Critical White Studies rapidly diffused from legal studies into other fields such as 
anthropology, sociology,11 and particularly American history. In an early study, Reginald 
Horsman traced the intellectual history of the Anglo-Saxon and Aryan nation myths from 
their origins in Europe to America, where they evolved into a belief in the manifest 
destiny of a chosen people.12 Later Theodore W. Allen compiled a multi-volume study on 
The Invention of the White Race, and more recently scholars have employed the historical 
method to demonstrate the opacity and plasticity of White: Noel Ignatiev chronicled how 
Irish immigrants, once considered a lower race on a par with Negroes, became White 
Americans;13 Karen Brodkin showed us how Jews merged with postwar White 
America.14 In Working Toward Whiteness, David Roediger included Italians, Slavs, and 
                                                
8 Dru C. Gladney, Making Majorities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1. 
9 An interdisciplinary reader that includes many of the representative writings from this period can be 
found in Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds., Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997). 
10 Derrick Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law 5th ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2004). John P. 
Jackson, Science for Segregation: Race, Law, and the Case against Brown v. Board of Education (New 
York: New York University Press, 2005). See also Ian F. Haney López, White by Law: The Legal 
Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 2006). 
11 For whiteness studies in sociology, see Ruth Frankenberg, White Women Race Matters: The Social 
Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Ruth Frankenberg, ed., 
Displacing Whiteness (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
12 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxons 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
13 Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
14 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
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Poles in the transformation of Eastern and Southern European immigrants into American 
Whites.15 Others have even begun to critically examine Whites in the European context 
and beyond.16 The historical dimension clearly demonstrates that as social and political 
circumstances changed, so too did the criteria for inclusion and exclusion—thus the 
borders of racial or ethnic categories are not fixed but continually shifting.  
 Critical Race Theory made its mark across academe, including China studies. In 
his pioneering work on The Discourse of Race in Modern China, the historian Frank 
Dikötter echoed basic CRT tenets in positing that race, whether in the US or China, “is a 
cultural construct with no relationship to objective reality.”17 Pamela Crossley, in her 
study of the Manchus, also referred to race as a “construct” and agreed on “the 
fundamental unviability of the notion that ‘race’ is or ever can be a thing real in itself.”18 
Crossley even suggested that ethnicity is just a euphemism for race, thereby suggesting 
that the critique of race may also apply to ethnic categories.19 Crossley, Wang Mingke, 
Ralph Litzinger, and others have demonstrated that ethnic identity in China is indeed both 
negotiable and evolving. Crossley’s influential studies of the Qing dynasty describe the 
pluralistic origins of the Manchu people and the modern creation of Manchu ethnic 
                                                
15 David Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White (New York: 
Basic Books, 2005). See also The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working 
Class 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2007). 
16 Alastair Bonnett, White Identities: Historical and International Perspectives (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 
2000). Radhika Mohanram, Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 
17 Dikötter, Frank. The Discourse of Race in Modern China. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 
viii. 
18 Pamela Crossley, Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5. 
19 Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," Late Imperial China 11.2 
(June 1990): 1-36. 
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consciousness.20 In his study of the Yao nationality, Litzinger discovered that the ethnic 
taxonomy created by the communist state and imposed on minority peoples essentially 
reconfigured affiliations and divisions in China’s southwest, even grouping together a 
culturally and linguistically heterogenous mix of peoples under the single rubric of Yao. 
Applying this broadly suggests that ethnicity in China is indeed a modern construct, and 
the project undertaken by anthropologists and the state to define China’s ethnic groups 
created new categories of identification that have since been accepted as objective, 
historical fact.21 In studying the boundary between the Qiang and Han nationalities, 
Wang found that both geographical and cultural divisions between these two groups 
shifted over time, and that in fact no hard or well-defined borders ever existed.22 All of 
these studies seem to support the theory that ethnicity, even in the context of China, is 
socially constructed and historically evolving.  
 But studies elucidating the synthetic nature of ethnicity, whether generated in 
China or abroad, has tended to focus on China’s fifty-five “minority nationalities”23 at the 
exclusion of the majority; critical examinations of the Han remain scarce. Only recently 
has a movement emerged in China which examines the Han as an ethnic group, a trend 
that began with the “First National Academic Conference on Han Ethnic Group 
                                                
20 Pamela Crossley, Orphan Warriors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Pamela Kyle 
Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999). 
21 Ralph Litzinger, Other Chinas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000). 
22 Ming-ke Wang, “From the Qiang Barbarians to the Qiang Nationality: The Making of a New Chinese 
Boundary” in Shu-min Huang and Cheng-kuang Hsu, Imagining China: Regional Division and National 
Unity (Taibei: Academia Sinica Institute of Ethnology, 1999). Earlier iterations of this study appear in 
Wang Mingke, “Hanzu bianyuan de Qiangzu jiyi yu Qiangzu benzhi” in Huang Yinggui and Ye Chunrong, 
eds. Cong zhoubian kan Hanren de shehui yu wenhua (Taibei: Academia Sinica Institute of Ethnology, 
1997); Wang Mingke, Huaxia bianyuan: lishi ji yi yu zuqun rentong (Taibei: Yun chen wen hua shi ye gu fen 
you xian gong si, 1997). 
23 !"#$ 
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Research” in 1987 and the subsequent publication of Han Research.24 Such famous social 
scientists as Fei Xiaotong and Li Yih-yuan also turned their attention to the majority, but 
minority studies still far eclipse study of the Han.25 Even so, an important distinction 
exists between White Studies and extant Han Studies—while the former dedicates itself 
to challenging the very foundations of race and Whiteness, the latter actually reifies the 
idea of Han ethnicity, drawing from both history and anthropology to substantiate the 
category. In this manner Han Studies, as presently constituted, is neither critical nor 
reflexive.26   
 In the 1990s, however, as Critical White Studies swept through the American 
academy, pioneering critiques of Han began to appear. Dru Gladney, an anthropologist 
specializing in China’s Muslim community, found that Han, like White, remains 
“undefined.” He further noted that the “widespread definition and representation of the 
‘minority’ as exotic, colorful, and ‘primitive’ homogenizes the undefined majority as 
united, monoethnic, and modern.”27 In 2001 Kai-wing Chow, a professor at the 
University of Illinois, contributed a chapter to an edited volume wherein he explicated the 
relationship between the modern creation of a Han race and the Chinese nation.28 
Although some studies followed, no broad movement akin to Critical White Studies has 
yet developed among scholars of China.29  
                                                
24 Han min zu yan jiu (Nanning: Guangxi Chubanshe, 1989). 
25 Today a Han Nationality Society %#$&' exists within the Chinese Society of Ethnological Studies 
()#$&&'. 
26 This is discussed in greater detail in Chaper 4, but arguably the most representative work is Xu Jieshun, 
Han minzu de renleixue fenxi (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1999). 
27 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China,” Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 93. 
28 Kai-wing Chow, “Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture: Imagining Hanzu Identity in Modern 
China” in Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds., Constructing Nationhood in Modern East 
Asia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 
29 See for instance Dru Gladney, ed. Making Majorities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Here 
Gladney situates Han within a context of global majorities. 
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 Observing this lacuna Susan Blum, in a review of Western scholarship on China’s 
minorities in 2002, remarked on the continued obsession with minority studies and called 
instead for “a full-fledged investigation into the making of the majority category ‘Han,’” 
and “the intellectual lineages of such study.”30 Prompted in part by Blum’s challenge, this 
dissertation project began in the same year. Unlike the continuing vogue for minority 
studies, and in contrast to the few Chinese-language studies on the Han that simply 
expound old narratives, this study aims to problematize the very idea of Han ethnicity.31 
Inspired by Critical White Studies and the few critiques of Han that have come before, I 
argue that the Han are not a homogenous community that transcends time as is often 
assumed, a trope that serves only to reify nationalist mythology and ethnic conflict. 
Rather, through historical analysis, this study seeks to establish how definitions of Han 
have changed over the past century while postulating why these changes occurred.  
 
Children of the Yellow Emperor: Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionaries, 1898-1923 
 
 It is important to recognize that familiar modern identities, including that of the 
Han, grew out of a hybridization of both indigenous, premodern roots and modern, 
Western science. China’s revered literary canon provided a foundation for the former: 
classical histories dichotomized a civilized core and a barbarian periphery with a dynasty 
reigning from the center, a cosmology that modern revolutionaries recast into a binary of 
                                                
30 Susan D. Blum, “Margins and Centers: A Decade of Publishing on China’s Ethnic Minorities,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 61:4 (2002): 1289. Guy R. Kent also reviewed recent studies of the Manchus in 
“Who Were the Manchus? A Review Essay,” Journal of Asian Studies 61, no. 1 (2002): 151-64. 
31 This study is thus not a search for the “real” or “historical” Han; rather, this is a historiographical survey 
of such narratives. Therefore I refrain from analyzing the factual historicity of the narratives presented (for 
which I am unqualified in any case) and focus more on the evolution of these narratives. 
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Han and minority. But the process of hardening cultural markers into official racial 
categories occurred only gradually and underwent many permutations. We know that 
during the Yuan dynasty [circa 1300] Kublai Khan had divided the imperial population 
into four classes according to political privilege: Mengren (Mongols), Semuren (“those 
with colored eyes”), Hanren (northern Chinese), and Nanren (southerners), the latter 
indicating that a great portion of today’s Han would not, in the Yuan dynasty, have been 
considered Hanren.32 At the same time, Crossley has pointed out that the Yuan dynastic 
records designated those peripheral peoples with a “settled lifestyle,” including elements 
of the Kitan, Bohai, and Jurchen tribes, as Han.33 Although an official rubric of Han 
existed in the Yuan, which marks a step toward the modern taxonomy, it clearly lacked 
rigid or well-defined criteria for inclusion and exclusion and so remained eminently 
permeable. 
 In Orphan Warriors, Crossley examined the racialization process in Qing China. 
Early in the dynasty categories were soft and opaque. Beginning in 1601 the Eight 
Banners system classed the Qing bannermen into Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun units, but 
she conscientiously pointed out that the latter included “people of often indeterminable 
Chinese, Jurchen, or Korean descent” with little regard for ancestry.34 Even then it was 
not unusual for those belonging to one banner, for instance the Hanjun, to be transferred 
to another banner like that of the Manchu, in which case “they were thereafter considered 
to be Manchu in every respect.”35 During the course of the dynasty “old differences 
among various federations, tribes and clans were worn away beneath the ‘Manchu,’ 
                                                
32 Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 71. 
33 Pamela Crossley, “The Tong in Two Worlds: Cultural Identities in Liaodong and Nurgan during the 13th-
17th centuries,” Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i 4.9 (1983): 21-42. 
34 Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 5. 
35 Crossley, “The Tong in Two Worlds,” 22. 
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‘Mongol,’ and ‘Chinese-martial [Hanjun]’ categories created by the court. Such labels, 
once based primarily upon cultural identity, were adjusted in the eighteenth century to 
accommodate the court’s new emphasis upon genealogy and its formalization of Manchu 
culture.”36 Ironically, then, the measures taken by the Qing court to set themselves and 
the banners apart from their subjects as a ruling elite were successful enough that by the 
end of the dynasty, Han and Manchu had developed as distinct and antagonistic races. 
 The real catalyst for the transformation from clan to race, or from Hanren to 
Hanzu, came with the introduction of Western ideas of Social Darwinism and the 
Enlightenment drive to “categorize, classify, and measure” the natural world, including 
its human population.37 In 1775 the German medical professor Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach divided humankind into five distinct races—Caucasian, Mongolian, African, 
American, and Malay. Anthropology, which began as a branch of medicine that studied 
human anatomy, soon dedicated itself to collecting human head and body measurements 
to substantiate these racial typologies under the guise of “science.”38 When this racial 
discourse permeated Chinese society in the late nineteenth century it transformed extant 
lineages into racial pedigrees, converting the Qing taxonomy into a system of races 
complete with Western-derived ideas of biological determinism—that is, that physical 
attributes are an outward manifestation of mental or moral character.39 Chinese 
                                                
36 Crossley, Orphan Warriors, 228. 
37 See Kai-wing Chow, “Narrating Nation, Race, and Culture,” 53-56. 
38 For a brief overview of this history see John P. Jackson Jr. and Nadine M. Weidman, Race, Racism, and 
Science (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2004), pp. 1-59. 
39 Although Dikötter demonstrates that stereotypes and prejudices existed in premodern China, here I 
follow those scholars who argue that racial thinking is a derivative of Western science and therefore a 
modern phenomenon. On the modern development of racial thought see Dante A. Puzzo, “Racism and the 
Western Tradition,” Journal of the History of Ideas 25 (1964): 579-586; George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A 
Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea 
in the West (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); George W. Stocking Jr., Race, Culture, and 
Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). For 
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revolutionaries picked up on this new discourse to challenge Qing legitimacy: In order to 
distinguish themselves from Manchus and others of barbarian extraction, revolutionaries 
chose the Yellow Emperor as progenitor of the Han and symbol of the Chinese race.40 
The Han therefore became “Descendents of the Yellow Emperor” who had emerged from 
zhongyuan,41 the “central plain” of the Yellow River valley and origin of Chinese 
civilization. Association with zhongyuan not only allowed the Han to assume royal 
lineage to an ancient homeland, but also enabled appropriation of Confucian culture, a 
tradition now effectively divorced from barbarians like the Manchus.42 
 Whereas culturalism could make the Qing Chinese, racism depicted Manchus as 
foreign usurpers and barbarians who had merely taken on the trappings of Chinese 
culture. Race was thus permanent and immutable—nothing could make Manchus into 
Han. This enabled revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen to turn anti-Qing political sentiments 
into anti-Manchu racism, rallying Han to bring an end to an alien dynasty and its 
attendant “Manchu oppression.”43 But after dissolution of the Qing state in the early 
twentieth century, Han identity remained the core of the Chinese national imaginary.44 
 
                                                                                                                                            
evidence in the Chinese case see and Poo Mu-chou, Enemies of Civilization (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005); 
Peter Zarrow, “Liang Qichao and the Conceptualization of ‘Race’ in Late Qing China,” Bulletin of the 
Institute of Modern History 52 (2006): 113-163. 
40!Shen Songqiao, “The Myth of the Yellow Emperor and the Construction of Chinese Nationhood in the 
Late Qing,” Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan 28 (1997): 1-77. See also!Kai-wing Chow, “Imagining Boundaries 
of Blood” in Frank Dikotter, ed. The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 
41 "# 
42 Kai-wing Chow, “Narrating Nation, Race, and Culture.” Chow discusses at length the relationship 
between evolutionary theory and revolutionary ideals. 
43 de Bary, 321. 
44 For further discussion of the relationship between race, revolution and nation in China, see Peter Zarrow, 
“Liang Qichao and the Conceptualization of ‘Race’ in Late Qing China,” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern 
History, Academia Sinica  51 (2006): 113-163. 
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Uniting the Five Races: $%&'45 
  
 In 1911 the newly inaugurated Republic, now free from Manchu overlords, 
looked outward to face the threat posed by foreign imperialism. Amidst fears of 
extinction in a world of social-Darwinist competition for national survival, Sun Yat-sen, 
leader of the revolution and father of the newly established Republic, lamented the 
vulnerability of the Chinese people, whom he likened to an inchoate mass of “loose 
sand.”46 He warned:  
If we do not earnestly espouse nationalism and weld together our four 
hundred million people into a strong nation, there is danger of China’s 
being lost and our people being destroyed. If we wish to avert this 
catastrophe, we must espouse nationalism and bring this national spirit to 
the salvation of the country.47 
 
 According to Sun, the key to national unity and salvation would be the Han. In his 
words, “If in the past our people have survived despite the fall of the state [to foreign 
conquerors], and not only survived themselves but been able to assimilate these foreign 
conquerors, it is because of the high level of our traditional morality.”48 This traditional 
morality of the Han is capable of “arousing a sense of national solidarity and uniting all 
our people.”49 Just as racialization of Han had mobilized the Chinese against the Qing, so 
nationalization of Han would assist in galvanizing the Chinese people against foreign 
                                                
45 Here I translate zu as race rather than ethnicity, in part to remain consistent with the following quote but 
also to emphasize the focus on lineage and biology as primary traits of a zu at the turn of the century. The 
transition from zu as racial construct to ethnic construct occurred only gradually and the two ideas were 
often conflated.  
46 ()*+ 
47 William Theodore de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 321. 
48 Ibid., 322. 
49 Ibid. 
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imperialism. In his “Three Principles of the People,” Sun asserted that the Chinese are of 
one blood and share biological descent:  
For the most part the four hundred million people of China can be spoken 
of as completely Han Chinese. With common customs and habits, we are 
completely of one race….Compared to other peoples of the world we have 
the greatest population and our civilization is four thousand years old.50  
 
But the equation of Han with the Chinese nation, while serving revolutionary ends, now 
posed a dilemma. Clearly although Sun recognized the existence of non-Han groups 
within China, his ideal nation would consist of Han united by blood and culture. 
Therefore what of the other zu, or lineage groups, created under the Qing dynasty, 
including the Manchus—what is their place in the new Chinese nation? This quandary 
elicited two different responses. On the one hand, Sun suggested that the answer was 
nothing short of forced assimilation: “We must facilitate the dying out of all names of 
individual peoples inhabiting China, i.e., Manchus, Tibetans, etc….we must satisfy the 
demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.”51 While this 
seems to have been Sun’s agenda, in the mean time the persistence of non-Han groups 
and the exigencies of territorial integrity led Sun to begrudgingly advocate wuzu 
gonghe,52 or uniting the five zu into one nation, hence the provisional flag of the Republic 
made up of five equal stripes to represent the Han, Man, Meng, Hui, and Zang 
(respectively the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Uigurs, and Tibetans). China would still be a 
single people, the zhonghua minzu, under a single state, zhonghua minguo, able to fend 
                                                
50 Ibid., 321.  
51 June Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 16. 
52 $%&' 
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off foreign imperialism.53 But identities established in the Qing proved surprisingly 
resilient, as demonstrated in the attempt to realign ethnocentric allegiances to the new 
cosmopolitan state. Revolutionaries thus bequeathed a paradoxical legacy to China’s 
anthropologists—a divisive taxonomy and the ideal of national unity.  
  
Anthropology and Han Identity  
 
 Scholars of nationalism have demonstrated how states mobilize history to produce 
a linear, teleological narrative that Benedict Anderson calls the “biography of the 
nation.”54 Shared participation in this narrative then provides a sense of identity and 
community. In the twentieth century, anthropology became key to defining the Chinese 
and composing this story: while archaeologists focused on China’s heartland to seek out 
the roots of the Chinese people and civilization, ethnologists traveled to the wild and 
remote borders to study non-Han minorities. Elites imposed a legacy of barbarism on 
contemporary minorities, linking them to ethnonyms from ancient histories while Han 
assumed the role of ethnic Chinese, heirs of historic Chinese civilization, and the heart of 
the modern Chinese nation. Thus the anthropological dyad of ethnology and archaeology 
essentially provided the text for China’s national narrative. 
 But Prasenjit Duara and others have urged us to question, rather than reify, these 
national narratives by looking to its disjunctures or counternarratives.55 In that spirit, this 
                                                
53 James Leibold has pointed out that Sun was never fond of the concept of five united races and only 
begrudgingly accepted it as an expedient for maintaining national unity. See “Positioning ‘minzu’ within 
Sun Yat-sen’s Discourse of Minzuzhuyi,” Journal of Asian History, 38.1-2: 163-213. 
54 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 204-6. 
55 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). See also “Bifurcating Linear History: Nation and Histories in China 
and India,” Positions 1.3 (1993): 779-804. 
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study emphasizes discontinuity and change, or “revisions,” in the Han narrative over the 
course of the past century. Throughout the study I intend to show how these revisions, 
often initiated by anthropologists, evolve with social changes and political expediency to 
produce an official narrative promulgated by the state and popularly accepted. 
 The study begins with Li Chi, China’s first doctor of anthropology, whose 
pioneering dissertation combined the methods of social science and history to investigate 
The Formation of the Chinese People. Proceeding from the traditional binary of a 
civilized “We group” versus a barbarian other, Li, like Sun and the revolutionaries, 
defined the former as descendents of the Yellow Emperor who had emerged from the 
Central Plain. Although he acknowledged that pure races no longer exist in China, he 
clearly believed that they once had and so endeavored to trace, through analyses of 
culture and biology, the dissemination of originary Han traits over time and space. Later, 
as his career path led him to pioneer archaeology in China, Li extended his search for 
Han origins by conducting China’s first excavations in the Yellow River valley of the 
Central Plain, the fabled homeland of the Yellow Emperor and cradle of Chinese 
civilization. Beginning in 1928 Li directed the famous excavation of the Shang dynasty 
capital at Anyang, where he unearthed the earliest evidence of Chinese writing, thus 
linking known prehistoric cultures to the historical records of imperial dynasties that span 
millennia—a linear series culminating with the modern Republic. This discovery not only 
legitimized Chiang Kai-shek’s government as the new incarnation of the Chinese polity 
but also satisfied the search for a respectable, modern, and scientifically-derived national 
identity with roots deep in antiquity. 
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 While chapter one covers the advent of Chinese archaeology and its focus on the 
center, chapter two turns to the periphery. In the 1920s, while Li Chi searched for the 
origins of the Han in the Central Plain, ethnology developed as a complementary counter-
discipline that scientifically and systematically studied China’s non-Han other. While the 
celebrated scholar and statesman Cai Yuanpei introduced and then institutionalized the 
discipline of ethnology in China, the field really flourished in the 1930s as World War II 
threatened the nation with disintegration. To combat this, China’s leading field 
ethnologist, Ling Chunsheng, along with other likeminded scholars, increasingly pursued 
studies that would emphasize the historical unity of the peoples and territories of China. 
While the doctrine of wuzu gonghe had earlier laid the groundwork for galvanizing a 
united Chinese nation, during the war of resistance unprecedented narratives of shared 
origins and historical interactions among Han and minorities permeated the Republic’s 
education system and Chiang Kai-shek’s own official biography of the nation as found in 
China’s Destiny. 
 Chapter three examines the gradual post-war demise of Han as a racial construct 
defined by lineage and biology, a prevalent idea among earlier revolutionaries. The 
process is seen clearly in the career of Li Chi who, as a pioneer of physical anthropology 
in China, had attempted to define the Han biologically beginning with his dissertation in 
1923. Following his later foray into archaeology, Li compared the unearthed Shang 
human remains with earlier discoveries of Paleolithic Peking Man and others from the 
Zhoukoudian cave outside Beijing, along with contemporary studies of living Chinese 
and minorities, to determine once and for all the Han somatotype. Although he never 
succeeded, Li’s work invoked the authority of science to credence belief in the Han, 
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reifying what had been a platonic revolutionary ideal by investing it with form and 
substance, thus concretizing a Chinese archetype. Although he never entirely abandoned 
anthropometry as the principal means of classifying China’s peoples, over the course of 
half a century Li’s historiography, much like the greater historiography spanning that 
time period, demonstrated a marked shift from assuming racial purity to asserting racial 
mutability.  
 Chapter four examines the Han narrative in the People’s Republic of China 
following Mao’s revolution in 1949. The communist regime proclaimed ethnic unity and 
equality even as the monumental state-sponsored ethnic identification project multiplied 
China’s ethnic groups by a factor of ten and held the Han aloft as the vanguard of social 
evolution, a paradox that suggests New China ultimately failed to surmount the challenge 
of unity in diversity Sun faced decades earlier. In fact PRC narratives can be considered 
an extension of those from the Republican era, the continuity most clearly evident in the 
work of Fei Xiaotong, China’s preeminent social scientist. In a close analysis of Fei’s 
“snowball” theory, which became state-sanctioned orthodoxy, we find that his ideas 
closely parallel those of Chiang Kai-shek as laid out in China’s Destiny some forty years 
earlier, including his emphasis on common origins for the Chinese people regardless of 
ethnicity, and a shared history of intermarriage and interaction, all of which has united 
the Chinese nation and overcome superficial cultural divisions. This narrative turn, which 
has been steadily developing since Sun’s time, has now culminated in the current official 
PRC narrative as found in the state White Papers. But in comparing the official PRC 
narrative with those generated in contemporary Chinese political communities in Taiwan, 
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Hong Kong and Macao, although all are ostensibly parts of a single China, we find that 
all perceive the Han differently, reflecting their divergent visions of the Chinese nation. 
 The fifth and final chapter attempts to link elite discourse on Han identity, 
including academic and official narratives discussed in previous chapters, with 
contemporary popular conceptions of Han in the various Chinese political communities. 
Looking first to dictionary entries as an indicator of evolving definitions of Han, we see 
that these tend to follow changing elite definitions but provide a more accessible medium 
for the dissemination of ideas. The study concludes with a cursory survey of the meaning 
of Han among residents of the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, with explicit 
comparisons to elite definitions within each region and contrasts among regions. On the 
whole this study, in examining interpretations of Han identity across temporal and spatial 
boundaries, reveals that the concept of Han is still fluid, evolving, and ultimately political. 
Han, like White or Caucasian in the US, indeed represents a social construct, but one with 
the power to convince a vast and variegated population that they belong to a single 
diasporic nation; conversely, deconstructing Han challenges the very foundation of the 
world’s largest community. 
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ARCHAEOLOGY: THE SHANG DYNASTY AS HAN HERITAGE, 1923-1930 
 
 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, as Chinese elites increasingly embraced 
nationalist discourse, many positivist youth turned to modern science as a means of 
composing China’s national biography. Although antiquarianism enjoyed a venerable 
tradition in China stretching back a thousand years to the Song dynasty,56 it was the May 
Fourth Movement in the early twentieth century, with its emphasis on scientific 
empiricism, that wedded an established regard for historical inquiry with new Western-
derived methodologies and a nationalist impetus.57 Li Chi, a member of the May Fourth 
generation, embodied this union of old and new, of native and foreign, which uniquely 
positioned him to pioneer Chinese archaeology,58 a discipline dedicated to the search for 
Han origins. 
 Li Chi was born to a family of means in Hubei province in 1896. Li’s father, an 
educator and servant of the imperial government, insisted that his son receive a proper 
Confucian education, and so employed an uncle who had attained the bureaucratic rank 
of xiucai to instruct the boy in classical literature beginning at the age of four. Later, Li’s 
own father tutored him in poetry and history. Although Li described his early education 
as austere, it clearly laid the groundwork for his later pursuit of China’s ancient past.59 
                                                
56 R. C. Rudolph, “Preliminary Notes on Sung Archaeology,” Journal of Asian Studies 22.2 (1963): 169-77; 
K. C. Chang, “Archaeology and Chinese Historiography,” World Archaeology 13.2 (1981): 156-169. 
57 Xia Nai, “Wusi yundong he Zhongguo jindai kaoguxue de xingqi,” Kaogu 3: 193-196; Li Chi, Anyang 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 40. 
58 Ibid., 32-48. 
59 A brief and early autobiography of Li Chi is reproduced in K.C. Chang, “Li Ji: 1896-1979,” Asian 
Perspectives 23.2 (1980): 317-21. 
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 In 1907 Li Chi’s father moved his family to the imperial capital in Beijing. In 
1911, the year of the Xinhai Revolution, Li became part of the first group selected to 
attend Qinghua Academy, a joint Chinese-American enterprise funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation with its campus located on the grounds of a former imperial garden on the 
outskirts of Beijing.60 After eight years of coursework with the academy’s foreign 
instructors, Li, now proficient in English, received a Boxer Indemnity scholarship for 
college education in the United States. At Clark University and later at Harvard, Li 
demonstrated his precociousness by earning three degrees in five years – a bachelors in 
psychology, a masters in sociology, and at the age of twenty-seven, China’s first 
doctorate in anthropology, which he received in 1923.61 
 In accordance with the American-style “four fields” approach to anthropology, 
during his three years at Harvard, Li studied cultural anthropology with Roland B. Dixon 
(1875-1934), physical anthropology with Ernest A. Hooton (1887-1954), and 
archaeology with Alfred M. Tozzer (1877-1954). Li’s dissertation, titled The Formation 
of the Chinese People, synthesized disciplinary methodologies while drawing on sources 
ranging from Chinese classical texts to biometrical statistics in formulating a 
metanarrative of the Chinese nation that would later become archaeology’s raison 
d’être.62  
                                                
60 ,-./, previously romanized as Tsinghua Academy. A history of this institution is found in Su 
Yunfeng, Cong qing hua xue tang dao qing hua da xue (Taibei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern 
History, 1996). For information on Li Chi’s relationship with Qinghua as both academy and university, see 
Li Guangmo, Li Ji yu Qinghua (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 1994). 
61 Li Guangmo, Li Ji Juan (Shijia: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1996), 2. Because of this, Li has been dubbed 
“modern China’s first anthropologist.” See the postscript in K. C. Chang (Zhang Guangzhi) and Li 
Guangmo, eds., Li Ji kaoguxue lunwen xuanji (Wenwu chubanshe, 1990).   
62 For information on Li’s early life and education see his memoirs: Li Ji, Gan jiu lu (Taibei: Zhuanji 
wenxue chubanshe, 1967), 1-47. 
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 Proceeding from the putative binary of core and periphery derived from 
traditional cosmology and revolutionary rhetoric, in his thesis Li defined the Han (or “We 
group” to use his term) as “the group which the Chinese historians consider as their kind, 
the civilizers.” In contrast, the You group are those the We group refers to as 
“barbarians.” Li defined each in terms of origins: Geographically, the We group “are the 
people who are found in, or whose origin is traceable to, the land called China proper” 
while the You group reside in the periphery.63 Li’s maps then provide graphic illustration 
of China’s heartland, “the Yellow River plain where the early history of China 
developed.”64  
 In addition to according the Han an ancestral home in the cradle of Chinese 
civilization, as a trained ethnologist Li also looked to culture to distinguish Han from 
Other. He described the peripheral peoples as “the horse-riding, kumiss-drinking, flesh-
eating Hsiung-nus; the yak-driving Ch’iangs; the pig-rearing Tungus and the cattle-
stealing Mongols…the tattooing Shan-speaking group, the cremating Tibeto-Burman-
speaking group and the Kanlan-dwelling Mon-Khmer-speaking group,” all in 
contradistinction to the Han, the “the silk-wearing, rice-eating, and city building 
Descendents of the Yellow Emperor.”65 Li’s inclusion of the Yellow Emperor indicates 
acceptance of the racial discourse of revolutionaries, as is his suggestion that the 
“genuine Chinese” possess a monosyllabic surname that represents one’s lineage 
traceable to the original inhabitants of the Central Plains.  
 But Li’s thesis was most important for adding a biological component to the 
definition of Chinese. Kai-wing Chow recently noted that “unlike racial theorists in 
                                                
63 Li Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928), 7. 
64 Li Chi, Anyang, 39. 
65 Li Chi, Formation of the Chinese People, 275. 
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nineteenth-century Europe, Chinese revolutionaries did not always focus on grounding 
racial differences in biology,”66 opting instead to focus on blood lineage. But as the 
pioneer of physical anthropology in China67 Li grafted physical traits onto established 
lineage criteria, utilizing anthropometry to prove that biologically “the Descendents of 
the Yellow Emperor are strongly round-headed,” “decidedly leptorrhinic,” and therefore 
“brachycephalic-leptorrhine,” or broad-headed with a long, narrow nose.68 In a later 
elaboration of Han features Li concluded that the Chinese, as a member of Blumenbach’s 
Mongoloid race, share a physiognomy, namely almond eye, Mongoloid folds, flattish 
forehead, depressed nasal root, broad cheek bone and flat face.69  
 Li’s dissertation became widely available, published by Harvard University Press 
in 1928 with a summary version appearing in Chinese. With this study Li offered new 
scientific backing for a narrative of the Han and the development of the Chinese nation. 
Li’s adviser at Harvard considered it the best dissertation the anthropology department 
had seen in twenty years, and Li himself said it is the only way to study the history of the 
Chinese race.70 Over half a century later staple English language works on the Chinese 
people such as June Dreyer’s well known study China’s Forty Millions71 and Leo 
Moser’s The Chinese Mosaic72 continued to rely on Li’s definition of the Han, but his 
ideas more profoundly influenced his fellow Chinese. Although he would later move 
from pioneer of Chinese anthropology to father of Chinese archaeology, Li still placed 
Han firmly at the center of the Chinese nation both geographically and culturally. 
                                                
66 Kai-wing Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood” in Frank Dikotter, ed. The Construction of Racial 
Identities in China and Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 46, 52. 
67 Gregory Guldin, The Saga of Anthropology in China (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1994), 62. 
68 Li Chi, Formation of the Chinese People, 282. 
69 Li Chi, “Racial History of the Chinese People” Journal of the China Society 6 (1969): 10. 
70 See IHP, yuan 25-10 for comments from both Hooton and Li. 
71 June Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 283 n. 1. 
72 Leo J. Moser, The Chinese Mosaic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 13. 
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The Advent of Chinese Archaeology 
 
 After his dissertation earned him the doctorate, Li immediately returned to China 
to take up a position at Nankai University in Tianjin where he began teaching such 
courses such as Fundamentals of Sociology, Introduction to Anthropology, and History 
of Evolutionary Anthropology.73 In fall of 1923, during his first year as a professor, 
newspapers reported the discovery of a cache of ancient bronze vessels at Xinzheng 
(Hsin-cheng) county in Henan province, alleged birthplace of the Yellow Emperor and 
cradle of Chinese civilization. A number of interested parties eagerly descended on the 
site, among them one Carl Whiting Bishop, Associate Curator of the Freer Gallery of the 
Smithsonian Institution, who was then in China scouting for antiquities and opportunity 
for cooperation with Chinese scientists.74 Upon his arrival, however, Bishop lamented 
that conditions in Xinzheng were “most deplorable, in that no trained investigator was 
present to show how the objects could be removed from their setting without injury to 
themselves and to note down the information brought to light in the course of the digging 
but now, of course, lost forever.”75 After describing the unique and fine workmanship of 
the vessels he noted that although around one hundred were unearthed many had 
disappeared, and the tools of the local militia that had eagerly taken over the dig 
“irretrievably ruined the finest specimens,” reducing them to mere chunks of metal. He 
                                                
73 Guldin cites Chen Yinghuang as the first to teach anthropology courses in China (pp. 25-6), but Li was 
teaching anthropology even earlier. See note 26 below. 
74 Biographical information on Bishop can be found in C. Martin Wilbur, “In Memoriam: Carl Whiting 
Bishop” Far Eastern Quarterly 2, no. 2 (Feb. 1943): 204-7. 
75 Carl Whiting Bishop, “The Bronzes of Hsin-cheng Hsien” The Chinese Social and Political Science 
Review 8.2 (April 1924), 83. 
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went on to say that “even among the larger and more massive pieces the damage done is 
simply unbelievable unless seen. In fact I was told that the diggers deliberately broke up 
numbers of objects in the hope that they might turn out to be of gold.”76 All this led him 
to call for the establishment of “a school of Chinese archaeology, supported by Chinese 
and foreign institutions alike, both for the training of a force of competent field workers 
and for the undertaking of a systematic study of the still remaining traces of man’s former 
existence in this country.”77 
 Coincidentally, at that same time in Beijing, Li Chi had just received funds from 
VK Ting (Ding Wenjiang), a friend and British-trained geologist, to travel to Xinzheng 
and initiate the first native Chinese archaeological excavation.78 Like Bishop, Li was 
disappointed to find that others had already plundered the site of all marketable 
antiquities, but as a physical anthropologist he became interested in the discarded human 
skeletal remains.79 Li’s scientific analysis of these remains and the site in general greatly 
impressed Bishop, who began consulting with Li about the prospects of future 
cooperation.80 Their chance meeting at Xinzheng would culminate in the realization of 
both Li’s dream of developing Chinese archaeology and Bishop’s goal of international 
scientific collaboration. 
 As China’s first anthropologist Li had already attracted the interest of China’s 
elites, largely concentrated in Beijing, including such political and intellectual luminaries 
                                                
76 Ibid., 96. 
77 Ibid., 98-99. 
78 Li Chi, Anyang (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 55. VK Ting was supervisor to Swedish 
geologist JG Andersson when the latter excavated the painted pottery culture at Yangshao, which proved to 
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24 
 
as Hu Shi and Liang Qichao.81 In April 1925, when Qinghua Academy became a 
university, Liang and others invited Li to join them at the university’s newly established 
National Studies Research Institute82 as a specially appointed lecturer in anthropology. 
Due to his training in the “four fields” style of American anthropology Li taught some of 
China’s first courses on physical anthropology, ethnology, and archaeology, thus 
establishing an anthropology curriculum in his homeland.83 In his first archaeology 
lecture Li encouraged the diligent study of Chinese history in order to show the world’s 
academic community just how the Chinese people have contributed to the development 
of humankind. “Speaking archaeologically, all of China is like gold, but no one is 
investigating. If we have people investigating, then Chinese history, which we now 
emphatically claim to be five thousand years old, may yet in the future turn out to be over 
125,000 years old!”84 The exciting potential of this new discipline appealed to many 
Qinghua students including Wu Jinding, who took Li as his principal adviser. Five years 
later Wu would secure his place in the annals of Chinese archaeology with his discovery 
of the Longshan black pottery culture in Shandong province.85 
                                                
81 Li Guangmo, “Li Ji zhuan lüe,” 157. 
82 , predecessor of Qinghua’s current . An alternate translation is “Sinological Studies 
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are found in Su, 335; Li Guangmo, Li Ji juan, 731; and Ge Zhaoguang, Qing hua han xue yan jiu (Beijing: 
Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 1994), 283-284. 
84 Qing hua zhou kan #375 (April 16, 1926). See also Sun Dunheng, ed. Qing hua guo xue yan jiu yuan shi 
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 Meanwhile Carl Whiting Bishop maintained contact and correspondence with Li, 
a relationship culminating with an invitation to join the Smithsonian as a field worker in 
China while allowing Li to retain his teaching position at Qinghua. Ostensibly Bishop’s 
greatest interest lay in furthering both scientific inquiry and mutual cooperation between 
their two nations; Li, however, harbored misgivings about striking a bargain with Bishop. 
For decades, foreign adventurers had absconded from China with a quantity of relics 
which then turned up in Western (and Japanese) museums and private collections, an 
episode the Chinese still consider an imperialist outrage.86 Due to this legacy, “Chinese 
authorities were suspicious of independent foreign scientific expeditions and especially 
objected to exportation from the country of valuable artifacts and specimens unearthed by 
outsiders.”87 To the Chinese these men “were no more than shameless adventurers who 
robbed them of their history,”88 their memories now emblematic of Western domination. 
Li himself complained: “Old China, for centuries a hunting spot for European 
imperialism, was forced to open her door widely for whatever the ‘superior white power’ 
liked to do, including field work in science.”89 Such scientific imperialism spawned 
China’s academic nationalism, with modernizing intellectuals like Li resolutely 
committed to building the Chinese nation by protecting and glorifying its patrimony. 
 With this legacy of imperialist predation Li remained justifiably wary of joining 
forces with foreigners, but China at the time lacked any indigenous sponsorship for 
archaeology and this offer posed a rare opportunity. After preliminary discussion of the 
terms and with encouragement from VK Ting, Li agreed to work for the Freer on two 
                                                
86 See Peter Hopkirk, Foreign Devils on the Silk Road (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980). 
87 Furth, Ting Wen-chiang, 53. 
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89 Li Chi, Anyang, 34. 
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conditions: First, excavation would be under the auspices of a Chinese institution, with 
the Freer providing only funds; and second, that no relics could leave the country. The 
Freer could only expect an English report from Li for which they would hold publication 
rights. To this the two sides amiably agreed, thus inaugurating Sino-American scientific 
collaboration in the field of archaeology.90 
 That winter, in 1925-1926, Qinghua University and the Freer Gallery of Art 
jointly dispatched Li to Shanxi province. There Li discovered and excavated a Neolithic 
Yangshao site, part of the painted pottery culture made famous by J.G. Andersson a few 
years earlier.91 Unlike Li’s initial attempt at field archaeology in Xinzheng, this Xiyincun 
expedition proved a groundbreaking success in every sense of the phrase, and the fruits of 
the joint venture seemed to bode well for continuing the alliance. A preliminary English 
report, authored by Li, appeared in the Smithsonian’s annual publication.92 Qinghua 
University granted Li use of a room to display the unearthed artifacts,93 marking a rather 
modest beginning to his career as museum curator and earning him recognition as the 
“father” of Chinese archaeology.94 His achievement also prompted Liang Qichao to send 
a letter to his son Liang Siyong, then studying archaeology with Alfred V. Kidder at 
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Harvard, advising him to return to study with the fully qualified and now credible Li Chi; 
the younger Liang later followed his father’s advice, and for the next twenty years he and 
Li together pursued China’s ancient past.95  
 Later that same year, in October of 1926, Li Chi and others within China’s 
scientific community convened in Beijing in honor of a visit from the Crown Prince of 
Sweden, then president of the International Association of Archaeology. It was before 
this distinguished audience that the famous discovery of Peking Man was first announced. 
For this historic gathering Liang Qichao, whom Li characterized as an archaeology 
enthusiast, delivered an address entitled “Archaeology in China,” in which he suggested 
“for the present, what we can hope to do is to train experts and improve our tools so that 
when the opportunity comes we can immediately set to work….We hope that in the near 
future all the institutions for higher learning will provide for the special subject of 
archaeology in their curricula and that we will adopt the methods of western scholars,” 
meaning in part transcending the work of traditional antiquarians by employing the 
natural sciences. Liang continued: “With a large country like China, with such a long 
history and such an abundance of hidden treasures as China has, I am sure we are 
destined to play the most important part in the archaeological world.”96 Although for 
most in attendance their thoughts certainly focused on Peking Man, Liang’s prediction 
proved prescient in another way—within a decade Li Chi would travel to Stockholm at 
the invitation of this same Swedish royal, Crown Prince Gustaf VI Adolf, to lecture on 
his archaeological achievements in China.97 
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Academe, State, and Nation 
 
 Scholars have long observed that states appropriate archaeology to serve their 
own, often nationalistic, ends, and Lothar von Falkenhausen and others have shown that 
China offers no exception.98 But some have erroneously suggested that the communist 
regime marked a new era of state involvement in archaeology. Cheng Te-kun suggested 
that 1949 “marks a new era in Chinese archaeology, characterized by full government 
support,”99 and KC Chang concurred that since the establishment of New China 
“archaeology has become a state-directed enterprise, bureaucratically, financially, and 
ideologically.”100 Archaeology in China in fact served state interests from its inception.101 
  Since the dissolution of the Qing dynasty in the preceding decade warlords had 
kept China politically fragmented, but in summer of 1926, the same year as Li’s 
excavation at Xiyincun, Chiang Kai-shek initiated the Northern Campaign, a bid to 
reunify all of China through use of military force. As success of the Northern Campaign 
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grew imminent, the GMD party set about establishing a political framework for 
governing the newly reunited nation. At the 1927 ROC Central Political Meeting Cai 
Yuanpei, a distinguished civil servant under the Qing and Minister of Education under 
the Republic, proposed the establishment of a National Central Research Institute within 
the Executive Yuan, the foremost branch of the Republican government. As part of the 
Executive Yuan, the head of state (then Chairman of the State Council) would personally 
appoint the president of Academia Sinica as he does other members of his cabinet.102 
Chiang Kai-shek selected Cai Yuanpei as first president of Academia Sinica, who in turn 
recruited leaders among China’s intelligentsia to advise the central government in 
formulating national policy. Structurally, Cai divided the Academia Sinica into a number 
of institutes, with each institute further subdivided into sections. Within the Institute of 
History and Philology Cai created an Archaeology Section, headed by Li Chi, thus 
marking the institutionalization of archaeology in China by the state as part of the 
state.103 Li presciently said of this development: “I believe this will prove to be a real 
beginning of serious archaeological work in China.”104 
 Indeed the first national or state-directed excavation occurred soon after. 
Antiquarians had traced “dragon bones”—inscribed tortoise shells and ox scapulae used 
anciently for divination—to the Anyang area of Henan province in the Yellow River 
valley. Fu Sinian, director of the Institute of History and Philology, sent Dong Zuobin, a 
self-educated oracle bone specialist and epigrapher, to Anyang to conduct a preliminary 
                                                
102 China Handbook 1937-45 (Chongqing: Chinese Ministry of Information, 1945), 97.  
103 The Archaeology Section was also known more simply as the third section, the first two being history 
and philology. 
104 IHP, kao 21-2-9. 
30 
 
survey and assess its potential as an excavation site. Upon joining him Li was horrified to 
find that 
 not being a trained archaeologist, he [Dong] worked in a rather haphazard 
manner…there was no planning whatsoever; stratification was not at all observed. 
It is obvious that his digging was in no way different from the curio dealers’ 
except that it was backed up by the government.105 
 
Despite his lack of training, Dong’s recovery of inscribed bones, carved stonework, and 
pottery fragments, along with reports of bronzes in the area, suggested to Li the value of 
the site and he resolved to assume directorship of the dig the following spring, for what 
became the second season of excavation. After his meeting with Dong, Li wrote Bishop 
announcing: “I have just returned from a two week trip to Henan and am now in the 
position to give the best of news that can be given in the field of archaeology in 
China.”106 He went on to relate the discovery of the “Ruin of Yin,” capital of the ancient 
Shang dynasty [circa 1700-1200 BCE], with its royal tombs and now famous bronzes 
used in ritual sacrifice. Although classical histories made reference to Shang kings, Li’s 
excavation, like Schliemann’s discovery of Troy, established the historicity of a 
civilization earlier relegated to myth.107 
 Considering that the finds at Anyang offered the opportunity of a lifetime for an 
aspiring archaeologist, it seems curious that within a year Li resigned as director of the 
excavation. Its scientific and historical importance seem obvious, but soon the political 
significance of Anyang became clear as three museums vied over control of the ancient 
Shang remains. This controversy remains important because it facilitated a revolutionary 
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transition—the modern state’s appropriation of relics for construction of a national 
identity.  
 
Domestic Controversy: Primacy of the Nation 
 
 Although a preliminary survey of Anyang had yielded inscribed bones, stone 
works, pottery fragments, and further reports of bronzes in the area, all of which assured 
Li of the site’s archaeological potential, he confessed that “the only factor that I feel 
uncertain about is the political situation for which I am as unprepared and helpless as 
before an earthquake.”108 At that time much of northern China remained under the control 
of Feng Yuxiang, a local warlord, whose allegiance to Chiang remained dubious. 
Moreover Dong Zuobin and Guo Baojun, who had participated in the initial survey, were 
both locals while Li hailed from Hubei and would be viewed as an outsider. In the 
interest of preventing conflict the Academia Sinica sent official notice to the Henan 
provincial and county authorities, informing them that the excavation was “national 
business” that should not be obstructed.109 Despite these orders word of Anyang’s 
treasures spread quickly, and in October of 1929 He Rizhang,110 head of the provincial 
library and curator of the provincial museum in Kaifeng, brought with him to Anyang 
eighty workers, initiating his own excavation at the same site. Following a confrontation 
of the rival parties, the provincial government issued an order for Li to halt his excavation, 
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stipulating that He Rizhang and the Henan Museum had the sole right to excavate.111 
Worse yet, in an effort to sway public opinion, a provincial newspaper impugned Li’s 
character and motives by accusing him of smuggling relics out of the province, calling 
him both an “evil person” and a “thief.”112  
 Li, astonished to find himself accused of smuggling, retorted: “The fact is, our 
section was established by the central government as part of the National Research 
Institute,”113 and therefore “we are sent by the central government and not working 
secretly.” Li admitted that he had shipped some items to the IHP office in Beijing for 
analysis because the field office lacked proper equipment, but the greater part of the 
relics were sitting in the local school which served as an ad hoc warehouse. He explained 
that he planned to establish a local museum to house the artifacts where they could be 
“publicly presented to the national citizens.”114 Speaking rhetorically, he asked: “If this is 
smuggling, can the tomb raiders of Luoyang be called legitimate? Why does the 
provincial government follow us around instead of investigating them?” He then answers 
his own question, concluding that “the Henan government doesn’t care about thirty years 
of tomb robbing but they also don’t support academic work and our public excavation as 
scientific study.”115 
 The real problem, Li observed, was that “local authorities disregard (look lightly 
on) the central authority,”116 essentially complaining against the enduring parochialism of 
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the warlord era and a general lack of vision of the greater Chinese nation. To his 
superiors Li explained:  
This problem is not limited to Henan; wherever we go we will have this 
problem of dealing with local governments. They will react the same way, 
and there is nowhere we can work. I alone cannot convince them of the 
central government’s intent to promote scholarship and overcome 
parochialism. I cannot stand by and watch a few unscientific people ruin 
the work, so I ask to be relieved of this responsibility.117  
  
 In response to his frustrated threat of resignation, the central government cabled 
encouraging Li to continue work,118 which he agreed to do only on condition that the 
government order the provincial and local authorities to lend support to his archaeology 
section. Li further demanded that the Ministry of Internal Affairs form a National 
Antiquities Protection Committee119 and that he, as head of the archaeology section, be 
given command of seventy-eight soldiers and eighteen officers paid for with government 
funds to protect the site and the artifacts.120 Clearly for Li, the central government should 
serve as the penultimate authority in curating the nation’s relics. 
 The executive branch of the Republic of China, under Chiang Kai-shek’s direct 
authority, issued an official regulation granting Li Chi’s requests.121 After commenting 
that it was “strange” for a provincial or local authority to issue orders to the Academia 
Sinica, an organ of the central government, the document ordered the provincial 
government to stop the unofficial excavation of He Rizhang and to shift support to Li.122 
This power struggle between the state and local institutions suggests that before the 
modern period, without a concept of the nation, there was of course no sense that relics 
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belong to the nation. The novel idea that the state, as an embodiment of the nation’s will, 
could lay claim to relics evidently required new legislation and even military enforcement. 
 
International Controversy: Scientific Imperialism 
 
 Even as Li contended with the province for recognition of state authority he soon 
found himself battling the very benefactor who had helped launch his career. As 
individuals Li Chi and Carl Whiting Bishop were both archaeologists, museum curators 
with similar interests and, in their own words, friends.123 By 1928 they had also worked 
profitably together for three years with little difficulty. But political events of 1928, 
specifically the success of the Northern Campaign and subsequent establishment of the 
Academia Sinica, soon drove a wedge into their partnership. As Li himself succinctly put 
it, “in place of the Qinghua Research Institute, I am now working in the name of the 
National Research Institute.”124 In fact when Li joined the Academia Sinica he became a 
part of the Chinese government, while the Freer, as part of the Smithsonian, was a US 
state institution; Li’s acceptance of both appointments made him simultaneously an 
employee of the Chinese and US governments. Although both institutions purported to 
pursue an objective, immutable, universal and otherwise idealized “science,” to his 
dismay Li soon found himself torn between their irreconcilable agendas. The dispute that 
developed, though borne out between individuals and their respective research 
organizations, came to symbolize the greater contest of nations.  
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 Neither side seemed ignorant of the wider implications of the new union. Bishop 
clearly envisioned himself not only in a scientific role but a political one as well, viewing 
the alliance as a diplomatic opportunity for forging and reinforcing ties between the two 
governments. The prospect of working directly with the Chinese mirror of his own 
institution seemed an extraordinary opportunity. He told Li, “There isn’t much that we 
can do at this end to help establish a cordial modus vivendi with the Chinese Government; 
but that little, we are doing to the best of our ability.”125 He admitted that “official 
relations between the United States and China are of course in the hands of our 
Department of State,” but went on to say: “It has given me particular pleasure, therefore, 
that just at present there should have been appointed to take charge of the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs, a close friend of mine,” one Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck. Bishop then 
suggested that his own work with Li and the Academia Sinica “may prove to lead to 
developments of the highest importance, not merely to the scientific world alone, but to 
the development of improved relations of every sort between China and America.”126  
 Echoing Bishop’s optimism, Li believed that “when scientists agree to cooperate, 
fruitful results seem to be a matter of course.”127 He felt that the “contributions” and 
“service” of foreign scientists is valued by “their close contact with Chinese 
minds…consequently the cumulative effects soon become overwhelming and 
irresistible.”128 In his letters to Bishop Li offered assurances that Academia Sinica 
leadership “realize the importance of cooperating with foreign scientists” and that 
securing permission to work with the Freer was not in question. In describing his meeting 
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with Cai Yuanpei, president of Academia Sinica, Li said: “I had a whole hour with him 
and tried my best to explain and interpret the spirit of the Smithsonian Institution, 
particularly the good will of the Freer Gallery.”129 There was even talk of more extensive 
collaboration between the Academia Sinica and the Smithsonian, in areas such as physics 
and chemistry, because other departments “could also be benefited by the experience of 
the American scientists.”130 For his part Li seemed in every respect supportive of the 
union, at least in his correspondence with Bishop. 
 But a closer reading of Bishop’s correspondence alludes to issues plaguing both 
their interpersonal relationship and that of their respective nations. In one letter he wrote: 
“Your statements in regard to the attitude of the Southern Government toward scientific 
study seem to be well founded, and I hope that some arrangement may be brought about 
whereby we may be able to assist in every way possible.”131 Bishop further affirmed that 
his colleagues in Washington were “actuated by feelings of genuine friendliness and no 
less by the desire to assist in every way to extricate China from the difficulties 
necessarily attendant upon her present effort to achieve the fullest and richest degree of 
cultural growth that she can attain.”132 While his terms seem very agreeable, one could 
interpret Bishop’s inference of China’s need for US “assistance” as arrogant and 
patronizing. Worse, although Bishop intended to extend cooperation beyond academics 
into the political realm, the Chinese seemed to chafe at the idea of the US government 
involving itself in what the Chinese considered, in Li’s words, “national business.”133 
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The Dispute: *+,-  
 
 Fortunately for Li and, as it turns out, unfortunately for Bishop, the dissolution of 
Qinghua University’s National Studies Research Institute in 1928 happened to coincide 
with the founding of the Nanjing government and subsequent establishment of the 
Academia Sinica. Although the Freer continued to provide funds for his excavations, now 
undertaken at Anyang, the two institutions lacked a formal contract, so in autumn of 1929 
Li wrote Bishop to say: “I think that the time is ripe to consider planning of bringing the 
cooperation of the Freer Gallery and the Institute of History and Philology a step further 
and closer,”134 thus inviting Bishop to negotiate terms with the Academia Sinica. 
 A number of drafts then passed between the two sides, but at length both parties 
settled on an agreement that stipulated, among other points, that: The excavation would 
be directed by the Chinese side; that all objects discovered belong to the state; and with 
regard to publications, the Academia Sinica would publish the Chinese version of reports 
while the Freer would publish an English version.135 Both parties readily agreed to the 
terms, but the Academia Sinica offered a two part addendum: First, that the Freer 
publication carry the expression “English version” on its cover. On this Bishop 
dissembled because it would effectively relegate the Freer to a translation service rather 
than joint sponsor of the Anyang excavation. Secondly, the Chinese side insisted that all 
articles authored by members of the Academia Sinica “bear the official titles of the 
authors in the said Institute.”136 Earlier Smithsonian publications had referred to Li as “Dr. 
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Chi Li, of the Freer Gallery of Art Expedition to China”137 and a “Chinese member of the 
Freer Gallery field staff”138—never at any time was Li’s Qinghua University or 
Academia Sinica position mentioned, thus making him appear to be exclusively an 
employee of the Smithsonian Institution. Now, however, the Chinese side insisted that in 
Smithsonian reports Li, both as the director of Anyang and the author of official reports 
on the historic excavation, bear his Academia Sinica title rather than that of the Freer 
Gallery. Li soon found himself caught in the middle of a dispute between the two 
institutions over what seems a trifle, but the question of title—whether he was associated 
with the Freer or the Academia Sinica—prompted each side to claim both Li and the 
Anyang excavation as their own.  
 Like others of his generation, Li Chi believed in a Darwinian competition among 
nations, and a positivist view that science was the key to progress and national salvation. 
He endeavored to strengthen the Chinese nation by establishing the sciences, particularly 
archaeology, under the patronage of the state with Chinese scholars studying Chinese 
artifacts. In trying to negotiate this new contract with the Academia Sinica Li tried to 
explain to Bishop:  
The psychology of the whole situation is somewhat subtle; it needs a great 
deal of sympathy to fully understand it. On the Chinese side, the 
promoters of this organization realize only too clearly how far behind the 
other nations China is at present, in the development of modern science. 
At the same time they are very sensitive, almost excessively, to the 
injuries which the modern nations have done to China in the past two 
hundred years. So it is a sort of ‘inferiority complex’ mixed with acute 
nationalism that makes the Chinese side of the whole situation difficult to 
handle.139 
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Here Li admits that the Chinese side was committed to science but for the express 
purpose of building up the nation. Bishop never did appreciate this drive to nationalize 
the sciences—instead he continued to insist on Freer involvement in Anyang, sending 
$3,000 to initiate work and offering $10,000 per annum to continue the project.140  
 Despite limiting Freer participation to funds Li seemed uneasy. When consulting 
with Fu Sinian, head of the IHP and therefore Li’s immediate superior whom he 
characterized as “my greatest and most helpful ally,”141 Li confessed: “I think it is 
inappropriate for us to rely completely on US funding considering our government’s 
promotion of academics,” deciding instead that “we can only temporarily accept US 
funds.”142 Li never did apprise Bishop of his intention to sever Freer support, and in a 
private letter to Fu he revealed his reasons:  
My own suggestion is that when we cooperate with foreigners, we should 
have our own agenda. They seem polite, but they think themselves more 
experienced than us, so they consider us poor children for whom they are 
doing a favor. They think they are omnipotent…but it makes us feel 
awkwardly inferior. We should try as much as possible to escape their 
influence, otherwise we are like ape-men, walking before them hunched 
over [in obeisance] and patiently awaiting the powers of evolution to make 
us real people. Maybe the next generation (my son) can overturn this 
submission; we must put our hopes in that.143 
 
Li already possessed a motive for quitting the Freer, but until establishment of the 
Academia Sinica he lacked the means. The ensuing contract dispute merely afforded a 
pretext for Li to finally extricate himself from an imperialist (read foreign) agenda and 
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continue his work under the sole auspices of a Chinese organization; Anyang would then 
belong to China.144   
 
Resignation: ./01  
 
 In the 1929 Smithsonian report the Freer Gallery concluded: “Political conditions 
in China have improved steadily during the year, and it may be confidently expected that 
the Freer Gallery’s work in the field may now be carried on without interruption of any 
kind.”145 Of course, the “political conditions” referred to involve the end of the warlord 
era and reassertion of a central political authority over all of China. The Freer Gallery had 
won to its side the Academia Sinica, the intellectual arm of the Chinese government 
much like the Smithsonian of the US, hence the prediction of a bright future. Ironically, 
by the time this message went to press, the joint venture had already deteriorated due in 
great part to this same change in political conditions. 
 On Feb. 22, 1930, Li confessed to Bishop: “I have found myself in a quite 
impossible situation,” and then went on to inform Bishop of his desire to resign. He did 
not elaborate the problem, and in his memoirs fifty years later he says only:  
What concerned me particularly was the failure of the Institute of History 
and Philology and the Freer Gallery of Art to reach an agreement on 
continuing archaeological investigation in north China. When this 
regrettable cessation of the cooperative undertaking happened, my 
position became obviously untenable. So I resigned my Freer Gallery 
job.146 
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 In his response to Li’s resignation Bishop sympathized with a professed “desire to 
make Chinese scholarship appreciated in other countries as it deserves to be.” He then 
acknowledged a general ignorance of China and the Chinese language among Americans, 
further encouraging Li to write an English report to remedy this. It seems that Bishop 
appealed to Li’s desire for recognition of Chinese scholarship in order to secure an 
English report, perhaps fearing Li would generate only a Chinese one now that he no 
longer worked for the Freer. And in fact, although the Smithsonian’s Annual Report had 
for years promised a full report from Li, it never materialized.147 Instead in 1931 the 
Smithsonian projected a detailed report on these excavations from Carl Whiting Bishop. 
 But Li harbored other concerns. Bishop suggested as much when he offered to 
contribute an introduction “making it quite clear that from its inception the work on the 
Anyang site was carried on by Chinese archaeologists,” and that “the Freer Gallery of Art 
was able to contribute financially to the undertaking in no way alters the fact that its 
execution was solely due to the effective work of Chinese scientists.”148 Clearly Li feared 
that the Freer’s association with Anyang would make it seem an American project rather 
than a Chinese one, with Li and other Chinese scholars serving a foreign organization or 
worse, a foreign government. Ultimately Li found Bishop’s arguments entirely 
unpersuasive. 
 In desperation, Bishop began courting Fu Sinian, Li’s superior at the Academia 
Sinica and a reputable historian in his own right, requesting permission to publish an 
English translation of his report. But Li Chi was the archaeologist, director of the 
excavation, and therefore the key player, and without him the Freer had been cut out of 
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the Anyang project altogether. Bishop no doubt had to account for a lack of return on his 
considerable investments of both time and money;149 indeed, according to both Bishop’s 
estimates and a record of field accounts, Li spent nearly $4,000 in US funds during the 
eight months that the Freer was involved with Anyang, and this during the Great 
Depression.150 Following Li’s resignation the candor of Bishop’s correspondence 
changed considerably, his ire manifested in messages filled with demands and thinly 
veiled threats. The climax of the drama played out in two letters, the first issued by 
Bishop and the second a rejoinder from Fu Sinian, presented here as a dialogue.  
 Bishop opened his message accusing Fu of “not wishing it to be known at present 
that the excavation at An-yang was conducted jointly by the Academia Sinica and the 
Freer Gallery of Art,” and again: “I can assure you that I quite sympathize with your 
desire to make the An-yang excavation appear to have been the enterprise of the 
Academia Sinica alone, for reasons connected with politics.”151 These statements, as well 
as his pejorative reference to those involved in the Anyang excavation as “Chinese 
students,” contrast markedly with his earlier declaration that “execution was solely due to 
the effective work of Chinese scientists.” To this Fu responded: “It was never in my mind 
to consider the excavation a joint enterprise,” and therefore he would not hesitate to 
“claim the whole credit and that has nothing to do with political reasons.” Fu then made it 
clear that the excavation “was not undertaken at the initiative of the Freer Gallery of Art, 
whose help was by no means indispensable,” and “if any claim for initiating or 
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conducting the excavation at Anyang [on the part of the Freer] appears in print, I will 
consider it my duty to give out an official denial.”152  
 Bishop’s original letter went on to say: “I think, however, that in justice to the 
Freer Gallery of Art, in view of the relatively large sums expended by it in connection 
with the An-yang excavation, it should have some return for its effort,” more specifically 
an English report from Li. Noting that the Smithsonian publications have a worldwide 
distribution, Bishop then warned: “I can not undertake to prevent the publication of 
reports by the Smithsonian Institution regarding either the field work done on the An-
yang site or the sum of money expended there.” He then recounted all excavation 
expenditures put out by the Freer, explaining that “for all this, the Freer Gallery of Art 
naturally expects some return.”153 Fu, however, defused the threat by retorting: “As to the 
annual report of the Smithsonian, I think it is entirely entitled to give an account of the 
expenditure of its funds. That is not my business. Nor do I want to keep the facts 
secret.”154  
 Despite the acerbic war of words that laid to rest any chance at reconciliation, 
neither Bishop nor the Freer ever publicly acknowledged the breakdown of negotiations. 
After this incident and the discontinuation of the cooperative endeavor, the Freer simply 
issued a statement disclosing that “Dr. Chi Li, ethnologist, who has been associated with 
the field staff in China for several years, resigned his position on June 30, 1930, to take 
up other scientific work in Peiping.”155 The Smithsonian’s only allusion to the incident 
appeared in the Annual Report in a section reserved for updates on Anyang:  
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As in past years, we have steadfastly adhered to our fundamental practice 
of conducting our expedition with due respect for both the dignity of the 
Institution and for the sensibilities of the Chinese, since it is our purpose, 
as long as we stay in the field, to serve our own immediate ends only to 
the extent that in doing so we serve also the ends of future archaeological 
research in China and help to establish an atmosphere of greater mutual 
regard and confidence between native and foreign scientists.156  
 
Beyond this vague sentiment all official histories of the Smithsonian Institution and the 
Freer Gallery have neatly sanitized their failure in China. 
 Reflecting on this incident near the end of his life, Li lamented:  
I had worked, from 1925 to 1930, for five continuous years with the 
understanding described above and in the hope that some agreement might 
be reached between a national institute of China with the Freer Gallery of 
Art of Washington, DC, to promote archaeological science as well as 
Sino-American friendship in academic works. This failure naturally 
disheartened me greatly.157  
 
While it seems clear that Li’s commitment to improving both science and international 
relations was more than simply rhetorical, in his personal correspondence he also made it 
clear that when these goals conflicted with the interests of the Chinese nation, he 
ultimately favored the latter. In July of 1930 the Board of Directors of the Chinese 
Education and Culture Foundation158 (“China Foundation” in Anyang)159 offered Li a 
position for delivering a series of archaeology lectures in China, effectively replacing his 
Freer support with Chinese funds. The resumption of Sino-American archaeological 
collaboration would have to wait half a century for another Harvard-trained Chinese 
scientist, a student of Li Chi who finally, and most delicately, once again orchestrated the 
union of former cold war enemies in the pursuit of China’s ancient history.160  
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Nationalizing Artifacts: Pro Patria 
 
 The turning point in Li’s relationship with Bishop and the Freer occurred when 
Chiang Kai-shek reunified China under his Republican government. A strong, centralized 
and internationally recognized state supported by an army meant a power finally capable 
of assuming the mantle of China’s national heritage. Drafts of the Freer-Academia Sinica 
contract reflect this change, specifying that “all objects…thus discovered shall be at the 
disposal of the National Government of the Republic of China,”161 a novel concept 
promulgated not by politicians but by China’s scholars. Bishop had tried on several 
occasions to curb Li’s fears of foreign predation (and probably the fears of the Academia 
Sinica leadership) in saying: “I hope you will emphasize in all your conversations that 
our object is not the acquisition of specimens but the prosecution of research.”162 Yet in 
the years following, in the Smithsonian’s Annual Report, the Freer Gallery of Art listed 
each year’s additions to the Chinese collection, including historical relics such as 
paintings, pottery, porcelain, jade and silver objects, and even bronzes, the very emblems 
of power and political authority traditionally the accoutrement of Chinese royalty. Bishop 
may not have fully comprehended their symbolic capital, but their significance was not 
lost on Li or the Chinese government.163 This indiscretion coupled with those of He 
Rizhang and the Henan provincial museum prompted Li to join other concerned scholars 
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in petitioning the central government for legislation on excavation rights and artifact 
preservation.164  
 Their lobbying bore fruit on June 7, 1930, just days before Li’s resignation from 
the Freer went into effect, when the government officially promulgated an Antiquities 
Protection Law, the first of its kind in China.165 As with the US Antiquities Act passed 
twenty-four years earlier, haphazard digging and purposeful commercial looting 
prompted professional archaeologists and others to sponsor some legal means of 
safeguarding historic sites and objects. In 1906 President Theodore Roosevelt signed the 
first US law for the preservation of archaeological resources, establishing both a permit 
process for excavation by trained archaeologists and punishments for infringement.166 
Likewise the Chinese law also criminalized unauthorized independent excavation but 
went further: Article 7 allowed for state appropriation of all cultural relics within its 
borders, whether buried or unearthed, thereafter designated “national treasures”;167 
Article 2 stipulated that the aforementioned National Antiquities Protection Committee, 
promulgated by and including Li Chi as a member, “was charged to preserve, research, 
and excavate all the ancient objects of the nation and was put directly under the 
Executive Yuan”;168 Article 6 forbade selling relics to foreigners (whether inside or 
outside of China); and Article 13 specified that antiquities could not pass beyond the 
national borders.169 In essence, with this law the excavation, preservation, and exhibition 
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of artifacts became a national project under the sole auspices of the Chinese state, which 
had delegated this power to a handful of trained specialists. For Li this development 
proved that “scientific archaeology not only promotes verifiable knowledge, but also 
provides an assured means to find buried treasures and give them legal protection.”170 
 This original law served as a precedent for the current cultural relics laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, characterized as “among the most stringent and repressive in 
the world.”171 Today, the State Bureau of Cultural Relics ensures that China’s museums 
“acquire huge holdings of far more relics than can ever be displayed, or even 
catalogued….Many of the lesser museums are themselves more in the nature of 
warehouses than scientific institutions.”172 But if we consider the history of Western 
imperialism that served as the impetus for this law, what appears to be an 
overprotectionist “hoarding mentality” of the Chinese simply becomes a zealous 
expression of cultural pride and anti-imperialism. 
 After passage of the National Antiquities Protection Law the state naturally 
granted the first official certificate for excavation to the law’s patron, Li Chi and the 
Academia Sinica.173 In a very literal sense, Li became official curator of these national 
treasures, a position that consumed the remainder of his life. He turned down job offers 
abroad to remain in China, working at a Chinese institution with fellow Chinese scholars 
studying Chinese artifacts.174  
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 On July 7, 1937, shortly after the fifteenth season of the Anyang excavation, 
Japan invaded China initiating WWII in the Pacific theater. Li’s institute moved inland 
from Nanjing in the eastern seaboard and throughout the war relocated a number of times, 
and each time Li supervised the safety of the Archaeology Section and the Anyang 
relics.175 Li himself admitted that during the war, “in the course of moving these national 
treasures…there were overwhelming difficulties to overcome and inevitable losses 
suffered due to chaotic wartime conditions.”176 His protégé, Liang Siyong, was struck 
with tuberculosis which eventually led to his death. Reflecting on this difficult time Li 
later wrote: “Although like Liang, I also suffered some personal misfortunes in both 
Kunming and Li-chuang, I could still keep on working when there was time.”177 He never 
elaborated on these personal misfortunes, but it was in the spartan living conditions of the 
rugged and remote southwest that Dr. and Mrs. Li lost their two daughters.178 While in 
the thick of these trials he confessed that the war was wearing his spirit down, yet Li 
never abandoned his position as academic leader and curator of the nation’s antiquities, 
exhibiting a genuine devotion both to his nation and its heritage.179  
 On July 7, 1937, shortly after the fifteenth season at Anyang, Japan invaded China, 
thus initiating WWII in the Pacific theater. Li’s institute moved inland from Nanjing and 
throughout the war relocated a number of times, and each time Li supervised the safety of 
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the Archaeology Section and the Anyang relics.180 Li himself admitted that during the 
war, “in the course of moving these national treasures…there were overwhelming 
difficulties to overcome and inevitable losses suffered due to chaotic wartime 
conditions.”181 His protégé, Liang Siyong, was struck with tuberculosis which eventually 
led to his death. Reflecting on this difficult time Li later wrote: “Although like Liang, I 
also suffered some personal misfortunes in both Kunming and Li-chuang, I could still 
keep on working when there was time.”182 He never elaborated on these personal 
misfortunes, but it was in the spartan living conditions of rugged and remote Yunnan that 
Dr. and Mrs. Li lost their two daughters.183 While in the thick of these trials he confessed 
that the war was wearing his spirit down,184 yet Li never abandoned his position as 
academic leader and curator of the nation’s antiquities, exhibiting a genuine devotion 
both to his nation and its heritage. 
 War’s end brought only brief respite for Li and the Anyang treasures, and soon 
the rivalry between Chiang’s Nationalist government and the communists erupted into 
full blown civil war. The conflict became a rout, and when Chiang’s government began 
the retreat to Taiwan in 1948 Li assisted in the transfer of some 3,000 crates of national 
relics across the strait, even personally supervising the shipment of Anyang artifacts.185 
Due to the cold war that followed, Li never had opportunity to return to the mainland and 
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so never did again excavate at Anyang. Instead he characteristically devoted the rest of 
his life to studying the relics, publishing, and teaching at Chinese institutions.  
 
Constructing Museums and Memory: The Shang Dynasty as National Heritage 
 
 Each party contending for some stake in Anyang perceived the value of the Shang 
relics differently. He Rizhang viewed Shang civilization as part of Henan history and 
consequently claimed Shang remains as provincial property, initially refusing the central 
government or the nation any rights to Anyang and her treasures.186 After the retreat of 
the Nationalist government to Taiwan, the communist PRC regime had access to the 
Anyang site and conducted its own excavations using Shang remains to substantiate 
Marxist theory.187 Likewise the Freer Gallery served not as a repository of national relics 
but international relics—Li considered the Freer’s collection of Asian art and antiquities 
a symbol of US global domination and imperialism akin to mummies in the Louvre or 
Elgin Marbles in the British Museum. While Bishop and the Freer staff saw Anyang as an 
international endeavor, the Chinese clearly viewed Anyang as a national affair. Unlike 
imperialist museums, in nationalist museums artifacts assist the state in disseminating to 
citizens what Benedict Anderson calls an official “biography of the nation.”188 While Li 
Chi’s prolific reports on Anyang certainly constitute part of this biography, Li tended to 
write in Chinese for an erudite Chinese audience. Museums, however, “often have many 
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more normative effects on their visitors than all of the great books that go unread by the 
same people.”189 For Li, the museum became a means of popularizing the national 
narrative, thus instilling national consciousness in his compatriots in a way that erudite 
scholarship could not.190 As a matter of course, then, after unearthing a vast trove of 
ancient treasures the museum became Li’s means of safeguarding the patrimony and 
serving the nation. 
 In fact Li was well equipped to pioneer museology in China. Just months before 
the commencement of digging at Anyang Li visited the Smithsonian, the British Museum, 
the Louvre, the Indian Museum, and many other museums across Europe and the Middle 
East to analyze their exhibits.191 Following the first season of excavation he accepted an 
appointment to help create a History Museum,192 and later the central government 
commissioned him to establish a National Central Museum much like the Smithsonian in 
the US.193 Initially Li was designated head of the museum’s Humanity Section194 (the 
other two sections being Nature and Handicrafts) while Fu Sinian chaired the preparatory 
committee, but in July of 1934 Li took over as museum chairman. It had a great hall built 
in Nanjing, China’s new capital, to house the Anyang finds and commemorate the Shang 
dynasty as heritage of the modern Chinese nation.195 
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 It has been noted that museums serve as mnemonic media—a means of forging 
and reinforcing collective memory and of standardizing identity through shared social 
experience.196 As sites of ritualized reflection and public instruction, museums promote 
collective imagination and facilitate modern mass mobilization.197 Unlike earlier private 
or imperial collections, or even China’s “semi-private” first museum with its select group 
of patrons,198 the Nationalist government’s national museums were to transform imperial 
subjects into national citizens.199 Li played a key part in this “museumification” of 
China,200 explaining that now “all finds are to be used publicly for citizens.”201 In the 
book Museum, written for the Ministry of Education, Li reiterated that museum 
exhibitions are made for “educating the masses” and the “common people,”202 further 
underscoring this philosophy by providing strategies for attracting patrons. He suggested 
that exhibits be easily understood by all, with special allowances made for targeting 
children and youth. He also showed a shrewd awareness of the political power of 
museums when he explained that “the greatest purpose of a museum is to supplement 
education,” and “education is a step in establishing administration.”203  
 Although most articles unearthed by Li and his team at Anyang sit today in the 
IHP History Museum, Shang objects are found in museums the world over where 
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displays assume ethnic and cultural continuity from the Shang dynasty to the present, 
making the Shang people the biological and cultural ancestors of modern Chinese. This 
idea derives directly from Li Chi, who half a century ago insisted that “Chinese 
civilization [i]s represented by these remains.”204 According to Li, the Shang introduced a 
novel architectural technique utilizing pisé, or stamped earth, “a method that is still 
extensively employed in all parts of China.”205 One bronze item “is undoubtedly the 
forerunner of the frying pan used by every Chinese housewife.”206 Through Li’s work, 
Shang remains became emblems of Chinese civilization—Shang society was not simply 
part of the Bronze Age in China, it was the Bronze Age of China, the earliest dynasty in a 
linear progression to the modern nation and the shared heritage of every Chinese person. 
For this reason it became imperative that the Chinese state, rather than the Freer or any 
other entity, secure and retain authority to interpret the finds, to rewrite Chinese history, 
and to appropriate Shang civilization in order to incorporate it into the evolving narrative 
of the Chinese nation. 
 
Defining Chinese 
 
  
 But Li Chi and his peers of the May Fourth generation adopted a very narrow, 
exclusive definition of “Chinese” forged earlier by Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries; 
for them, Chinese simply meant Han. As mentioned earlier, anthropology in China grew 
out of the established dichotomy of Han and barbarian—just as Cai Yuanpei oriented 
ethnology toward China’s internal others, advocating travel to the feral and remote 
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borderlands to study non-Han minorities (a narrative taken up in the chapter following), 
Li and archaeologists focused on China’s heartland in the Central Plains to seek out the 
roots of the Chinese “race” and civilization. His success at Anyang and his indomitable 
search for Han origins set the future course of archaeology and subsequent views of 
China’s past.207 In training an entire generation of archaeologists including future leaders 
like Xia Nai, Guo Baojun, and KC Chang, he ensured that his vision of China would not 
fade quickly.  
 Whereas revolutionaries had earlier coupled literate civilization with the Han, the 
new science of archaeology enabled the search for continuity to move beyond textual 
histories into material remains. Therefore when Li and the state appropriated and 
mobilized vestiges of the Shang for a national narrative it was to compose the biography 
of the Han; contemporary minorities could only claim connections to the barbarians who 
surrounded Shang civilization. It is no coincidence that Anyang lies in the valley of the 
Yellow River—just as the Central Plains represented the geographical heart of China, so 
Han remained the human focus of Li’s work. His excavation at Anyang not only 
established the Shang as Han progenitors, it also allowed elites to push Han origins 
backward into prehistoric times, to the Yangshao and Longshan civilizations208 and even 
to Peking Man, a development discussed in detail in chapter three.209 This discrete, linear 
descent group constituted what Li called the “Chinese race,” beginning with native 
hominids that evolved in the Central Plains to become China’s great civilization. The 
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advent of archaeology thus replaced the popular but questionable belief in a Yellow 
Emperor as Han progenitor with more scientifically plausible, but no less nationalistic, 
origins. 
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ETHNOLOGY: FRONTIER STUDIES AND CHINA’S OTHER, 1926-1945 
 
 While Chinese archaeologists trace the origins of their trade as far back as the 
antiquarian tradition of the Song dynasty, Chinese ethnology supposedly began even 
earlier, with the classical textual tradition. This literature furnished accounts (some 
fanciful) of peoples outside the Central Plain, taking especial care to describe their 
eccentric, and sometimes outrageous, barbarian customs.210 Ethnologists today still 
recognize the Shanhaijing, or Classic of Mountains and Seas,211 as “the oldest volume on 
ethno-geography of the ancient Celestial Empire” and a prototypical account of peoples 
beyond the reach of civilization.212 Although the authors and precise date of the text 
remain uncertain, this work and others like it served as proto-ethnographies, perpetuating 
the idea of a civilized core and barbarian periphery.  
 In the twentieth century, while archaeologists like Li Chi focused on the roots of 
Han civilization in the Central Plain, ethnologists traversed the frontier to study China’s 
contemporary Other. It has been noted that the imperial court had earlier sponsored 
ethnographic and cartographic surveys of the frontier as a means of facilitating 
administration. The state’s purpose in gathering such information about the border lands 
and peoples was “precisely and unabashedly to learn about, or rather construct, the 
identity of those to be ruled. Such knowledge simplifies the task of governance.”213 
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Despite the dissolution of the civil service examinations and even the imperial system 
itself, the twentieth century saw a new breed of literati who enjoyed state sponsorship but, 
unlike their predecessors, came armed with scientific methodology, Western 
epistemological links, and a nationalist agenda. 
 
Cai Yuanpei: Politics and Ethnology 
 
 Cai Yuanpei has been called the Gottfried W. Leibnitz of China—a gifted 
polymath of broad education and interests who pioneered multiple disciplines even as he 
guided state policy.214 With this combination of education and political authority, Cai 
certainly epitomizes the ideal Confucian scholar. A prodigy of China’s classical 
education system, he climbed the ranks of the imperial civil service by passing the county 
level examination at age seventeen, the provincial examination at twenty-three, and the 
highest degree, the jinshi, at the extraordinarily young age of twenty-six.215 He then 
acceded to the prestigious Hanlin Academy, a select group of China’s foremost literati 
who oversaw the examination system and served as an advisory council to the court.216 
Ironically, despite his coveted position within the imperial bureaucracy, within a few 
years Cai would become an anti-Qing radical and revolutionary. 
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 The turn occurred in 1898, when certain of his fellow literati, led by Kang 
Youwei and Liang Qichao, prevailed on the young Guangxu emperor to enact what 
became the Hundred Days Reform, a plan to modernize China by adopting a constitution 
and other political changes. When the Dowager Empress and her clique staged a coup 
d'état, nipping any hope at reform in the bud, she brought to a head gathering tensions 
between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the nation, a dilemma that recurs throughout 
this chapter: while the state was increasingly viewed as an alien dynasty bereft of any 
mandate, the nation, thanks largely to Sun Yat-sen, centered on an imagined Han identity. 
The abortive Hundred Days Reform pushed Cai from the reformist camp into that of the 
revolutionaries. Had Cai viewed the Qing as representing the nation it is unlikely that he 
would have turned on the regime, but only in betraying the state could he remain loyal to 
the nation.  
 Although he too had originally supported the reformers, by 1894 Sun had already 
grown dissatisfied with the Qing and all reform efforts and had formed a secret society 
based in Hawaii known as the Xingzhonghui, or Revive China Society,217 whose 
members took an oath to “expel the foreigners, revive China, and establish a government 
that unifies the people.”218 Sun’s organization is considered the first modern 
revolutionary society in China, but others soon appeared. In 1903 Huang Xing 
established the Huaxinghui,219 also committed to overturning the Qing and restoring 
China, and in November of 1904 Cai Yuanpei established his Guangfuhui, or 
“Restoration Society,” yet another clandestine organization dedicated to overthrowing the 
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Manchu dynasty and re-establishing Han rule but based in Shanghai.220 In an effort to 
unite all these disparate revolutionary groups, the following year in Tokyo Sun Yat-sen 
founded the broad-based Tongmenghui, or Revolutionary Alliance,221 and appointed Cai 
director of the Alliance’s Shanghai branch.222 Already a well-known scholar and 
bureaucrat, Cai now became an early and high profile revolutionary allied with Sun Yat-
sen. 
 That same year, in 1905, the court discontinued the civil service examinations as 
part of its belated reformation policy and the following year arranged to sponsor scholars 
on a mission to study abroad. Having learned German for years, Cai, at the age of forty, 
embarked on a four year stint in Germany pursuing a broad, interdisciplinary Western 
education initially in Berlin and later at the Universität Leipzig. It was at the latter 
campus that Cai first encountered an ethnology museum and attended lectures on the 
discipline, even becoming acquainted with the German ethnologist T.W. Danzel.223 This 
was Cai’s first encounter with the field he would later pioneer and institutionalize in 
China. 
 When Cai received word of the Xinhai Revolution, he immediately left Germany 
and returned to China, arriving November of 1911 to find both the dynasty and the 
imperial system at an end and the Hanlin Academy closed after twelve hundred years in 
operation. But Cai’s talents and connections did not leave him long unemployed—as a 
founding member of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party and with demonstrated interest and 
experience in education, Sun, as provisional President of the Republic of China, 
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appointed Cai as first Minister of Education. As Minister, Cai revolutionized China’s 
education system, shifting the curriculum away from the Confucian classics toward more 
modern and Western-derived disciplines, most notably the natural and social sciences. 
Within weeks of Sun’s accession, however, the Qing general Yuan Shikai assumed the 
presidency. Once again feeling that the government had failed the nation, Cai soon 
resigned his position and returned to Europe to continue his mission to strengthen the 
nation through modern education.  
 In both France and Germany Cai had an opportunity to engage in broad study of a 
number of subjects, including ethnology.224 Four years later, following Yuan’s death in 
1916, Cai returned to China to accept an appointment as Chancellor of Peking University. 
In this capacity he shifted the university focus from its historical role of training 
government officials to promoting independent modern scholarship. As part of this new 
policy he reshuffled faculty and recruited to his institution those who would become stars 
in the New Culture Movement, including Hu Shi and future CCP founder Chen Duxiu. 
As part of his policy advocating apolitical intellectual freedom, during the infamous May 
Fourth episode he supported students (including protest leader Fu Sinian) in their strike 
against the government and made the school an open forum for debate and political 
change.225 What is less generally known but pertinent here is that while serving as 
Chancellor, Cai also began teaching China’s first ethnology courses while using 
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ethnological theories and materials in his lectures on the fine arts, thus working ethnology 
into Peking University’s curriculum.226  
 Just days after the protests Cai decided to resign his position as Chancellor due to, 
in his words, a lack of political freedom;227 Cai was in fact incensed at the forced closure 
of campus and unjustified arrest of students. Soon afterward the government sent him to 
America and Europe to survey higher education in the West and then, in 1924, when Cai 
took up residence in Europe for a third and final time, the Ministry of Education 
dispatched him to attend an ethnology conference on Native Americans. According to his 
memoirs, this experience deepened his interest in ethnology and prompted him to pursue 
research in that field.228 At this conference he again met Professor Danzel, who 
convinced Cai join him at the University of Hamburg where Cai devoted an entire year 
exclusively to the study of ethnology. In his memoirs Cai suggests that this marks a 
turning point in his intellectual life, explaining that in his forties he specialized in the 
study of aesthetics and fine arts while in his fifties he turned to ethnology.229 In 1926, 
shortly after returning to China, Cai published “A Discussion of Ethnology,” China’s first 
treatise on the subject.230 
 In this important article Cai systematically introduced the discipline, providing a 
historical overview of its development in both Chinese tradition and in Western social 
science and explicating its relationship to other fields such as raceology, archaeology, 
geography, history, sociology, psychology, etc. He defined and etymologized key 
                                                
226 He, 5. 
227 Cai, Jiemin zishu, 167. 
228 Cai, Jiemin zishu 64-65. See also Cai Yuanpei, “Minzuxueshang zhi jinhuaguan” in Cai Yuanpei xueshu 
wenhua suibi (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1996), 87. 
229 Cai, Jiemin zishu 11-12. 
230 Cai Yuanpei, “Shuo Minzuxue” Yiban 1, no. 4 (1926).  
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Western terms and his translations now constitute the language of Chinese ethnology.231 
He even suggested uniting ethnology and archaeology, suggesting that the methods of the 
two could complement one another, thus broaching the field of ethnoarchaeology.232 
According to Cai: “The materials acquired through archaeology are all concrete; for 
instance, the bones of man and beast as well as other types of objects. Only in using the 
information acquired through ethnology to confirm [archaeological findings] can we 
understand the precise usage [of these objects]. Through this [comparative method] we 
can understand both the ancestors of modern civilization, and also contemporary 
barbarians.”233 In other words, because minorities and Han ancestors share a material 
culture, ethnological analysis of modern barbarians helps us understand the primitive 
ancestors of the Han. Thus, for Cai, Han represented the vanguard of social evolution. 
 While Cai did not engage in fieldwork himself, he fervently advocated “on-the-
spot investigation,” a novel concept largely derived from Western scientific empiricism. 
Although in his recitation of Chinese historiography Cai cited the Shanhaijing as China’s 
ethnographic prototype, he explained that none of China’s venerable texts constitutes 
what one would consider a “scientific record.” Instead, he emphasized the need to 
transcend traditional reliance on text by using one’s own senses to understand different 
                                                
231 By this time a number of terms were in use, including renleixue, renzhongxue, and minzuxue, and 
although Cai’s article distinguished between them, his training in Germany led him to favor ethnology or 
minzuxue. Historically the term anthropology, or renleixue, has been more prominent in the south, 
including Zhongshan and Xiamen Universities and in Taiwan, while ethnology remains favored in northern 
institutions. Recently, however, CASS Institute of Ethnology added the term anthropology to its title, 
making it the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. Although Cai differentiated “ethnography” 
789#$: from “ethnology” ;<9#$:, these terms are seldom used today; instead they are 
simply rendered 7%pand 7%.. 
232 The term and field of 7%qI. would develop later. For an introduction to the ethnoarchaeology in 
China see Rong Guanqiong and Qiao Xiaoqin, Minzukaoguxue chulun (Nanning: Guangxi chubanshe, 
1992). 
233 I translate Cai’s rs0 as simply “barbarians”; some alteration of Cai’s original punctuation was 
necessary to make the English version of this passage more natural.  
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races and cultures.234 He explained that facts come from actual observance, a principle 
that differentiates present studies from those previous.235 In “A Discussion of 
Ethnology,” Cai noted that ethnologists utilize personal connections to “deeply penetrate 
natural ethnic tribes, experience extremely bitter travels, risk great dangers and, following 
this, often sacrifice even one’s life to achieve the worthy goal of obtaining a detailed and 
true report.”236 In recording ethnographic fieldwork he advocated the use of interpreters 
and cameras as well as specialized training, since “without studying their languages, 
knowing their customs, or having intimate contact, there is no spying out the real 
situation.”237 
 But as Cai himself pointed out, modern ethnology differs from classical literary 
accounts of the Other in both method and purpose. According to Cai, ethnographies not 
only possess intellectual value, but practical value as well—as one biographer put it, Cai 
believed that ethnology can perform “many useful political functions.”238 Indeed, in his 
seminal article, Cai noted that “relying on government funds, [ethnologists] establish 
exploratory parties and conduct large-scale purchases and explorations.”239 Despite his 
sincere and admittedly influential pursuit of an ideal academe divorced from politics, 
when Cai institutionalized ethnology two years after the publication of his article, 
economic realities ensured that it became a state endeavor. Even so, there was not always 
agreement about how to best serve the national interest. 
                                                
234 He Liankui, ed., Cai Yuanpei minzuxue lunzhu (Taibei: Taiwan zhonghua shuju, 1967), introduction 17. 
235 Ibid., 3. 
236 From Cai Yuanpei, “Shuo minzuxue” as reprinted in He, 3-4. 
237 Ibid., 4. Cai used the term t which I render as “spy.” 
238 He, pg. 17 of the introduction. 
239 Ibid., 4. 
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Having observed exhibits of the material culture of colonized peoples in European 
museums and listened to lectures on the cultures of colonial African tribes, Cai 
purposefully set ethnology to the task of studying and defining the accessible Other—the 
non-Han minorities of China’s frontier. Although by the time Cai penned this article 
ethnology had become externally oriented and largely associated with the colonies of 
Western powers, he noted that in Europe ethnology had originally served to study each 
nation’s own peoples—those ethnic groups within the state borders. This was certainly 
true of ethnology in the United States, with its early focus on minorities of the homeland. 
The Bureau of American Ethnology, under the aegis of the Smithsonian Institution, 
included several ethnologists and an archaeologist who took as their primary subject the 
study of Native Americans.240 Similarly, Cai set Chinese ethnology to the task of 
studying China’s non-Han minorities concentrated in the national periphery. Although 
Cai advocated the independence of academics from politics, even playing a significant 
role in revolutionizing China’s education system, national education necessarily 
depended on state funding. in Hostetler’s Machiavellian terms, to construct their 
identities for the purpose of administration. 
 Scholars today consider Cai the father of Chinese ethnology due in part to his 
pioneering article but, more importantly, because he personally institutionalized the 
discipline in China.241 In October 1927 Chiang Kaishek appointed Cai head of the 
Academic Yuan242 which, following the French model, would serve as the highest organ 
                                                
240 See the front matter in the early Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. 
241 Cai wrote further on the subject of ethnology in “Shehuixue yu minzuxue” 1930, and “Minzuxueshang 
zhi jinhuaguan” 1934. See reprints in Cai, Cai Yuanpei xueshu wenhua suibi, 1996. 
242 ].A 
65 
 
of education policy in the state.243 According to Cai’s vision, the Academic Yuan would 
encompass two sections: a National Central Research Institute, or Academia Sinica, to 
oversee research; and a National Central University to preside over all universities, with 
university presidents in turn directing education policy in their district. Thus primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education as well as research would all come under the aegis of 
the central government. But when the government re-established a Ministry of Education 
and appointed a new Education Minister the following year, the Ministry assumed 
responsibility for all teaching institutions including the National Central University.244 
Cai’s short-lived Academic Yuan quickly dissolved, but the Academia Sinica, as a 
special bureau under the Central Government’s Executive Yuan, remained in place to 
guide research and advise on matters of state policy.245  
 As mentioned in chapter one, Cai recruited to the Academia Sinica trained 
pioneers in the sciences like Li Chi, scholars who represented their respective discipline 
and presided over its development in China. Earlier Cai had intended to establish an 
Ethnology Institute complete with museum, but lack of trained personnel and funds 
forced him to scale back his plans. Instead, within the Academia Sinica’s Social Science 
Institute, he created an Ethnology Section246 and served concurrently as both president of 
                                                
243 Although relations between Chiang and Cai would later deteriorate, in 1927 Cai was not only the dean 
of academics under the Guomindang but in December he presided over Chiang’s wedding to Song Meiling, 
an indication of their amiable relationship at that time. Recounted in Jonathan Spence, The Search for 
Modern China (New York: WW Norton, 1990), 362. 
244 As the name implies, the National Central University >T"U]. served as the state’s foremost or 
model university until 1949, when the new communist government renamed it Nanjing University. The 
history of Nanjing University is exceedingly complex, with the school itself tracing its origins back to AD 
258. Here I focus only on its incarnation as the National Central University. 
245 Cai, Jiemin zishu, 177-178. 
246 Within the Social Science Institute uDv.?@w Cai created four sections: Law, Economics, 
Sociology, and Ethnology, all numbered in that order so that the Ethnology Section 7%x was also called 
the Fourth Section (much like within IHP the Third Section was the Archaeology Section). See Cai p. 157 
for a description of the original Social Science Institute. 
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the Academia Sinica and director of the Ethnology Section.247 Although in the following 
year he relinquished the latter position, he continued to preside over the development of 
ethnology by recruiting researchers and sponsoring fieldwork.248 
  
Academia Sinica in the Field 
 
 This fieldwork began even before the formal founding of the Academia Sinica. In 
summer of 1928 Fu Sinian, then head of the preparatory office of the Institute of History 
and Philology of the Academic Yuan (later the Academia Sinica), ordered an expedition 
to western Sichuan, then known as Chuankang,249 to explore this remote frontier and 
gather data on the natives. The team was to be led by Wang Yuanhui and Li Guangming, 
both originally from Sichuan province.250 Wang had recently graduated from the 
Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy251 where he served as a propaganda officer, 
while Li, as a Muslim, had been rejected by the Academy and so had just graduated from 
Zhongshan University instead. Whampoa, the Soviet-style Military Academy run by 
Chiang Kai-shek since his appointment by Sun Yat-sen in 1924, served as a training 
ground for officers in the Guomindang army. In the course of their instruction, which 
included heavy doses of political indoctrination, these cadets became fiercely loyal to 
                                                
247 He Liankui, 16-17. 
248 An overview of this is found in Gregory Guldin, The Saga of Anthropology in China (Armonk: ME 
Sharpe, 1994), 32. 
249 yz, abbreviation of Sichuan and Kangding. 
250 Until recently this seminal expedition was ignored by scholars, most astonishingly in Gregory Guldin’s 
Saga of Anthropology in China, which makes no mention of it whatsoever. However, in recent years, Wang 
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published until 2004 as Li Guangming and Wang Yuanhui, Chuanxi minsu diaocha jilu 1929 (Taibei: 
Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology, 2004). For a discussion of its significance, see Wang 
Ming-ke, “Wasi tusi de zuyuan: Yige dui lishi, shenhua yu xiangye chuanshuo de bianyuan yanjiu,” Lishi 
renleixue xuekan 2.1 (1994). 
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their commandant.252 Graduates became Chiang’s elite force in his subsequent struggles 
with warlords and communists, working to assert his power over all China—even, 
apparently, in the hinterland.  
 Although they labeled their mission a “folklore investigation,” Li’s formal 
research proposal made it clear that the principal object of study was not the Han but 
minorities.253 They intended to use Chengdu as a base as they ventured into the 
surrounding mountains to study the ManYi, a general term for barbarians adopted from 
Sima Qian’s Records of the Grand Historian.254 At one point Li even mentioned the 
value of recording the difficult life of the “common people” as they traveled, but Fu 
Sinian made it clear in his commentary that the plight of the common people does not fall 
under the purview of the Institute.255 Although they did plan to gather some information 
on urbanites, this was to be left to subordinates while they would personally conduct 
research in the remoter areas.256 
 Echoing Cai’s earlier call to ethnologists to brave all hardships for the sake of a 
“true report,” they planned to take treacherous paths, passing through territory inhabited 
by “nothing but wild beasts and thorny weeds; those who live there are all called ‘raw 
barbarians,’257 their numbers are particularly few and they have very little contact with 
                                                
252 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: WW Norton, 1990), 339. 
253 IHP { 115-20-1. Although the final report has been published (see below), this original proposal 
remains unpublished. 
254 s| as a phrase combined the even older terms Eastern Yi }| and Southern Man Os, ancient 
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256 Ibid., 5. 
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See Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 
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the Han. But to achieve the purpose of the investigation, and to satisfy our deep interest, 
we must fearlessly go despite all dangers and difficulties.”258 In dramatic flare, Li 
concludes that “…in taking all these paths that no one travels, although we are persistent 
and determined to get there, I don’t know whether we will be able to reach our 
objective.”259 
 Li explained that the party would refrain from frequent visits along the way in 
order to avoid the suspicion that their work will be used for military or political purposes, 
but once outside (presumably beyond the metropole) they planned to “make a detailed 
record of suitable research concerning finances, the salt industry, and currency, as well as 
military and political matters, in order to identify the cause of recent riots and to know 
where to send relief.”260 Although they acknowledged that the Tibetans were the direct 
reason for these uprisings, they also accused the British of inciting unrest and therefore 
vowed to pay particularly close attention to these international events.261 Just as Cai had 
advocated that ethnology serve both an intellectual and political purpose, Li hoped that 
their record would serve “as a reference for those who will govern Sichuan in the 
future.”262 
 But although the team intended to track politically relevant information on their 
travels, “popular customs are not less important than the antics of warlords and 
politicians; therefore, besides noting military and political affairs, we especially 
emphasize social culture—all popular customs, folksongs, proverbs, etc.”263 In the 
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opening paragraphs of the proposal, Li made it clear that the overall purpose of the 
expedition was to investigate the “setting, customs, temperament, attire, residence, 
occupation, language, and economy of the Luoluo and other barbarians,” and determine 
how these tribes should be categorized—their “zhongshu,” a term referring to the 
Linnaean taxonomic system used to classify biological organisms according to phylum, 
class, genus, species, etc.264 Just as Cai had suggested that the government should provide 
funds to explore and make purchases, Li explained that in order to capture the lives of 
their subjects they intended to take pictures and, “for those things that are not easily 
viewed but possess reference value, to buy it for a price.”265 Li also planned to make the 
results available to the masses in Chengdu. He explained that “in order to capture the 
attention of society, we will arrange for a famous newspaper to reserve a column for us to 
openly publicize, and go to every school and lecture freely…”266 
 Most importantly, however, they intended to investigate historical change and 
“how this influences the current political situation, with special regard for how to 
cultivate the land and civilize the people.”267 This, in fact, appears to be the driving force 
behind the expedition—to develop and integrate the periphery. While the exclusivity of 
Han ethnocentrism served the revolutionary cause decades earlier by alienating the 
Manchu regime, by this time the policy of wuzu gonghe, or uniting the five races, was 
actively extended to the undefined peripheral peoples of China’s remote southwest. 
   
                                                
264 The proposal explicitly states that the researchers wish to study the zhongshu , or classification, of 
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Linnean system for classifying biological organisms. 
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Ling Chunsheng and Assimilation: n"- 
 
 Although Cai Yuanpei deservedly receives credit for introducing and 
institutionalizing ethnology in China,268 Cai was a theorist and administrator, not a field 
worker. Therefore in 1928, with establishment of his Ethnology Section, Cai began 
dispatching researchers into the periphery to conduct pioneering ethnological 
fieldwork.269 Like Wang Yuanhui and Li Guangming of the IHP expedition to 
Chuankang, however, these fieldworkers too lacked formal training.270 China’s first bona 
fide ethnologist was Ling Chunsheng, a student of Marcel Mauss and Marcel Granet who, 
in 1929, received his doctorate from the University of Paris for a dissertation on the 
Yao.271 Cai Yuanpei, who for years had dedicated himself to establishing the discipline in 
China and possessed a special interest in its future development, deferred to Ling by 
inviting the younger scholar to replace him as head of the Ethnology Section.272 Cai 
retained his position as president of the Academia Sinica, however, which allowed him to 
continue his supervisory role.  
 In fact, in 1930, shortly after Ling Chunsheng assumed his new post, Cai 
encouraged Ling to undertake a study of the Tungusic Hezhe people in the northeast area 
formerly called Manchuria. Ling’s expedition is now hailed as “the first scientific field 
investigation in Chinese ethnology” and a historically important milestone in its 
                                                
268 As Guldin points out, this would include social or cultural anthropology. See Guldin, 30-31. 
269 Guldin, 32. 
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subsequent development.273 In 1934 the Academia Sinica Institute of History and 
Philology published Songhuajiang xiayou de Hezhezu based on this fieldwork.274 
According Li Yih-yuan (Li Yiyuan), one of Ling’s former students and successor as head 
of the Institute of Ethnology, this lengthy multi-volume work “became the first Chinese 
scientific ethnography.”275 More importantly, like Li Chi’s work in archaeology, Ling’s 
ethnography represented the highest caliber of scholarship which for the next decade 
served as the model for fieldwork and reporting on the periphery.  
 Ling’s work indeed set many important precedents,276 but one in particular 
characterizes his approach generally. In this and later studies, he (and his assistant, Rui 
Yifu) relied on the historical records in constructing (or reconstructing, depending on 
one’s degree of credulity) the genealogies of contemporary minorities. In this case, he 
concluded that the modern Tungus were a derivative of the ancient Eastern Yi, and 
therefore shared origins with the Lai Yi277 and even the Shang (and therefore presumably 
the Han);278 elsewhere he found that the contemporary Miao were an extraction from 
another ancient group whose ancestors came from the Central Plain and were friendly 
with the Zhou.279 Many of these studies seem to suggest that, while ethnology tended to 
divide and differentiate peoples, history could unite them.280  
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 This tack already appealed to those searching for a credible narrative 
substantiating the official Nationalist rhetoric uniting five races into a single Zhonghua 
minzu, but it became imperative as Japan unveiled its predatory ambitions in the 
mainland. Japan had first demanded a number of territorial concessions from China 
following their victory in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although forced to abandon 
some of these demands, the Japanese made their imperial designs apparent. Then in 1905, 
after defeating Russia in a contest over northeast Asia, Japan acquired rights to Russian 
interests in the region, including the South Manchurian Railway. The Japanese imperial 
army remained stationed in the area, ostensibly to guard the strategic railway but more 
accurately to serve as the front line of Japanese expansionism. In 1910 Japan annexed 
Korea outright, and in the years that followed Japan watched the centralized Chinese 
government dissolve into regional warlordism. In 1928, as Chiang’s Northern Expedition 
troops approached Manchuria, the Japanese army sent a substantial contingency force to 
Jinan in Shandong province where they temporarily but effectively checked Chiang’s 
campaign to reunify China. This intervention sent a clear message to Chinese nationalists, 
leaving them embittered toward and distrustful of the Japanese.281   
 Then on September 18, 1931 Japanese junior officers stationed in Manchuria 
sabotaged their own railway and blamed local Chinese forces for the alleged attack. This 
Mukden Incident afforded the Japanese military a pretext for full-scale invasion and 
occupation of Manchuria, which then became the puppet state of Manchukuo.282 The 
Chinese considered this seizure an outrage, but widespread boycotts in Shanghai mounted 
in protest resulted in the infamous bombing of the city. Years later, Fei Xiaotong 
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reflected: “As a Chinese youth in the 1930s, with my country and Chinese nationhood at 
the crossroads of survival or extinction, I knew that my life was closely bound up with 
Chinese society. I realized that as long as the future of my country and my people was in 
doubt, so was my own.”283 With the possible demise of the nation at hand, many 
academics chose to pick up, not a gun, but the pen. 
 It is no coincidence that in the following year the Institute of History and 
Philology published Fu Sinian’s Brief History of the Northeast that, like Ling’s study, 
used history as a means of binding Manchuria to the rest of the nation, thus presenting 
China as a single integrated whole.284 His narrative attracted criticism for manipulating 
history to serve a political agenda, despite the fact that the Japanese were generating 
counter-narratives depicting the northeast as a contested region that never belonged to 
China. Li Chi produced an English-language abridgment of Fu’s history, presumably 
published to garner support from the international community and perhaps even to 
persuade the Lytton Commission, dispatched by the League of Nations, to rule in favor of 
Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria.285 Just as history became a means of justifying and 
reinforcing the center’s claims on the periphery, ethnology too became a medium for 
integration. Significantly, Ling Chunsheng and other ethnologists credit Sun Yat-sen’s 
discourses on the nation for inspiring an explosion of studies—books, articles, and 
serials—on the Chinese minzu at this time.286 Although he pointed out that most of these 
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285 Li Chi, Manchuria in History: A Summary (Beiping: Peking Union Bookstore, 1932). 
286 At least forty Republican-era periodicals began their title with the phrase 7%. See Quan guo Zhong 
wen qi kan lian he mu lu: 1833-1949 (Beijing: Beijing Tushuguan, 1961), 340-343. 
74 
 
do not represent genuine scientific ethnological research, ethnology was certainly a part 
of this concern for the fate of the minzu.287 
 
Defining the National Border 
 
 In 1934, the Academia Sinica dissolved its Ethnology Section and transferred 
Ling to the newly formed Fourth Section in the Institute of History and Philology where, 
after the History, Philology, and Archaeology Sections, it became the new Anthropology 
Section. Under its director, Wu Dingliang, who had received a doctorate in physical 
anthropology in Britain, the new Anthropology Section focused on somatometry, or 
gathering measurements on biological variation among China’s races.288 The subsequent 
marginalization of ethnology, and therefore Ling’s own work, caused friction that 
eventually led to Ling’s departure from the Academia Sinica, a story picked up again 
shortly. In the mean time, the new mix forced a compromise.  
 In the preceding years Ling had studied the Miao in Hunan province and the She 
in Zhejiang and Fujian,289 but in the winter of 1934 he joined a team that, like the earlier 
IHP expedition to Chuankang, explored China’s southwest frontier where the national 
border remained largely undefined. Indeed, their mission seemed most concerned with 
studying and defining the human boundary of this frontier. They headed first to Hong 
Kong and then Macao, a place that, according to their report back to IHP head Fu Sinian, 
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“is the best location for studying the hybridized European and Asian race.”290 The team 
then moved west, to a village on the border of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, where 
they surveyed Hanification among the Tong, or the degree to which the Tong had literally 
“become Han.”291 The team first gathered body measurements on over fifty of the local 
Tong people, presumably for comparative purposes, and then commented on their 
extensive cultural assimilation, noting that their language in particular represented a mix 
of Tong and Han languages.292 The expedition continued westward where the team 
gathered further data on assimilation of the Yi in Yunnan province.  
 In 1937, Ling submitted to the IHP a simple report on his fieldwork in Yunnan 
over the previous year. His summary results for each of the four projects undertaken 
during that time divided minority groups into civilized and barbarian elements: Among 
the Kawa of Yunnan, now known as the Awa or Wa, those of the northwest are 
“domesticated,” while those in the southeast are “wild”;293 the Jin are simply “regular 
people” today,294 and not the Baige nationality; likewise the Tang dynasty Wuman, or 
Black Barbarians, are today’s Luoluo, while the Baiman, or White Barbarians, are now 
“regular people.”295 Not only did Ling assume continuity from ancient ethnonyms to 
contemporary minorities, but it seems the purpose of his study was to calculate the degree 
and extent of assimilation within each group.296 His research seemed to confirm that 
although cultural differences still exist, barbarians are indeed assimilable.  
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 While still in Yunnan, Ling received a message from the Academia Sinica’s main 
office at Nanjing informing him that a confidential letter had arrived from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs recruiting him to join the Ministry’s Border Survey Commission.297 The 
project aimed to “survey the undefined southern border between Yunnan and Burma,” or 
more accurately the border between China and Southeast Asia. The team still needed a 
professional mineralogist and an anthropologist,298 and they had heard that the Academia 
Sinica had capable scholars in these fields already conducting research in Yunnan. The 
letter made clear that the committee would cover his salary and travel expenses for the 
duration of the survey, and he simply needed to arrange a time and place to meet the team. 
Moreover, the Academia Sinica had also received a letter directly from the Deputy 
Minister concerning further details about duration, expenses, and remuneration for 
accompanying specialists.299 This expedition brought together an interest in the 
borderlands shared by Ling and the central government, and initiated what became a 
long-term collaborative effort to study and develop China’s peripheral regions and 
peoples, a project that soon became imperative to national survival. 
 
War and Frontier Studies 
 
 In 1937 Ling, along with fellow ethnologists, were slated to undertake a national 
customs survey on behalf of the Central Government’s Ministry of the Interior, but the 
Japanese invasion on July 7th cut short this massive undertaking.300 The Japanese seizure 
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of China’s east coast that fall sparked a mass exodus westward to the inhospitable frontier 
wherein resides China’s concentration of minority peoples. With the government 
stationed in Chongqing in Sichuan province and many academics gathered in Kunming in 
Yunnan province, both the state and scholars naturally turned their attention to studying 
and securing this region. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the outbreak of war 
halted archaeological excavations at Anyang, but archaeologists were able to shift their 
focus from the Central Plains to the periphery: The IHP and the National Central 
Museum jointly sponsored ethnological and archaeological work among the Yi at 
Liangshan in Sichuan301 and undertook similar studies in the Chuankang region of 
Yunnan;302 Li Chi continued his analysis and writing on Anyang, but he too became 
involved in frontier studies as president of the short-lived Yunnan Ethnology Society.303 
In his presidential address, in which he acknowledged his ethnological training, he 
offered encouragement and advice to his beleaguered colleagues for continued 
ethnographic research.304 
 But wartime ethnology was more than ever a matter of national security. The 
Japanese occupation of China marks a transition from often nebulous minzu studies 
which, as mentioned earlier, could mean either ethnic groups or the nation, to a new 
explosion of research specifically dedicated to “the frontier” (bianjiang) and “frontier 
administration” (bianzheng).305 For instance, in 1941 the former Minzuxue yanjiu jikan306 
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became Bianzheng gonglun, the most prominent periodical in this genre with 
contributions from Ling himself as well as Wu Wenzao, Lin Yaohua, and other leading 
ethnologists. Ling’s own historiography also makes this transition apparent: Before the 
Japanese invasion, Ling’s publications on Yunnan had focused on identifying and 
categorizing the various “tribes” within what he viewed as the most complicated and 
diverse region in China. His purpose had been to correct earlier taxonomies of Major 
Davies and VK Ting, who had relied on language as the primary factor in categorization, 
by instead taking into account “cultural, physical, historical, and especially geographic 
characteristics” of these tribes.307 Just two years later, in 1938, in an article entitled 
“Meng-Ting: A Geographical Survey of a Miasma Area in the Yunnan Border,” he noted 
that although due to war many Han had migrated to the province, they still viewed 
Yunnan as a dangerous area to be avoided, which was why the region remained 
undeveloped.308 That same year he published an article entitled “The Importance of 
Developing the Southwest Border” in which he argued that “the southwest holds just as 
important a position as the northwest in the war of resistance and establishing the nation.” 
In fact, according to Ling, one could say that the southwest “is the primary grounds for 
reviving the nation.” He further asserted that “dutifully establishing the frontier will 
increase the strength of the battle of resistance while also accomplishing the mission of 
establishing the nation.”309 Throughout the war Ling explored historical precedents for 
border administration with articles on such topics as “The Manchu System of 
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Administering China’s Borders” and “The Role of Hereditary Chieftainship in 
Borderland Administration,” both published in the aforementioned Bianzheng gonglun,310 
and a related monograph entitled Zhongguo bianzheng zhidu, or China’s Frontier 
Administration System.311 As an ethnologist Ling already had a professional interest in 
China’s periphery, but when a foreign enemy had by degrees seized part of the frontier 
and used it as a staging ground for invasion, the periphery became a matter of national 
interest. Ling believed that national survival depended on securing, developing, and 
effectively administering the frontier, and he was soon given the means of contributing to 
this cause. 
   
Official National Narrative: China’s Destiny 
 
 In 1937 President Roosevelt appointed the China hand Owen Lattimore as a 
personal adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. In his memoirs, Lattimore said of Chiang: “He 
thought the way to save China was to create a trained, organized elite; and through his 
educated elite he intended to give the right orders to the common people and see to it that 
these orders were carried out.”312 Clearly Chiang thought of the Academia Sinica as part 
of his educated elite. On February 23rd, 1943 Ling Chunsheng received a telegram from 
Zhu Jiahua,313 then president of the Academia Sinica and chief of the Guomindang Party 
Organization Department.314 In this dual capacity Zhu was both privy to China’s top 
scholarship and responsible for staffing party leadership positions. Doubtless Zhu knew 
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of Ling’s background and skills and therefore appointed Ling to be both Xinjiang 
Provincial Party Officer and director of the department’s Research Division, where his 
training and experience would come in handy working with the local Muslim population 
in China’s vast and undeveloped westernmost “new territory.” Zhu explained that Chiang 
Kai-shek, acting in his capacity as party chairman, had already personally approved the 
appointment and wished to arrange a time to meet Ling.315 Ling ended up declining the 
offer, sending Fu Sinian to explain in person that his wife was gravely ill and that at the 
moment traveling to a distant and remote area would present many problems.316 It may be 
that Ling refused for other reasons, but more offers would soon come. 
 In March of 1943 Chiang Kaishek wore numerous hats, serving simultaneously as 
Director-General of the Guomindang party, Premier of the Republic of China and 
therefore head of the Executive Yuan, and Chairman of the National Government 
(antecedent to the position of President, which he assumed upon its creation in 1948).317 
Despite the grandeur of his many titles, years of Japanese occupation had taken an 
exacting toll on the nation and its fate was by no means secure. To combat this despair, 
on March 10, 1943 the Guomindang party published China’s Destiny, which described 
Chiang’s vision of the Chinese nation.318 Priced at a modest US ten cents, it was intended 
for mass consumption and received extensive publicity and distribution (one is reminded 
of the little red books of Mao’s quotations a few decades later). China’s Destiny saw two 
hundred printings in 1943, the first of which alone sold two hundred thousand copies. 
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The book became required reading for all civil servants and the military, while in China’s 
schools youth were required to pass examinations based on its content. “It is thus fair to 
describe China’s Destiny as the political bible of the Kuomintang, and to state that 
intensive efforts have been made to indoctrinate the potential leaders of China with its 
ideology.”319 This extended to China’s intellectual leadership, who were also called on to 
support the official line. 
 The book begins with a succinct narrative entitled “The Growth and Development 
of the Chinese Nation.” Predictably, the story begins five thousand years ago when the 
Chinese nation established itself in Asia, but already the definition of the nation had 
evolved. Two decades earlier, Sun Yat-sen had insisted that the Chinese people were 
“…completely Han Chinese. With common customs and habits, we are completely of one 
race.”320  Chiang likewise asserted that the nation “is of one stock,”321 but now no longer 
simply the Han. Instead, for Chiang the nation was the broader zhonghua minzu which 
had grown from the continual “blending of numerous clans.”322 This blending continued, 
“dynasty after dynasty, but the motive power was cultural rather than military, and it was 
accomplished by assimilation rather than by conquest.”323 
 Then, two thousand years later, many clans—branches of this originary single 
race—“spread along the valleys of the Yellow, Yangtze, Heilungkiang [Amur], and Pearl 
rivers. They maintained different cultures according to the differences in their geographic 
environment, and cultural differences gave rise to differences among clans.”324 Ling 
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Chunsheng had similarly argued that environment and climate determine cultural 
differences when he said: “It is the variety of geographic detail combined with that of 
cliamatic condition—cold in the high mountain ranges and hot in the deep river valleys—
that brought about the differences in customs, languages, and modes of living of the 
tribes. In short, the primary factor in bringing about the bewildering complication of the 
tribal distinctions is due mainly to influences of geographic environment.”325 Likewise, in 
Chiang’s narrative, culture distinguishes clans, not biology or lineage. Instead, shared 
blood lineage is in part what binds the clans together, as “…the clans of the various 
localities were either descendents of a common ancestor or were interrelated through 
marriage.”326 Citing passages from the classical literature, Chiang concludes that “the 
main and branch stocks all belong to the same blood stream,” and “among all the clans 
there were either blood relationships or connections by marriage. This is how the Chinese 
nation was formed in ancient times.”327  
 By the time of the Qin and Han dynasties, Chinese civilization centered on the 
Central Plains. “Due to economic interdependence and the spread of a common 
civilization, the numerous clans in various localities had already blended together and 
formed one great nation”—namely, that of the Hanzu. When barbarians attacked and “the 
Hans migrated southward,” invaders then “occupied the Yellow River Valley. However, 
these clans gradually acquired the civilization of the Hans,” or became Hanified, by 
“adopting Chinese dress, methods of government, and culture.”328 The Sui/Tang 
unification “was the result of four hundred years of nation-blending,” during which “the 
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many varieties of religion, philosophy, literature, art, astronomy, law, institutions, and 
social customs were gathered together and synthesized.” Repeated barbarian invasions 
resulted in their conversion to Han civilization. The assimilation of Mongolia and 
Xinjiang “has been taking place for more than two thousand years,” while “Tibet’s period 
of assimilation has lasted over thirteen hundred years….the northeast started its inward 
orientation even earlier.”329 “When the Manchus occupied China, they were assimilated 
in the same way as the Nuchen Tartars. Thus, after the Revolution of 1911, the Manchus 
and the Chinese were really blended into one body, without the slightest trace of any 
difference between them.”330 In this manner the Hanzu “was able by virtue of its great 
and enduring civilization to blend these neighboring clans into the nation.”331  
 Chiang then concludes his narrative by emphasizing that the history of the 
Chinese nation is one of common origins and blending cultures. Ancient texts and 
genealogies have proven that Mongols trace their ancestry to Xia dynasty, while the 
Yellow Emperor “is the forefather of both the Manchus and Tibetans of today.” Hui are 
simply Han who embraced Islam, with no difference but religion. “In short, our various 
clans actually belong to the same nation, as well as to the same racial stock….That there 
are five peoples designated in China is not due to difference in race or blood, but to 
religion and geographical environment. In short, the differentiation among China’s five 
peoples is due to regional and religious factors, and not to race or blood.”332  
 Sun had grappled with the quandary of forging national unity from racial diversity, 
seeing only loose sand that refused to congeal. But whereas he had equated Han with the 
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Chinese, emphasizing both Han descent from the Yellow Emperor and Manchu otherness, 
Chiang suggested that the two “clans” were both progeny of the Yellow Emperor, and in 
fact all clans found within China came from the same racial stock. Only superficial 
cultural differences distinguished these clans, yet Chiang also insists that “the customs of 
each clan were unified to form China’s national culture.”333 With shared blood and 
culture, the Chinese people formed a single, united nation. If one were to accept Chiang’s 
narrative of historical assimilation, then the Nationalist government’s policy of 
assimilation and integration would merely continue a naturally occurring process.  
 Just three months after initial publication, and doubtless to ensure advocacy of the 
official view of history, Chiang Kai-shek, acting in his capacity as chair of the Military 
Affairs Council, sent to Fu Sinian, head of the Institute of History and Philology, a letter 
on the subject of the institute’s research agenda.334 He first acknowledged that “for the 
past several years the institute has devoted itself to the study of the national history and 
languages, as well as ethnology and anthropology,” and expressed his “deep 
gratification” with the institute’s successful results. “However,” he admonished, 
“research on this nation’s history should both illuminate the culture of the minzu and 
foster its spirit.” He went on to explain that “for the sake of current needs, considering the 
relationship between academia and social morals, research on Tang culture is most 
important” because “the mores of both scholars and the common people [of the Tang 
dynasty] served as a model for later generations. I hope that from now on your institute 
will focus on the system of belief and politics, scholarship, society, and arts of this 
period.” To accomplish this he recommended that all researchers in the IHP, be they 
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historians, linguists, or anthropologists, focus on some aspect of the Tang as a specialty 
and publish their results “in order to change [current] social trends by working to glorify 
the nation’s history.”335 In essence Chiang, as the head of a nation in distress, wished to 
buoy morale in the nadir of national history by revisiting its zenith. In spite of the candor 
of the message, which employed language of persuasion and entreaty, Fu Sinian’s reply 
to Chiang referred to the original communication as an “order” and assured him that the 
institute would naturally put forth every effort to comply, further enumerating ways they 
were meeting Chiang’s demands.336 
 This is not to suggest that the Academia Sinica or IHP were simply dutifully 
carrying out orders from above, or that their work was entirely dictated by the state. At 
this time Chiang and his government were in Chongqing, while the remaining IHP 
scholars were in Kunming, where they exercised more than a degree of autonomy. But 
their positions, salaries, and future (as wretched as these may have seemed at the time) 
were still dependent on Chiang’s government. And considering Fu’s earlier collaboration 
with Li Chi in propagandizing a politically motivated history of Manchuria’s relationship 
to China, it seems likely that their patriotism matched that of Chiang, even if all parties 
did not always agree on how best to serve the nation. Cai Yuanpei, for one, felt that the 
state, and principally the generalissimo, had betrayed the nation and so retreated to Hong 
Kong rather than Chongqing, where he died in 1940. Others, however, found the state 
agenda in line with their own. 
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Ling Chunsheng and Frontier Education: pro patria 
 
 As mentioned earlier, dissolution of the Ethnology Section and Ling’s subsequent 
transfer to the Anthropology Section in 1934 left him playing second fiddle to the 
physical anthropologists. On several occasions Ling appealed to Fu Sinian and Zhu 
Jiahua for the Academia Sinica to establish an independent Ethnology Institute, but his 
request was always denied.337 During the war, as border studies thrived, he finally 
succeeded in convincing the Academia Sinica to prepare a Frontier Culture Research 
Institute,338 but in the end this too never materialized.339 Disaffected with the Academia 
Sinica, he remained open to other career opportunities. In September of 1936 Luo 
Jialun,340 then president of the National Central University, had invited Ling to deliver 
four ethnology lectures, one per week, to the geography department reporting on his work 
at IHP.341 Then, in summer of 1943, Ling again accepted an appointment from the school, 
this time to establish a new Border Administration Department342 within the school’s 
College of Law.343 Fu Sinian, then part of the Academia Sinica administration but still 
engaged in supervising the IHP, had assumed that the NCU position was temporary. 
When he heard rumors that Ling intended to stay in Chongqing to chair the newly 
founded department, he entreated Ling to remain in Lizhuang with the IHP.344 Instead, 
Ling confessed that since he had called for an independent ethnology institute that had 
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never materialized, he had lost face and so decided to leave the IHP in May, having 
already spoken with president Zhu about his resignation.345 After arriving in Chongqing 
on the 28th of June, the Ministry of Education made him principal of the Asian 
Languages School,346 and in July he had accepted the NCU invitation to serve 
concurrently as director and distinguished lecturer in the Department of Border 
Studies.347  
 On January 12th of the following year, the Ministry of Education recruited Ling to 
direct the Department of Frontier Education.348 Just as envisioned by Ling, ethnology 
served the state not only in defining, administering, and developing the periphery, but in 
uniting and strengthening the nation. Ling Chunsheng’s training in ethnology and 
education (he had received a degree in education from National Dongnan University) 
indeed assisted the state in making citizens out of the fringe folk. During the war of 
resistance, the central government moved to make education standardized, centralized, 
and compulsory.349 According to official government publications, wartime border 
education targeted “all frontier regions” to provide education in “citizenship training” and 
Han language, with special emphasis on instilling “a clear understanding of the Chinese 
race and nation.”350 Textbooks and courses incorporated Sun Yat-sen’s teachings on the 
nation in order to keep citizens on the fringes aware of “national affairs.”351 In short, war 
was a national crisis and that demanded unity, and unity would be achieved through 
uniformity. This propaganda endeavor continued after the war as the Ministry of 
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Education appointed Ling director of the National Frontier Culture Education 
Committee,352 where he worked with a number of well known ethnologists to oversee the 
production of textbooks for primary schools used to educate minorities.353 June Dreyer 
accused this institution of serving as the Chinese state’s “chief vehicle of assimilation.”354  
 But such a Machiavellian view may be giving the government too much credit. 
When Ling initially assumed directorship of the Department of Frontier Education he 
wrote to Fu Sinian complaining that frontier education existed in name only. He was 
unaccustomed to spending his entire day writing reports and found himself unable to put 
his heart into the Ministry. He explained that his predecessor, for whom the job had been 
tailor-made, accomplished little other than creating many related organizations and 
superfluous positions with overlapping responsibilities. In exasperation, he exclaimed 
that the department’s bureaucratization “exceeds anything seen in China or abroad from 
ancient times to the present.” According to Ling, all the department had actually done so 
far was to offer general education to those near the border areas. As a result, he admitted 
he would have to start from scratch in building a foundation for frontier education by 
cutting and organizing. He concluded by admitting that “all hopes for this lie with me.”355 
 Although Ling did indeed dedicate himself to furthering frontier education on 
behalf of the central government, apparently the grass in Yunnan seemed greener. That 
fall, as he continued to revamp the department, he wrote numerous times to Fu Sinian 
about the possibility of creating an ethnology institute within the Academia Sinica.356 He 
confessed that for the past nine years, ever since ethnology and physical anthropology 
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had merged into one section, he had been grieved, as the two “differ in every way.” 
Although he did not mention names, part of the problem stemmed from differing visions 
of the purpose and placement of ethnology. Li Chi, who during the war had replaced Fu 
as acting director of the Institute of History and Philology, had received his training at 
Harvard in the four fields approach to anthropology, which included linguistics, 
ethnology (cultural anthropology), physical anthropology, and archaeology. Li remained 
orientation toward the latter two, whereas Ling, due largely to his French training, wished 
to align ethnology more closely with geography and sociology. After noting that the 
physical anthropology lab had recently petitioned for its own institute, Ling argued that if 
physical anthropology indeed became independent then ethnology could finally develop 
into an institute. The war had certainly proven the usefulness of this new and obscure 
discipline, catapulting Ling to the height of academics and politics. Ling himself 
observed that “recently more and more Chinese citizens see the importance of ethnology. 
Likewise two years ago the government planned to establish a Frontier Culture Research 
Institute within IHP. The charter for this institute stipulated that the greater part of the 
research work would fall within the scope of an ethnology institute.” He further pointed 
out that Cai himself first promoted ethnology in China, and aligned it with the social 
sciences. From Academia Sinica’s inception Cai had said that, given adequate funding, 
ethnology should have its own institute. Therefore, Ling argued, in order to realize Cai’s 
unfulfilled wish and serve his memory, we should see to it that ethnology develops into 
an institute.357 
 Despite his passionate appeal, Ling’s proposal was once again denied. That same 
year he became titular director of the Anthropology Section, but it seems he remained 
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consumed with political duties. In July of 1948 he wrote to Xia Nai, then acting director 
of the IHP, to resign as head of the Anthropology Section, explaining that he left the 
institute four years earlier and was now chair of the Ministry of Education’s National 
Frontier Culture Education Committee.358 Even so, when he followed Chiang and the 
Nationalist government to Taiwan later that year, Ling assisted in the migration of the 
Anthropology Section across the Strait where after a period of turmoil it finally settled 
with the rest of the Academia Sinica in Taibei’s southeast suburbs. There, in 1965, Ling 
finally realized Cai Yuanpei’s dream from nearly four decades earlier when he 
established an Institute of Ethnology, which today sits beside the Institute of History and 
Philology on the Academia Sinica campus. For the next five years Ling served as the 
institute’s first director while Rui Yifu remained in the IHP to head the Anthropology 
Section.359  
 In his later career Ling continued to combine ethnology and history in his search 
for the origins of cultural connections spanning the Pacific, from southern China to South 
America.360 His legacy of transcending modern political borders is readily apparent in the 
careers of students such as KC Chang and Li Yih-yuan, who agreed that Ling’s greatest 
contribution was in “expanding the conceptual realm of Chinese culture.”361 What 
remains overlooked is how this work coincides with his vision of the nation and how the 
state became his means of propagating that vision. 
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LI CHI AND EVOLVING NARRATIVES OF THE CHINESE RACE, 1950-1977 
 
 
Nine Tribes: Colonialism and Ethnology 
  
 The end of WWII and the defeat of Japan saw the retrocession of Taiwan, for fifty 
years a Japanese colony, back to China (though in this case to the Republic of China 
rather than the Qing). Once the ROC government acquired Taiwan, Chinese 
anthropologists like Ling Chunsheng and Li Chi wasted no time in assuming aboriginal 
studies from the previous Japanese colonizers. The Academia Sinica was relocated a 
number of times, eventually resettling in Nangang (Nankang) in the southeast suburbs of 
Taibei. There Ling Chunsheng headed the Institute of Ethnology while Li Chi directed 
the Institute of History and Philology, retaining that portion of the Institute’s personnel 
who had not remained in the mainland. WWII ended fifty years of Japanese 
administration of the island, and repatriation of Japanese nationals left open Taihoku 
Imperial University in Taibei.362 Fu Sinian accepted an appointment as president of the 
university, now renamed National Taiwan University (Taida), and he recruited many of 
the Academia Sinica researchers to serve simultaneously as university professors (a 
tradition that continues to this day). Fu commissioned Li Chi to create a Department of 
Archaeology and Anthropology (now all subsumed under anthropology) which 
immediately resumed Japanese colonial studies of Taiwan’s other—the island’s non-
Chinese indigenous tribal peoples. Taida not only had a developed anthropology 
curriculum that followed the four fields “Harvard model,” it was the first Chinese 
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institution to offer a degree in archaeology.363 The department began accepting students 
in the fall of 1949, with Li Yih-yuan and K.C. Chang (to be discussed hereafter) among 
the earliest to enroll. Li Chi served as adviser to this first generation of students in 
Taiwan, teaching courses in Introduction to Archaeology and Anthropology, Prehistory, 
Physical Anthropology,364 a more advanced course in Anthropometry,365 and ultimately 
directed the senior theses of both Chang and Li.366 Though he built his professional 
career in the field of archaeology, significantly Li left Shi Zhangru to teach the 
department’s archaeology courses while he took it upon himself to teach physical 
anthropology and anthropometry, subjects he had specialized in as a graduate student and 
retained as a primary interest. 
 Once in Taiwan the ROC government, and Chinese anthropologists in particular, 
proceeded to build on the Japanese colonial framework, adopting the imperial Japanese 
taxonomy which divided the island’s indigenous population into nine tribes and 
immediately set to work studying them as Taiwan’s other.367 Because it was believed that 
Taiwan’s inhabitants were either Chinese who had emigrated from the mainland 
primarily in the Ming or Qing dynasties or indigenous tribal “highland” peoples without 
any history of civilization,368 scholars at the time saw no need to conduct archaeological 
studies on the island. Once again in the periphery, without access to the Central Plains, Li 
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Chi reprised his role as ethnologist just as he had done during wartime while among the 
tribal peoples of China’s southwestern frontier. In the summer of 1949, immediately upon 
arrival on the island, he put together an expedition to a tribal area in the vicinity of 
Taizhong (Taichung) on behalf of the government and supported by National Taiwan 
University and the Academia Sinica, employing scholars affiliated with both institutions. 
The report generated by the group, published the following year in the provincial 
gazetteer, became part of the Special Collection on Tribal Culture entitled “A Report on 
Preliminary Ethnological Investigation in Ruiyan.”369 The team of ten scholars included a 
number of prominent archaeologists who had excavated Anyang, including Li himself, 
Dong Zuobin, Shi Zhangru, and Song Wenxun, as well as ethnologists like Rui Yifu and 
Chen Qilu. This was their first project in Taiwan and each scholar was responsible for 
studying a different aspect of Atayal society (one of the nine “tribes”),370 detailing how 
these natives differed from the Chinese in areas such as population, education, family 
structure, hygiene, material culture, religion, concept of time, genealogy, and, for Li Chi, 
the physical properties of the natives. Li used anthropometric tools from both the 
Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University Ethnology Research Office to take 
precise body measurements of 216 individuals in the Ruiyan community, assisted in this 
endeavor by Rui Yifu, Song Wenxun, and Dong Zuobin (the last two individuals having 
been part of Li’s Anyang excavation team). Following the standards set by the 
International Anthropology Society, Li’s study included measurements of stature, span, 
sitting height, head length, head breadth, auditory height, frontal diameter, bizygomatic 
diameter, bigonial diameter, facial height, head circumference, nasal height, nasal width, 
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and upper facial height. But he also surveyed certain “immeasurable” characteristics of 
the Atayal, such as skin color, hair, eyes, eyebrows, forehead, glabella, form of nose 
(bridge, nostrils, cavity, and partition), cheekbone, mouth, teeth, lower jaw and jaw angle, 
and ear, all in accordance with the standards of Peking Union Medical College. Having 
gathered the raw data Li then employed some complex formulas to calculate averages for 
the various indexes, and compared these numbers with the biometrical statistics for 
Taiwan’s other indigenous tribes taken earlier by a Japanese physical anthropologist. 
From all this Li concluded, among other things, that Ruiyan males exhibit two important 
traits—a relatively long torso and long legs. “Among all the highland peoples (Taiwan 
natives), Ruiyan adult males have the longest legs of those compared. The sitting height 
of Ruiyan males is 50.92 on average; this short sitting height index is truly rare among all 
groups in East Asia.”371 
 Li’s purpose with the study was to isolate some unique identifying characteristics 
of the Atayal in particular and of Taiwan’s tribal peoples collectively. He took as a model 
a similar study performed on “Chinese of the North China Plain”—in other words, the 
Han. It was assumed that not only were Han direct descendents of the original inhabitants 
of the Central Plains, but they also resided farthest from the periphery and therefore 
remained relatively insulated, historically having minimal contact with or defilement 
from barbarians. “Huabeiren” were therefore racially the purest of the Chinese people 
who could most clearly represent an unadulterated Chinese somatotype. This study 
showed that people of the North China Plain tended to share two unique characteristics—
the so-called “Mongoloid fold” present in the eyelid, and “shovel-shaped upper 
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incisors.”372 The reader will recall the significance of this from earlier chapters, the 
shovel-shaped incisor being a physical link between Peking Man and modern Han. As Li 
himself put it: “Modern physical anthropologists acknowledge that the uniqueness of 
these two traits is the most apparent quality of the Yellow Race. Many taxonomists use 
these two traits as a mark of Yellow Race classification, of equal importance to hair 
quality and skin color. But the frequency of the appearance of these two traits in the 
bodies of those of the Yellow Race still does not receive sufficient recognition.”373  
 After reviewing Stevenson’s statistics on the appearance of the Mongoloid fold 
and shovel-shaped upper incisor among his subjects of the North China Plain, Li 
concluded his own study with similar statistics for the Ruiyan community. Although 
many of the older people had lost their teeth and some youth had swapped their originals 
for gold teeth, still as expected the measurements of this Atayal population of Taiwan 
clearly differ from those of the Han. Put simply, all the charts and statistics boil down to 
this: In the Han, the Mongoloid fold is only absent about 9% of the time, whereas the 
shovel-shaped upper incisors are missing in 18.2% of cases—in other words, among the 
Han, it is twice as likely that one has the requisite fold and lacks the teeth than the other 
way around. However, from Li’s data with the natives, those who have the fold and lack 
the teeth altogether account for 5% of the subject pool, whereas those who have the teeth 
and lack the fold total around 37% of the Ruiyan population. In short, for Han the 
Mongoloid fold is more prevalent than the shovel-shaped upper incisor, but for Atayal the 
opposite is true. He then concludes his study by emphasizing that both the Mongoloid 
fold and shovel-shaped upper incisor are important physical characteristics of the 
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Mongoloid race, and that each trait probably has different origins and principles of 
inheritance.374  
 But whereas the mere presence of these two traits had earlier identified the 
Chinese, the ratio of one feature to the other became a defining characteristic of both the 
Han and Atayal and therefore a means of distinguishing one from the other, or of 
measuring the biological distance between the two groups. The enigmatic reference to 
heredity suggests a heuristic dimension to this relative distance—they have been separate 
and distinct peoples for some time. In fact simple statistics on the presence of these traits 
among the Atayal would not suffice, since these revealed that about half of the subjects in 
Ruiyan had both the Mongoloid fold and shovel-shaped upper incisor—enough to 
nominate them to candidacy as Chinese. But in this case Li and his team were clearly 
bent on discovering differences rather than similarities. This example underscores an 
important political point—while Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have never been 
considered Chinese under the ROC government, and therefore remain outside the 
Chinese national narrative, the Taiwanese were until very recently considered Chinese. 
The People’s Republic of China in the mainland adopted a very different approach to the 
island’s natives, classifying them as Chinese (but not Han), a discrepancy we shall return 
to in the chapter following. 
 
Peking Man and Origin of the Chinese Race 
 
 In contrast to his study of the physical properties of the mountain tribes of Taiwan, 
in 1950, the same year the Ruiyan report was published, Li contributed the lead article in 
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the initial publication of Dalu zazhi, or Mainland Magazine, entitled “Origin of the 
Chinese People.”375 While Li’s ethnological fieldwork among the natives ended as 
quickly as it began, this article and others after it synthesized Li’s expertise in both 
archaeology and physical anthropology in seeking the origins of the Chinese people.  
 Ever since his doctoral research at Harvard Li’s work had focused on the question 
of the Formation of the Chinese People, but so many revelatory discoveries had occurred 
in the intervening twenty-seven years that Li reapplied himself to the old question with 
renewed vigor. Before the unearthing of China’s prehistoric cultures Li and 
revolutionaries, and in fact anyone interested in China’s remote past, had of necessity 
relied on literary accounts of dubious authenticity concerning the emergence of the 
Chinese people and their civilization. But the series of archaeological and paleontological 
discoveries in the 1920s, beginning with Andersson’s discovery of the Yangshao 
Neolthic culture, then the Pleistocene era remains of Peking Man at Zhoukoudian, Li’s 
own excavation of the Shang capital at Anyang, and later the Longshan Black Pottery 
Culture, all demanded serious revision of established narratives of China’s origins. 
Reconciling the new scientific evidence with long ensconced literary tropes posed a real 
challenge. 
 With his new approach to the “Origin of the Chinese People,” Li proposed to 
write Peking Man, and indeed all the human remains found in the cave of Zhoukoudian 
south of Beijing, into his narrative of the formation of the Chinese nation. In the 
immediate postwar period when Li served as a cultural adviser to the Chinese delegation 
stationed in occupied Japan, his duties involved the location and repatriation of important 
cultural relics plundered by the Japanese during their occupation of China, including the 
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relics of Anyang. Although he found a number of important antiquities, he always 
regretted his failure to locate the famed Peking Man skull,376 a loss he referred to as 
“another casualty of war.”377 Like everyone else, Li saw Peking Man as a most important 
key in the evolution of mankind, but his precise role in the formation of the Chinese 
people remained ambiguous. Li took for granted that Peking Man too was part of the 
northern stock of the Mongoloid race, the same as other Chinese, but what most 
concerned Li was heuristically linking the peoples of Zhoukoudian in a linear series, 
beginning with Peking Man of half a million years ago with the Upper Cave Man of over 
twenty thousand years ago, culminating in modern Chinese of the Zhoukoudian region. 
Li reasoned that because China’s traditional histories fail to reference anything earlier 
than five thousand years ago, more than ten thousand years after the last cave culture of 
Zhoukoudian, therefore when Emperor Yan fought his great battle the Zhoukoudian 
remains were already fossilized.378 Such an idea “forced Chinese historians to alter their 
views. Just at the time when sage kings such as the Yellow Emperor, Yao, Shun, and Yu 
were being dismissed as mythical, the spades of paleontologists and archaeologists 
suddenly uncovered a ‘modern human’ [homo sapien] more than ten thousand years older 
than the Yellow Emperor.”379  
 As discussed in chapter three, under the influence of the May Fourth Movement 
and a new faith in scientific empiricism, Gu Jiegang and the “doubters of antiquity” had 
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challenged the existence of these early mythical personages from classical histories, even 
calling into question the Xia and Shang dynasties for which there existed no evidence at 
the time. But when Li Chi’s excavation of Anyang in 1928 proved the existence of the 
Shang beyond any doubt, skepticism gave way to renewed faith in the classical stories. 
As Li himself put it, “those Doubters of Antiquity stopped their utterance of some of the 
most flaming nonsenses as soon as the discoveries of Anyang were made known.”380 
Evidence of the Shang naturally led Li to believe that the Xia dynasty and even the sage 
kings before that could have been real historical figures. Li argued that the Zhoukoudian 
discovery doesn’t disprove the existence of the ancient sages; in fact it implies their 
existence is more likely. “The discovery of underground materials shows that the Chinese 
minzu and Chinese culture are actually older than recorded in traditional histories, a fact 
now accepted by orthodox historians.” In effect, Li was saying that the new fields of 
paleontology and archaeology revealed that the Chinese minzu antedates even the sage 
kings, which for millennia represented the origins of Chinese civilization.381 Whereas 
revolutionaries had rather arbitrarily assigned a birthdate of 2704 BCE to the Yellow 
Emperor, which placed the genesis of the Chinese nation in hoary antiquity, Li and other 
scientists actually outdid them by pushing the national origins into an immemorial past, 
far beyond the heuristic limitations of history. This effectively made China timeless, 
without beginning or end.382 
 In constructing his earlier narrative of 1923 Li had self-avowedly accepted Sun 
Yatsen’s concept of Han (or “We group”) as descendents of the Yellow Emperor, if not 
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as hard historical fact at least in principle.383 But by 1950 Li had to reconcile his narrative 
with Chiang Kaishek’s revision of the official party line as manifested in China’s Destiny, 
which had implicitly rejected the Yellow Emperor in toto. Although he believed that 
archaeological findings supported the likelihood of a historical Yellow Emperor, Li now 
rejected the idea of the Yellow Emperor as father of the Chinese race, saying that “the 
idea of so-called ‘Children of the Yellow Emperor’ really is just a kind of legend full of 
cultural meaning certainly not befitting the reality of raceology.”384 As suggested by his 
study on the Ruiyan people, race was now based not on literature but on quantifiable 
scientific evidence. Even so, this was not the last time the Yellow Emperor appeared in 
Li’s historical narratives of the Chinese nation, as we shall see. 
 In his article Li then reviewed the conclusions of other, and importantly Western, 
scholars on Zhoukoudian, who essentially argued that the cave remains were not Chinese. 
One scholar suggested that the upper cave man at Zhoukoudian was taller than the 
average northern Chinese, more closely resembling Europe’s Cro-Magnon Man. Li, 
however, utilizing his background in physical anthropology, was careful to point out how 
this skull differs from European counterparts in four ways: nose bone, cheek bone, area 
below the nostril, and the gums.385 What really seems to have irked Li, however, is that 
Franz Weidenreich concluded that the family within the upper cave “originally belonged 
to an outside nomadic tribal group who were exterminated by the natives of the 
Zhoukoudian area, who represent the true original Chinese people. According to 
Weidenreich these imagined Paleolithic original Chinese were never discovered. This is 
disappointing for those of us studying the history of the Chinese minzu, but the lapse of 
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time since his analysis allows us to reexamine this question from a new perspective;”386 
in other words, to revise Weidenreich’s conclusions. 
 Weidenreich indeed suggested that Peking Man and the other cave dwellers were 
not Chinese, but for Li the problem lies in Weidenreich’s definition of Chinese. 
According to Li’s line of reasoning, because we currently lack data on human physical 
traits across all of China, we therefore cannot say definitively what the Chinese 
somatotype really is. Because we don’t know what the Chinese somatotype is, how can 
one conclude that these remains were not Chinese? Therefore Li advocated “a large-scale 
study of human body measurements, at the very least 1,000 people in every county. Only 
then will we know the racial composition of the Chinese minzu, and only then can our use 
of the term ‘Chinese’ carry any real meaning.” In essence, Li hoped to establish standards 
on the physical properties of the Chinese. Such a study would put to rest, as Li put it, the 
“question of the Chinese race.”387  
 Although Li never did return to the mainland, and so never had opportunity to 
fulfill this wish, he made every effort to engage this question within the limited scope of 
Taiwan. Immediately following the Ruiyan report, in the years 1951 and 1952 
respectively, Li proposed and then directed detailed studies conducted by his star pupils, 
Li Yih-yuan and K.C. Chang,388 on the physical properties of the school’s incoming 
freshmen class, even contributing a preface to the first.389 Both studies addressed the 
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lacuna Li had mentioned earlier; that is, the lack of detailed biometrical statistics 
spanning China. In searching for “physical traits of the modern Han,” Chang relied on 
such earlier studies as Stevenson’s on the north China plain, C.H. Liu’s which divided the 
Han into three “races,” including Yellow River, Yangzi River, and Pearl River types, and 
that of E. A. Hooton, Li’s former adviser at Harvard. Yet earlier works constituted only 
the proverbial tip of the iceberg, “still not enough to constitute a solid foundation for 
research on Han physical traits.”390 Therefore he examined Taida’s freshman class, 
dividing them into four groups by region—north, central, south, and Taiwan—and 
compiling statistics on their respective features. 
 In “Origin of the Chinese People,” Li went on to say that part of the problem 
arises from the fact that “Chinese” as a term, its anthropological meaning, still adheres to 
an archaic im/pure dichotomy. “From this we can understand that Weidenreich was a 
little too certain in concluding that no relationship exists between upper cave man and 
Paleolithic Chinese. In fact, there is not an anthropologist capable of proving that within 
the bloodline of ancient and modern Chinese there is no element passed down from 
Zhoukoudian’s upper cave. For this we must await the accumulated data from 
archaeology and biometrics, only then will we answer this question.” Ostensibly modern 
science would yield the necessary data for a comparison between the Zhoukoudian 
inhabitants and the Chinese people in order to establish their biological relationship. For 
Li proving such a relationship—showing that the cave’s inhabitants were part of the 
Chinese minzu—was all important, but he never addressed why he or anyone else should 
care about making Chinese ancestors out of a pile of fossilized bones. In fact, keeping 
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Peking Man and the ancient Zhoukoudian population within the Chinese family 
represented a matter of national interest. Ensuring that the earliest humans (and even 
hominids) in the area are designated Chinese is a political statement suggesting that 
modern Chinese are indigenous to the area—heirs to the original inhabitants with 
legitimate claims to a particular territory. The tactic thus meshes human and physical 
geography to make a nation (people + territory).  
 Li then went on to speculate about exactly how these remains fit into the national 
biography, but their variety of physical features made this a unique challenge. Following 
Blumenbach’s racial configuration, the “family” of the uppermost cave, according to 
Weidenreich, consisted of a “white” Eskimo, “yellow” Mongoloid, and “black” 
Melanesian. Ernest Hooton, Li’s adviser at Harvard, had written about this Chinese man 
with an Eskimo wife and a Melanesian wife in Up from the Ape.391 But Hooton 
substituted a “primitive European White” similar to the modern Ainu for Weidenreich’s 
primitive Mongoloid, and  
Everyone knows that modern Melanesians and Ainu, according to the 
system of racial classification,392 are respectively of the black race and 
white race…So according to the conclusions of Weidenreich and 
Professor Hooton, it seems as if the skeletal remains of Zhoukoudian’s 
uppermost cave represent a family formed from three different modern 
races of yellow, black, and white.  
 
This supposition presents an interesting quandary—if Li insisted on including this 
“peculiar family” in the history of the Chinese people it would directly counter earlier 
narratives of Chinese racial purity predicated on direct descent from a regal ancestor. Li’s 
dilemma, one assumes, was whether to sully Han blood by including other races in the 
genealogy or whether to exclude the Zhoukoudian remains altogether. Or as Li put it, in 
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an interesting equation of physiology and culture: “If we admit that Zhoukoudian upper 
cave culture is late Paleolithic Chinese culture, then we must as a matter of course admit 
that the human bones remaining there also represent part of the formation of the Chinese 
minzu at that time.” The operative phrase here is “part of”—the Zhoukoudian peoples 
may have contributed to the formation of the Chinese minzu, but there is no suggestion 
that the Chinese came of miscegenation of white, black, and yellow races. Conveniently 
by this time Li had moved beyond the simple ideas of racial purity held in the early 
Republic, but he retained the idea of the persistence of races.  
 Moving along chronologically in the narrative, he suggests that these prehistoric 
races exhumed at Zhoukoudian endured in China, later appearing in the ancient histories 
as crude ethnonyms: Annals of the two Zhou periods “record the appearance of peoples 
with black features,” and the Shanhaijing tells of a country of “Maomin (hairy people) 
corresponding exactly with Japan’s Ainu.”393 What these “reliable histories” suggest is 
that twenty thousand years after their appearance in the cave these same black and white 
races were still active in the Yellow River valley—and not exterminated by 
Weidenreich’s imagined Chinese (after all, as Li argues, it would be antithetical to the 
fundamental principles of the Chinese minzu to exterminate rather than educate a people 
of difference, a sentiment completely in line with Chiang Kaishek’s narrative in China’s 
Destiny).  
 Although the various races do transcend time, existing in the prehistoric, historic, 
and present, yet they clearly do not exist in modern China; therefore one must ask what 
became of these black and white races living within the realm of the Han. Li made it clear 
that they were not exterminated—the Chinese people are incapable of such an atrocity. 
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But neither was Li prepared to allow the “Chinese race” to become a hybridized 
derivation of older, and purer, foreign races. Instead he devised a means for the Chinese 
to become, via natural selection, a product of China itself. This again conflates geography 
with biology, enabling the yellow earth and the yellow river of northern China to spawn 
the yellow race. It has been said that the magic of nationalism turns chance into 
destiny,394 and in Li’s narrative we see this magic at work:  
China’s climatic cycle, soil quality, variety of grains, distribution of ores, 
and certain other as yet unknown elements within the natural environment 
collectively selected a black hair, yellow skin people as the masters of this 
piece of earth. Natural selection drove the ‘hairy people’ originally close 
to (part of) the white race to the eastern sea, while the originally diverse 
and numerous ‘short people’ of black blood lineage were driven to the 
southern hemisphere. The formation of the Chinese minzu occurred in the 
north—the northern yellow earth selected the physical characteristics of 
the Chinese minzu, just like the Baltic Sea produced the Nordic minzu; like 
the environment of India blackened island peoples; just like the forest 
climate of Africa enlarged the nostrils of the black race.395  
 
Echoing the environmental determinism and racial mutability from China’s Destiny, Li 
privileged phenotype over genotype, concluding:  
Environment is not all powerful, but present anthropologists make 
heredity too mysterious, always looking to heredity to explain everything. 
In the end, some things are still not clearly explained. We should put some 
effort into seeking the direct ties between man and nature.”396  
 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
 
 Following the discovery of Anyang in 1928 Li Chi devoted his life to studying 
China’s earliest historical period, but in fact he had pioneered Chinese archaeology when 
he discovered and excavated the Neolithic Yangshao finds at Xiyincun three years earlier. 
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Although preoccupied with Shang civilization, his interest in prehistory never waned, and 
he was determined to link the two. The discovery of Pleistocene-era human remains at 
Zhoukoudian in the 1920s marks the beginning of Chinese paleoanthropology, and in the 
1950s, following cessation of the Anyang excavation, years of warfare, and the move to 
Taiwan, Li found inspiration in China’s Destiny to devise a national narrative that would 
include Zhoukoudian’s Paleolithic remains, Neolithic Yangshao and Longshan cultures, 
the Shang, and modern Chinese. More particularly, it was Chiang’s trope of 
consanguinity among all China’s peoples, Han and minorities alike, that allowed Li to 
turn from earlier revolutionary-era ideas of racial purity and allow for a degree of racial 
mixing (although Li never embraced Chiang’s ideas wholesale). As Weidenreich, Black, 
and others had already pointed out, the Zhoukoudian remains were not only clearly 
different from modern Chinese, but they also represented what was considered a 
variegated mixture of races; therefore in order to include them in the national narrative Li 
suggested that these prehistoric peoples are part of the Chinese pedigree and therefore 
contributed to the development of the Chinese minzu. This allowance for integration 
certainly differs from Li’s earliest narratives and that of the revolutionaries, but jibes well 
with the official wartime narrative generated by Chiang Kaishek.  
 In one particular paragraph, for example, Li rejects the earlier proclivity to equate 
Chinese history with Han history, or in fact privileging any one race over another, in 
saying: “Supposing we didn’t have any preconceptions regarding the formation of racial 
properties of the Chinese minzu—we should then grant equal attention/weight to all 
colors of people within the realm of China and their place in China’s national history.” 
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Such an argument attempts to incorporate China’s marginalized peoples into the 
mainstream of the national narrative. He then continues: 
If it is true that a certain racial or ethnic constituent of a certain time 
period occupied a superior position within China’s realm—Mongols, 
Manchus—we cannot deny their contribution to the growth of the Chinese 
nation (minzu) in that period, but to say that they then represent the 
Chinese minzu of that period is clearly inconsistent with the facts. As with 
recent history, in ancient history and in prehistory the process of the 
formation of the Chinese minzu never really stagnated in a fixed stage. As 
a result, those referred to in history as the ‘Han minzu,’ ‘Zhou minzu,’ 
‘Yin minzu,’ ‘Xia minzu,’ none of these single races/clans (zu) in their 
heyday alone occupied all of China at that time.397  
 
What Li seems to be saying is that no particular ethnic group can represent all China or 
all Chinese (and most certainly not Manchus or Mongols), even if they held political 
control at a certain time. This apparently includes not only those formerly referred to as 
barbarians but the Han as well—the Chinese are not simply Han, but a broader, more 
diverse mix of peoples. He also makes plain that although the Chinese minzu spans time, 
prehistory to present, it “never really stagnated in a fixed stage” but has changed and 
evolved over time—in short, Li has worked the concept of racial mutability into the 
narrative. By this time Li professed a belief in the idea that environment determines the 
evolution of human morphology, or what biologists call “adaptive differentiation,” which 
for the Chinese race meant that China’s unique ecology and climate determined the 
Chinese somatotype. Historically, white and black (non-Yellow) racial elements were 
eventually drawn out of China to their own areas because the Yellow River region of the 
Central Plains was most conducive to developing the Yellow Race. 
 The final and perhaps most pronounced change in Li’s racial narrative of the 
Chinese involves the Yellow Emperor. Li believed that even as archaeological evidence, 
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including that accumulated by his own hand, suggested that the Yellow Emperor was a 
factual historical figure, by this time Li had rejected the Yellow Emperor as father of the 
Chinese race, an idea he now deems unscientific. All these revisions in Li’s narrative 
seem to have occurred in conjunction with the Japanese invasion and the government’s 
conscious efforts to retain and incorporate the periphery, hence the pronounced influence 
of China’s Destiny. Over the next several decades these trends continued, his ideas 
morphing into narratives now current and familiar. 
 
Anyang and the Chinese Race 
 
 A few years later, in 1953, Li presented a paper before the Eighth Pacific Science 
Congress entitled “Importance of the Anyang Discoveries in Prefacing Known Chinese 
History with a New Chapter.” As witnessed in Li’s dissertation, long before his 
excavation of Anyang Li subscribed to the prevalent idea that the Central Plain was the 
homeland of the Chinese people and cradle of their civilization. The discovery of Anyang 
only served to reinforce an inherent proclivity to privilege the north: “It has become 
abundantly clear, after the Anyang discoveries have been made, that the Early Historical 
Chinese Culture is essentially a North China creation.” According to Li the unique 
aspects of “oriental culture,” including the written script, scapulimancy, sericulture, and 
decorative art, all “originated and developed in North China, representing respectively 
the religious, economic and artistic life of the early Chinese.”398 Anyang provided not 
only the earliest known examples of scapulimancy and therefore a written script, but also 
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served as the link, both racially and culturally, between the inhabitants of Neolithic and 
historical north China.  
 With regard to the latter, Li explained that “skeletal remains recovered from the 
Anyang sites show an assemblage of physical traits deviating only within a limited scope 
from those of the aeneolithic northern Chinese.”399 This “limited deviation” refers to the 
higher figures in Li’s measurements of Anyang skulls: “The Yin people, in other words, 
possessed a bigger head than the prehistorical folks of North China.”400 Despite this 
anomaly, for Li “there is hardly any doubt that the Yin people were essentially 
mongoloid, just as the inhabitants of North China in the prehistorical period were, and the 
Chinese of the historical period have always been.”401 All evidence for this racial 
continuity he pins on a single physiological trait already familiar to the reader:  
I have examined, at random, most of the upper frontal incisors still 
existent and intact in the Hou-chia-chuang skulls, and found them all 
shovel-shaped. It is a well-known theory that this particular morphological 
character is distinctively Mongolian. The almost universal presence of 
such a physical trait among the Hou-chia-chuang skulls is sufficient to 
prove their racial character.402  
 
In other words, the Shang were decidedly Chinese.  
 In the Anyang finds Li perceived not only racial continuity but also a transcendent 
Chinese culture. “Many of the magnificent bronze articles discovered in Anyang derived 
their forms from Neolithic prototypes; the shapes of bronze vessels after those made of 
pottery and wood, and bronze tools and weapons copied faithfully shapes of those of the 
stone. The continuity of forms exhibited thru different media furnish another clue, 
indicating the close relationship of the Yin Culture to the culture developed in the 
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Neolithic age.”403 In all these links, whether racial or cultural, “early Chinese history was 
found merged into protohistory, and protohistory into prehistory in a close succession.”404 
 But having linked prehistoric and historic northern China, Li also emphasized that 
much greater continuity exists, whether ethnic, racial, cultural, or political, from Shang 
civilization to the Zhou and onward. And while in this instance Li limited his discussion 
of continuity to northern China, yet he went on to explain that the core did not develop 
independent of other influences; it was in fact  
enriched by the ability of the people responsible for this culture, to absorb 
all the useful cultural elements thru actual contacts with alien nations and 
adopt a receptive attitude towards new ideas, whose world migration was 
already current at the close of the Neolithic time.405  
 
In other words, although the seed of the Chinese nation germinated in the Central Plains, 
the increasing movement of people and ideas enabled the nascent Chinese nation to 
enhance itself by “absorbing” useful elements from other, outside groups. This 
acknowledges migration, contact, and cultural exchange with “alien” peoples in the 
process of national development. Traditionally cultural borrowing was thought of as 
unidirectional—from the center outward, with barbarians adopting sinic civilization 
rather than the other way around. This theme of the core’s assimilation of alien cultural 
elements, though barely touched on here, harkens back to China’s Destiny and became 
increasingly conspicuous in Li’s later narratives as we shall see. But at this time Li 
limited exchanges and assimilation to “cultural elements” and “ideas,” refusing to follow 
Chiang’s lead in proclaiming an all-out racial integration of China. The biological unity 
of the Chinese was a trope that would only emerge later in Li’s discourses. 
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The Beginnings of Chinese Civilization 
 
 In the mid-1950s when the University of Washington issued an invitation for Li to 
visit as a lecturer on ancient China he again revisited the question of Chinese morphology, 
beginning his lectures with the question of “the racial history of the Chinese people.”406 
After relating the multiracial properties of Zhoukoudian’s upper cave, he concluded that 
the Ainu element “played an important role in the formation of the Chinese people in the 
protohistorical period,” but they were a minority.407 Likewise the Melanesian element is 
confirmed by China’s ancient artworks, replete with figures “Negroid in appearance.”408 
Li is careful to point out, however, that “down to the close of the Neolithic time in North 
China, the people who dominated this area were Mongoloid,” a phenotype “essentially 
similar to that represented by the present-day Northern Chinese.”409 Due to this 
continuity, prehistoric north China populations could be called “proto-Chinese.”  
 Note here that although Li made steps toward incorporating historically marginal 
peoples in mainstream Chinese history (a la China’s Destiny) they play only an ancillary 
role—therefore he remains narrowly focused on the peoples of northern China, a 
proclivity he never fully abandoned. According to Li, the thread that binds northern 
Chinese, or Han, across time is the atavistic shovel-shaped upper incisor, a single link in 
the “evolutionary series of the Mongolian race” from Peking Man to modern Han. But 
while physical characteristics serve as the most important or salient criteria for defining 
the Chinese minzu, significantly he now allows for impurity, even going so far as to 
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suggest that the formation of the Chinese people came from the mixing of these early 
Neolithic “races.” But he again emphasizes that the principal component of the Chinese is 
the Mongoloid (elsewhere referred to as Yellow) race that developed east of the Ural 
Mountains. This last point anchors Chinese origins within Asia and prevents the Chinese 
people from becoming a mere younger offshoot of older foreign races.  
 
Racial History of the Chinese People 
 
 
 Over a decade later, in 1969, the Journal of the China Society featured a renewed 
discourse by Li Chi concerning “The Racial History of the Chinese People.” In it he 
made clear that the two principal criteria in identifying the Chinese minzu are once again 
both race and culture, but of these “the formation of the Chinese people in a cultural 
sense is richly documented both in the written records and the archaeological remains. As 
for the racial aspect, the data are only gradually accumulating.”410 Li therefore attempted 
to shed some light on this opaque but, to him, paramount topic. By this time, however, 
due mainly to World War II and the horrors of holocaust, anthropometry had become 
associated with racism and Li was forced to rely on dated studies from the 1920s and 
1930s as well as his own continuing work to formulate a theory on the biological 
component of the Chinese minzu. Though his sources remained obsolete and he reiterated 
many of his earlier ideas, even so this article also marks a clear transition in Li’s 
historiography, a break from earlier paradigms of discrete racial groups that transcend 
time to a more politically acceptable narrative that supported Chiang’s official line. 
 Still adhering to Blumenbach’s racial schema, Li believed that the Chinese exhibit 
physical traits “considered to be typical of the Mongoloid race, such as the hair structure, 
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the pigmentation, and the peculiar anatomy [shovel shape] of the incisor teeth.”411 But the 
most apparent biological trait the Chinese share is a physiognomy, or composite of facial 
features. According to Li this includes almond-shaped eyes, Mongoloid folds, a flattish 
forehead, depressed nasal root, high cheek bone, and broad, flat face.412 Most important 
of these “typical Mongoloid characteristics” are the almond eye, with “moderately or 
slightly sloping” eye slits, and the wide bizygomatic (cheekbone to cheekbone) 
measurement of the face.413 As in his “Origins of the Chinese People” from two decades 
earlier, Li still subscribed to the climatic interpretation of environmental determinism as 
an explanation for this unique Chinese physiognomy: 
The particular facial appearance of the Mongoloid people had its origin, 
according to this theory, in the necessity of fighting against the bitterly 
cold weather during the last glacial age, when a group of early 
Mongoloids were trapped in the dry cold region somewhere east of the 
Ural Mountains in northeastern Siberia. Man at that time had already 
invented both shelter and clothing which was sufficient to protect his body, 
but his face was by necessity exposed. This severe cold climate wiped out 
those who were physically unfit by the spread of pneumonia and sinus 
infection. Those who happen to be naturally protected in the sinus region 
and the eye region by a heavily padded layer of fatty substance 
[Mongoloid fold] and possessed smaller nasal apertures, were better 
qualified to survive in this kind of climate than their fellow creatures 
devoid of these natural gifts. The result of this severe struggle is the 
development of the Mongoloid physiognomy.414  
 
 Despite this and other pronouncements on the Chinese somatotype, Li was quick 
to acknowledge China’s great diversity: “The Chinese people are by no means 
homogeneous in their physical attributes; they vary from locality to locality.” For 
instance, northern Chinese are taller than southern Chinese; nasal indexes also differ 
strikingly from north to south. “One finds in Shandong as well as in Gansu 
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concentrations of long-headed people, while in central China, like Hunan, Hubei and 
certain parts of Fujian near the eastern coast, the local populations are quite broad-
headed;” For Li these quantifiable biological differences are not only “anthropologically 
significant” but demonstrate “the great variability of the physical character of the living 
Chinese population.”415  
 But this paradigm still suggests, if not purity, at least predictability, with Chinese 
of a certain region collectively possessing a certain set of physical traits. Such a view 
again tends to conflate human and physical geography, with certain phenotypes endemic 
to a particular location. The Han, as one such subset of the Chinese people, supposedly 
remain concentrated in their homeland of the Central Plains. Once again Li cited 
Stevenson’s anthropometrical study of Chinese in the three core provinces of Henan, 
Hebei, and Shandong, “where ancient Chinese civilization had its roots.”416 If, as it was 
believed, the Han continuously occupied this cradle of Chinese civilization, its population 
would then more fully exhibit the vestigial anatomy of the earliest Chinese. Han would 
therefore represent the Chinese archetype; others are merely thematic variations on an 
original.  
 He first examined data from Chinese heads at five temporal stages, or what he 
called the “Chinese cranial series,” beginning with the Paleolithic upper cave at 
Zhoukoudian, then the Neolithic prehistoric period, through the Shang dynasty, the Sui-
Tang period, concluding with modern Northern Chinese.417 This allowed him to trace the 
evolution of the Han from earliest homo sapiens in China to the present. Li then placed 
this linear development of the Chinese minzu within a broader, global context: 
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Employing the CRL, or Coefficient of Racial Likeness, he used another study to compare 
this Chinese series with surrounding “Oriental and non-Oriental races of Asia.” From this 
data Li concluded that the Chinese constitute a somatotype distinct from non-Mongoloid 
races, as one would expect, but also distinct from other “Oriental” or Mongoloid peoples 
such as northern Mongolians, Tibetans, Javanese, and Filipinos (although the Japanese 
were grouped with the Chinese).418 One may then conclude that the Chinese are today 
distinguishable by physical traits. But when exactly did the Chinese emerge as a distinct 
biological group? Li suggests this happened only in the historical period.  
 The reader will recall that in 1953 Li noted marked differences in material culture, 
politics, and biology (cranial size) in the transition from prehistoric to historic China but 
greater continuity from Shang civilization onward. In 1969, while he depicted prehistoric 
China as racially and culturally heterogeneous, Li saw in historic China ever increasing 
homogeneity. Li himself had uncovered the many interred skeletons at Anyang, which 
upon examination suggested that a mix of racial groups existed in China from the earliest 
historical period.419 Though he had earlier dismissed the non-Mongoloid races as simply 
foreign invaders executed or sacrificed, and therefore not representative of the Shang 
royal house, by 1969 he had revised his theory, suggesting that 
in the latter part of the 2nd millennium BC, north China was a meeting 
place for a variety of peoples: Eskimoid, Mongoloid, Australoid, Negroid, 
Caucasoid and a number of others….These identifications serve to 
indicate that the Chinese of this period were already in a melting pot.420 
 
The idea of a “melting pot” marks a significant deviation from Li’s earlier narratives, 
especially those of the Nationalist period. Not only did ancient China have a racially 
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diverse population, as acknowledged previously, but Li now envisioned a great deal of 
historical intermixing among these peoples. 
 As evidence Li appealed to historical records that relate how repeated barbarian 
invasions resulted in a “process of hybridization among different clans” of China.421  
The movement started with foreign invasions from the north, activating 
the momentum of the mass migration towards the south. The remnant 
indigenous people in north China, as a consequence, absorbed the invaders 
from the steppes, while emigrants from the Yellow River basin who 
crossed the Yangzi River and settled further south, mixed to some degree 
with the indigenous population of the southern territory. 
 
So in the north the Han assimilated invaders while those Han who diffused outward from 
the Central Plains ended up mixing with locals. These migration patterns have occurred 
continuously over time, in both large and small waves. “One of the main results of this 
perpetual motion as evidenced by the continuous historical marches is the highly 
hybridized character of the Chinese of the present day, homogenized by a unique 
culture.”422 For Li many different racial elements converged within China to produce the 
genetically “hybrid” Chinese people, who all share a single “culture” that unites and 
distinguishes them as a nation. And what is this homogenizing culture? According to Li, 
Confucianism “helped Chinese statesmen for more than 2,000 years to forge many racial 
elements into one people, and many local cultures into one civilization.”423 
 Li Chi’s 1969 narrative corroborates the official Republic of China version of 
national history. Chiang Kaishek, in China’s Destiny, had described how barbarian 
invasions precipitated migrations, and these migrations led to greater contact and 
intermixing of China’s various peoples: “As they [the clans] shared living space over the 
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past five thousand years, opportunities for contact were prevalent, and with the close 
proximity of their migrations and movements they continuously met and blended into a 
single nation (minzu).”424 But Chiang also explained that it was Han culture, with origins 
in the Central Plains, which facilitated the gradual homogenization of China’s various 
peripheral clans: “When the Western Jin suffered the chaos of the five barbarians, the 
Hanzu moved southward, and the Yellow River basin became the dominion of the 
barbarians. But all these barbarian clans gradually became Hanified (Hanhua).”425 He 
then recounts how with each successive barbarian invasion into the Central Plains, the 
Tartars, Mongols, and Manchus successively succumbed to Hanification. Thus “the 
Chinese nation, by virtue of its great and enduring culture, could assimilate the four 
surrounding clans.”426  
 Certainly what Chiang referred to as Han culture could otherwise be called 
Confucianism. Despite the universalist application of his ideology, Confucius himself 
was born in present day Shandong province along the path of the Yellow River, and those 
works attributed either to him or his disciples depict a sage who looked to early antiquity, 
particularly the Zhou dynasty, as both a golden age and a standard to be emulated. 
Beginning with the Han dynasty subsequent political authorities, from their northern 
capitals, often used this ideology and its adherents to administer their empire. After 
completing the Northern Campaign and reuniting China under his government, Chiang 
himself had initiated a New Life Movement intended to imbibe Chinese society with both 
Confucian and military values. The culture of the Han would also serve as his means of 
governing China and assimilating peripheral groups. 
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 The prerequisite for being considered Chinese, it seems, was Hanification, but for 
both Chiang Kaishek and Li Chi assimilation entailed not only cultural but biological 
transformation. In Chiang’s version the various clans, though separate and distinct, all 
descended from a common origin and are therefore of one race. Moreover the tendency to 
intermarry means that all clans share bloodlines. Likewise Li explained that although 
Confucianism defined the culture of the Chinese, north China’s environment guided the 
process of natural selection that determined the Chinese somatotype. He had earlier 
described in explicit detail how this environment prefigured the form of the Chinese body, 
but now environment was also a means of homogenizing and therefore unifying the 
Chinese body politic, a process that occurred along with cultural homogenization.  
 Whereas earlier paradigms had emphasized divisions among China’s peoples, 
particularly distinguishing Han from Manchus which enabled revolutionaries like Sun 
Yatsen to attack the Qing dynasty, Li now emphasized a separation of the modern 
Chinese nation from its racially and culturally heterogeneous ancestry. In speaking of 
environmentally-determined evolution, Li explained: “By continually moulding and 
remoulding the physical as well as the mental character of its inhabitants, this process 
developed a modern type of Chinese widely divergent from that of their Neolithic 
ancestors.”427 According to Li’s 1969 narrative, there now exists a notable break between 
the prehistoric and historic peoples of China—in examining human remains, specimen of 
the historical period biologically resemble one another to a far greater extent than they 
resemble specimen of the prehistoric period. “Thus, in spite of the wide range of 
anthropometrical variations made apparent by recent surveys among the living 
inhabitants, a more or less convergent somatotype seems to be emerging in continental 
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China.” The trend is toward greater and greater biological homogeneity due to 
intermixing and intermingling of peoples from China’s various regions. Due to this 
intermixing Li summarily condemns those who “insist on the existence of a pure Chinese 
stock,” concluding that “there has never been any ‘pure race’ on this planet of ours. This 
theory, in my opinion, can be fully confirmed by the racial history of the Chinese 
people.”428 Despite its perpetuation of some earlier motifs, this article exhibits 
remarkable deviations from revolutionary narratives of racial purity and closer alignment 
with Chiang’s politically-motivated narrative of national uniformity as laid out in China’s 
Destiny.  
 
A Final Word on the Chinese Race  
 
 In 1977 Li published Anyang, a succinct narrative of the discovery and excavation 
of the Shang capital and the conclusions he had spent a lifetime formulating. In this Li 
offered what turned out to be his final thoughts on the matter of the Chinese race. The 
stark differences with his dissertation fifty-four years earlier reflect the evolution not 
simply of Li Chi’s ideas of the Chinese nation but, more broadly, changes in society and 
politics that occurred during that period. 
 In 1923 Li had defined the Han in part as “the silk-wearing, rice-eating, and city 
building Descendents of the Yellow Emperor.”429 In 1977, however, Li referred to the 
Yellow Emperor and his purported role as father of the Chinese race, as well as to 
recorded accounts of the founder of Xia (and therefore the foundations of dynastic China), 
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as “legends.” He did emphasize that modern scientific archaeology confirmed their 
legendary accomplishments in the very region they reputedly took place—northern China 
and the Yellow River valley—and his own archaeological work at Anyang lent credence 
to certain historical accounts, particularly that of Sima Qian who began his chronology 
with the Yellow Emperor; yet late in his career we find Li dismissing the popular view of 
a regal ascendant of the Han as both legendary and unscientific.430 
 And whereas Li had earlier subscribed to the idea perpetuated by revolutionaries 
that both Han and minorities transcend time as discrete groups, with not only distinct 
origins and lineages but homelands, histories, languages, cultures, and biology (and the 
tacit assumption that these would remain separate and distinct in the future), he gradually 
rejected purity in favor of the lately developed and politically sanctioned theory of 
assimilation. When the Institute of History and Philology created a special section for 
analysis of the skeletal remains collected at Anyang, the Institute invited the respected 
biometrician Wu Dingliang to lead the investigation. These samples certainly constituted 
a heterogeneous group, with Li still employing Blumenbach’s racial terms such as 
Mongoloid, Melanesian or Oceanic Negroid, Caucasoid, and Eskimoid. But unlike his 
earlier conclusions, in which he believed the non-Mongoloid specimen to be simply 
captured enemies or foreign invaders and therefore unrelated to the Chinese, late in his 
career he continued to emphasize that “in both anthropometrical measurements and 
morphological characteristics, the Anyang crania…indicate a mixed character that is no 
doubt the result of a mixed race.”431 He went on to say that “from the very beginning, the 
north China plain was a meeting place of many different ethnic stocks and it is partly 
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from the mixture of these groups that the early Chinese population was formed.” So now, 
at the end of Li’s life, Han lineage is no longer the neat genealogical line of descent from 
the Yellow Emperor as imagined by revolutionaries and accepted earlier by Li himself; 
rather, the revised narrative depicts Han ancestry as a complex amalgam of disparate 
races.  
 Despite late acceptance of the innovative melting pot analogy, Li still maintained 
a proclivity for continuity in adhering to the concept of a Chinese homeland in the central 
plains, and in adding the caveat “we must not forget that the dominant group among these 
stocks was indubitably the Mongoloid group.” As for the non-Mongoloid minorities: 
“Physical anthropologists have occasionally found traces of kinky hair in an 
anthropometric survey of the Chinese population, indicating the survival of some 
Papuans or Melanesians; but these are relatively rare indeed.” Similarly for the Caucasoid, 
as “it is still difficult to say how many of their genes could be definitely shown in the 
modern Chinese.”432 So in the end Li allowed for assimilation of other races into the 
dominant Mongoloid group, a mixture which produced the Chinese somatotype. Since 
the Shang dynasty, or in other words during the historical period, the constant movement 
and migration of what had been distinct groups led to greater and greater homogenization 
of the Chinese people, producing the modern Chinese nation. 
It seems that while racialism of the early twentieth century emphasized the 
eternally discrete nature of groups, the desire for national unity precipitated by the 
Japanese threat and the backlash against racism since WWII led to the other extreme, 
suggesting that purity does not exist—instead mixing is constant and absolute. Li’s 
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revisions follow Chiang Kaishek’s official narrative and parallel developments in the 
mainland PRC to be discussed in the chapter following. 
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FEI XIAOTONG AND THE CHINESE SNOWBALL:  
OFFICIAL NARRATIVES OF HAN AND THE CHINESE NATION IN THE PRC 
AND BEYOND, 1950-2007 
 
 
 
Schism: The End of Nationalist Archaeology 
  
 Japan’s surrender in August of 1945 brought an end to both WWII and the 
Japanese presence in China, allowing the longstanding rivalry between the Nationalists 
and Communists to escalate into full blown civil war. By 1948, as Red Army forces 
overwhelmed Chiang’s troops, the ROC government, including the Academia Sinica, 
began a mass evacuation to Taiwan. Scholars now faced the weighty decision of whether 
to retreat with Chiang’s government or to stay in “liberated” China under Mao’s regime. 
 While Li Chi and Ling Chunsheng chose to follow the Nationalist government 
into exile across the strait, many of their students and colleagues remained behind: Liang 
Siyong, Guo Baojun, Wu Jinding, and Xia Nai stayed in the mainland to guide 
archaeology under the Peoples Republic of China.433 Mao’s new regime founded the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences,434 a PRC equivalent of the ROC Academia Sinica, each 
the ranking think tank for its respective government. Like Li Chi’s Archaeology Section 
now in Taiwan, in 1950 CAS formed its own Institute of Archaeology to preside over that 
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aspect of the national biography project for the PRC.435 In these first decades, under Li 
Chi’s protégés, mainland archaeology followed the conventional sinocentric (Hancentric) 
focus on the Yellow River region tracing the roots of the Han even as it substantiated 
Marxist stage theory.  
 Early Marxist historians like Guo Moruo had established a new interpretation of 
Chinese history relying on Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the 
State, a work which was in part inspired by Lewis Henry Morgan’s theories of society’s 
origins and evolution as found in Ancient Society. While these foreign texts served as 
Guo’s theoretical base he cited Chinese classical records as source material and, to a 
lesser extent, archaeological findings in order to trace China’s social development 
through six universal historical stages, beginning with primitive communalism, then slave 
society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally communism. The first stage in this 
linear progression—that of primitive communalism—is characterized by matriarchy, clan 
society, and pronounced lack of both social classes and personal property. For Guo this 
coincided with the Stone and Bronze Ages, persisting through the Shang dynasty until the 
Western Zhou when the Iron Age precipitated the first great “social revolution”: iron 
made farming and animal husbandry a man’s business, relegating women to a position of 
dependency and eventually slavery. This development ushered in patriarchal society, the 
separation of social classes, the rise of emperors, kings, and states, and personal 
possessions. Thus begins civilization and the practice of man extorting man, with only 
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two classes in existence—slaves and those who owned them, the upper class. This slave 
society arose from the subjugation of the weak and susceptible in one’s own group, 
including women, and from conquering other ethnic groups.  
 Only after the Eastern Zhou did China truly enter the feudal stage, where it 
remained for over two thousand years. During that protracted time slaves continually 
revolted against and overthrew dynasties, but the shrewd simply set up new dynasties and 
the means of production essentially remained unchanged. The Taiping Revolution was 
among these failed slave uprisings, but finally the “capitalist revolution” of 1911 
simultaneously ended the dynastic cycle and the feudal stage in China, ushering in the 
age of capitalism. The victory of Mao’s Red Army and subsequent establishment of the 
PRC heralded the socialist epoch and the inexorable march toward society’s final utopian 
state, that of true communism.436 Thus scholars like Guo applied the universalities of 
Marxist stage theory to the particularities of China’s past. Establishment of the PRC, 
under which this Marxist interpretation of Chinese history became orthodox, ensured that 
this diachronic paradigm served as the metanarrative for historians, archaeologists, and 
anthropologists alike.  
 As discussed in chapter one, in the revolutionary period classical texts and 
imperial records became the history of modern Han. Li Chi’s excavation of Anyang 
proved the existence of the Shang dynasty, which both silenced skeptics who had served 
as a critical check to nationalist imaginings and enabled the Han to trace their roots back 
to China’s earliest historical period. Li Chi and others then extended the search to 
                                                
436 Guo Moruo, Zhongguo gudai shehui yanjiu, 4th ed. (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1960). The first edition 
was published in 1930 but remained staple reading for PRC scholars. 
126 
 
China’s prehistory, seeking to link Longshan and Yangshao cultures and even Peking 
Man to an established literate Han civilization. 
 Li’s colleagues and students who remained in the PRC continued his legacy, 
illustrated most clearly in the case of the Xia dynasty. In 1959 archaeologists discovered 
a settlement at Yanshi that they claim was the capital of the Xia dynasty, a link between 
the prehistoric Longshan culture and the historic Shang dynasty. The ongoing debate 
about whether this site in fact represents the Xia dynasty referenced in certain histories is 
less compelling than the PRC insistence on working this discovery into the national 
narrative. The Chinese state sponsored and continues to endorse a largely discredited 
Chronology Project437 that linked the Xia, Shang, and Zhou civilizations into a neat linear 
series which, when linked to later dynasties, culminates with the PRC itself.438 Ultimately 
this is an exercise in self-aggrandizement and political legitimization, pushing the current 
regime’s roots further into China’s remote past. Such a tactic of course lacked originality; 
each new regime, once established, commissioned its own official history by which it 
effectively grafted itself onto the earlier dynasties. But as Barry Sautman and others have 
noted, PRC scholars in fact took Li’s search for continuity to its extreme, arguing that 
Chinese civilization predates any others and even that the earliest hominids originated in 
China.439  
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 Yet in spite of their intellectual debt to the father of Chinese archaeology,440 in the 
1950s the preeminent PRC archaeology journal, Kaogu tongxun (now Kaogu), issued a 
series of criticisms roundly denouncing Li Chi and his methods as tools of capitalism and 
imperialism.441 Foreigners in the early twentieth century had suggested that China lacked 
an indigenous culture—their imperialist agenda instead led them to postulate that 
Western culture diffused into China, which relegated the Chinese to a position of 
inferiority as a mere offshoot of Western civilization. These articles included several 
quotes from Li as proof that he also believed Chinese culture originated in the West, 
summarily placing him in the capitalist and imperialist camp (he had, after all, received 
his training in the United States). The reader will recognize from previous chapters the 
absurdity of this accusation, yet due to his ties with the US and the Guomindang Li and 
his works remained anathema in the mainland for decades. During the Cultural 
Revolution archaeologists were subject to harassment for teaching from Li’s texts. One 
scholar vividly recalls being forced to wear a dunce cap and stand in front of a jeering 
crowd as he hung his head and withstood verbal abuse from his colleagues. His house 
was raided and turned upside down, frightening his family and damaging personal 
possessions.442 Li of course was safely in Taiwan by then, but he was not ignorant of the 
smear campaign. In 1962, perhaps in response to such radical politicization of himself, Li 
referred to the PRC as “a totalitarian regime which has manpower to spare and uses 
archaeology as an effective political instrument.”443  
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 It was not until the post-Mao reform era that Li received posthumous exoneration 
in the same publication that had sullied his legacy, first when Xia Nai contributed an 
article acknowledging his mentor’s role in the early history of Chinese archaeology444 
and then in 1982, when the journal featured a piece on “Li Chi’s Life and Academic 
Contribution.”445 Following the rehabilitation of Li’s reputation (along with millions of 
other “rightists”) his son, who had remained in China since 1949, began authoring books 
and articles culminating in a five volume collection of Li Chi’s works,446 all published in 
the mainland.447 While during his lifetime Li felt betrayed in the way former friends, 
colleagues, and students treated his life’s work, in his absence from the mainland he 
certainly escaped far worse. 
  
Ethnic Identification Work in the PRC
448
 
 
 In the wake of war the ROC government, as a member of the victorious Allies, 
stationed representatives in occupied Japan. Li Chi served as a cultural adviser to this 
Chinese delegation, his duty being the location and repatriation of important cultural 
relics plundered by the Japanese during their occupation of China (including a failed 
search for the Peking Man skull).449 Wu Wenzao’s Qinghua University colleague, who 
directed the group, appointed Wu to head the commission’s political organization and in 
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this capacity he served as adviser for the Chinese delegation to the Allied committee on 
Japan. As a noted sociologist, however, his duties in Japan also included understanding 
both US army occupation policy and Japanese society generally. By the time of the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October of 1949 Li had already 
rejoined the Nationalist government in Taiwan, but Wu was still working as their 
representative in Japan. After careful deliberation he decided to resign his post and sever 
ties with the ROC government, but because of his previous affiliation with the 
Guomindang he had serious misgivings about returning home (and for good reason, as 
illustrated in Li Chi’s case). Therefore, relying on a Singapore newspaper reporter ID, he 
remained in Tokyo for a full year waiting for events in the mainland to unfold. In fall of 
1951, though extended an invitation to teach sociology at Yale, he returned to New China 
to rejoin former students Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua in what became the monumental 
“ethnic identification project.”450  
 Due to official repudiation of the disciplines of anthropology and sociology (the 
former because of ties to Western imperialism, and the latter because it was conflated 
with socialism) the new government closed down academic departments and assigned 
veteran social scientists like Wu, Fei and Lin to the task of identifying minorities, 
formulating minority policy, and training minority cadres.451  Most of this work 
was concentrated at the Central Institute for Nationalities (CIN), a latter incarnation of 
the pre-liberation Yan’an Institute for Nationalities.452 As the ranking state body for 
minority research, CIN, with Fei as deputy director, advised the State Ethnic Affairs 
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Commission453 on minority policy while presiding over a hierarchy of provincial and 
local branches throughout the country much like the Institute of Archaeology presided 
over a hierarchy of archaeology institutions throughout China.454 
 After several years of fieldwork this corps of scholars, and hence the state itself, 
came to recognize a total of fifty-six ethnic groups or “nationalities,” namely the Han, 
Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan already well established by revolutionaries and the 
ROC, but now additionally the Uygur, Miao, Yi, Zhuang, Bouyei, Korean, Dong, Yao, 
Bai, Tujia, Hani, Kazak, Dai, Li, Lisu, Va, She, Lahu, Shui, Dongxiang, Naxi, Jingpo, 
Kirgiz, Tu, Daur, Mulam, Qiang, Blang, Salar, Maonan, Gelo, Xibe, Achang, Pumi, Tajik, 
Nu, Ozbek, Russian, Ewenki, Deang, Bonan, Yugur, Jing, Tatar, Drung, Oroqen, Hezhen, 
Moinba, Lhoba, Jino, and Gaoshan (Taiwan’s “mountain people”).455 Today every citizen 
of the PRC identifies with one of these fifty-five minority groups or, by default, with the 
Han.456  
 Once all nationalities were identified, in 1956 Fei Xiaotong found himself “in 
charge of supervising the task of studying the social development of the national 
minorities of China organized by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress.”457 It was emphasized that this national minorities work in New China differed 
from anthropology, the instrument of Western imperialism. The Marxist interpretation of 
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history indeed promoted a view that divided Chinese society into oppressor and 
oppressed, and minorities typically fell into the latter category. As Fei explained:  
Despite their different conditions, all the nationalities have always been 
under the government of the common power prevailing over China. The 
unitary state of China, built with common labor by her different 
nationalities, was for a long time under the rule of reactionary classes 
which pursued a policy of national oppression. Emperors, kings, warlords, 
and the Kuomintang, a reactionary government who ruled over China for 
centuries, adopted oppressive policies against these national minorities to 
obstruct their development.458 
 
In the most recent era, “before liberation, the reactionary Kuomintang government 
practiced national oppression and pursued a policy of forced assimilation of the 
minorities. The latter were forced to speak and use the Han language.”459 Such an attitude 
was condemned as “Han chauvinism”460 and, although it persisted under the PRC, the 
communist party had supposedly established a system that would wipe out such inequity.  
 But in their zeal to right past wrongs the Party ironically furthered social 
inequality that favored the Han. As minorities “remained more backward economically 
than the Hans, and some of the others remained in still more primitive stages of social 
development,” Han became the vanguard of social evolution—those who had progressed 
farthest along the evolutionary trajectory while minority tribes remained stuck in the 
earlier stages of development, in need of Han patronage, leadership, and direction.461 
Thus “the Hans, with the largest population and relatively more advanced economy and 
culture, have played an important role in propelling the societies of the minorities 
forward.” It seems the Han remained not only a pinnacle and standard for minorities to 
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follow but now the PRC had gone so far as to transform them into saviors of the Chinese 
nation—hardly the socialist egalitarianism proclaimed by the Party.  
 But still there were no studies of the Han nationality in these years—only 
minorities were subject to so-called “nationality studies,” and these were defined against 
a putative Han identity, both culturally and linguistically (biological differences, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, were no longer regarded). In the Republican period 
sociologists in China (and not all were Chinese scholars) had engaged in community 
studies, a movement Wu Wenzao in particular had fostered.462 These typically involved 
discrete communities that happened to be Han but did not attempt any holistic research 
on the Han as an ethnic group. Now, however, all their earlier works, whether 
sociological or ethnographic, were dismissed as “old books” produced by their previous 
bourgeois selves.463 Because sociology and anthropology did not officially exist, and 
belief in the Han served Party interests, critical examination of the Han would have been 
ideologically heterodox and therefore dangerous; any possibility of such inquiry would 
have to await post-Mao reforms. 
   
 
II. INVERSION: ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CENTER AND ARCHAEOLOGY 
OF THE PERIPHERY  
  
 For seven years, until the autumn of 1957, Fei assisted the state in studying 
China’s minorities. His work came to an abrupt halt with the anti-rightist campaign, the 
same movement that ensnared countless other intellectuals as dissidents and 
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counterrevolutionaries. Lin Yaohua, a long time friend and colleague, publicly 
denounced him in a particularly scathing letter.464 Of all this Fei related:  
In 1957 when some friends proposed rehabilitating sociology in China I 
said a few words in concurrence. At that time, the country was in the 
middle of an exaggerated struggle against Rightists and many veterans in 
Chinese sociological circles were wrongly branded as bourgeois Rightists. 
I was not excluded….My life in the years from 1957 to 1979, including 
the ten years of the so-called “cultural revolution” was inevitably very 
abnormal. I could no longer carry on social studies as an academician.465 
 
During those years Fei kept a low profile and companied with Wu Wenzao and Pan 
Guangdan, the three of them studying and publishing under pseudonyms when able. 
During the Cultural Revolution they were again targeted and sent to an infamous May 
Fourth Cadre School for labor reform. Fei confessed that he accomplished little in these 
intervening years, apparently too occupied with menial labor such as steaming buns for 
his work unit to devote himself to intellectual pursuits.466  
   
The Han Snowball: Fei Xiaotong and the Revised Narrative, 1978-2005 
  
 After the death of Mao and the trial of the Gang of Four, millions who had been 
targeted as “rightists” or “counterrevolutionaries” shed their labels and, if they had 
survived the purge, attempted to reintegrate into society. The proscription against 
sociology and anthropology was also lifted. Fei recalled that “after the calamitous decade, 
I was assigned in 1978 to re-establish sociological studies in the Academy of Social 
                                                
464 R. David Arkush, Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1981). 
465 Fei, Toward a People’s Anthropology, iii-iv. 
466 From an interview with Huang Shuping, a close colleague of Fei and professor emeritus at Zhongshan 
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Sciences,” a branch of CAS.467 That same year the central government re-established the 
National Ethnic Affairs Commission468 and appointed an aging Fei Xiaotong to 
spearhead that effort. He also served as vice president of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress, sat as a judge at the trial of the Gang of Four, and in and in 1979 
it was announced that Fei would head the newly formed Chinese Society of Sociology. 
Apparently among his colleagues it was often asked whether Fei was a scholar or 
politician.469 In 1988 he said of himself: “I have become a high-level promoter. I analyze 
what is going on, describe it, and advise those who control policy.”470 Given Fei’s 
peerless academic and political influence it comes as no surprise that his narrative of the 
Han became orthodox. 
  Since its introduction into China by Cai Yuanpei half a century earlier ethnology 
had examined only minority groups, and as late as 1972 Western observers reported: “As 
far as we were able to determine, no cultural anthropological studies per se are being 
done on Han Chinese peoples.”471 Yet today the Chinese Ethnology Society has formed 
an ancillary Han Research Society,472 and the anthropologist Xu Jieshun, now China’s 
foremost authority on the Han, has published a prolific number of anthropological 
analyses of the majority ethnic group. But it was China’s most famous social scientist, 
Fei Xiaotong, who presided over the rehabilitation of sociology and anthropology in the 
reform era and directed efforts toward revision of the national narrative, eventually 
paving the way for Han studies in China. 
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 The new paradigm is easily summarized by Fei’s pithy phrase duoyuan yiti, now a 
popularized slogan which literally means “many sources one body,” or from plurality to 
unity—e pluribus unum.473 For Fei, the Han constitute an absorptive center, a core that 
over time assimilated outside groups and grew to become the Chinese nation, zhonghua 
minzu, coterminous with the present state boundaries. His first exposition on the subject 
occurred in 1988 when he was invited to present the Tanner Lecture on Human Values at 
the University of Hong Kong. In this initial introduction to his theory he relied heavily on 
archaeology, classical texts, and ethnology in tracing the history of the Han from their 
prehistoric origins within China to the present day:474 
 “Three thousand years [BC], a nucleus assembled in the middle reaches of the 
Yellow River and gradually melded together a number of national groups. Known as 
Huaxia, this nucleus attracted all groups around it, growing larger like a snowball.” Note 
first that Fei no longer traces Han lineage to the Yellow Emperor, now a symbol of “Han 
chauvinism.” Instead he invokes an ancient ethnonym referring to the peoples of the 
Yellow River valley—Hua derived from Mount Hua, one of the five sacred mountains in 
China; and Xia from the society that occupied that region just prior to advent of historical 
records.475 Although Fei did not coin the term, following his invocation Huaxia replaced 
the Yellow Emperor in national genesis narratives.  
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  As the Huaxia snowball rolled along, “The ethnic entity of the Hans grew 
steadily by their absorption of other groups”476 until “the unification of central China by 
the Qin empire was the last step which completed the development of the Han 
community into an ethnic or national entity.”477 “This meant the economic, political, and 
cultural unification of the Chinese as a nation” over two thousand years ago.478 Whereas 
Sun Yat-sen had wished in the future to unite all races “in a single cultural and political 
whole,”479 Fei believed that this had been accomplished long ago by the Qin dynasty, 
after which the Han snowball continued to expand: “China was a great melting pot with 
the Hans as the nucleus during the six centuries from Tang through Song,”480 and “the 
Mongols and Manchus merged with the Hans in large numbers after the fall of their 
empires.”481 This of course was the direction Li Chi seemed to be headed—the melting 
pot idea taken to its conclusion. 
 Fei then asks: “What, then, has made the Hans a nucleus with such centripetal 
force? The main factor, in my view, has been their agricultural economy.”482 Fei in fact 
frequently refers to the Han as peasants, and “even now the small-farmer economy 
remains the economic basis for the Hans” and therefore of China.483 Fei’s emphasis on 
peasants comes as no surprise given his classical studies like Peasant Life in China and 
From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society. Li Chi had also defined the Han by 
pastoral lifestyle, but here Fei, in Marxist idiom, defines the Han by class, a tactic that 
meshes well with Mao’s exaltation of the rural peasants. 
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 Fei’s snowball simile transcended racial or ethnic divisions by literalizing the 
policy of minzu tuanjie (ethnic entwinement), a kind of official nationalism by which 
one’s identification with the state would supersede ethnic identity, which was in any case 
blurred. But the idea that the Han constitute the heart of the Chinese nation smacks of 
ethnocentrism, so he tempered this by explaining:  
Hans during their process of development have absorbed a lot from other 
groups, and meanwhile they have also contributed to these other groups. As 
far as biological factors and blood lineage are concerned, the Chinese 
people as a whole have been mixing and integrating throughout their history. 
We cannot say that one nationality is pure in terms of blood lineage.484  
  
 Fei’s suggestion that all Chinese share the same blood harkens back to Chiang’s 
narrative in China’s Destiny in which he attempted to make a single race of all China’s 
citizens regardless of “clan,” or in this case “ethnic,” affiliation. Again this represents a 
departure from revolutionaries who earlier assumed that the Han and barbarians 
transcend time as discrete races or lineage groups. Instead Fei depicts a constant 
intermingling of races, with no references to biology, Mongoloid physiognomy, or 
lineage to the Yellow Emperor. 
 Fei’s narrative further differs from earlier paradigms in suggesting that the origins 
of the Chinese people are “pluralistic and indigenous.” It is pluralistic because zhongyuan, 
the cradle of Chinese civilization, is now a center where the Chinese originated, not the 
center. Fei includes the periphery, areas such as Taiwan, Manchuria, and Yunnan, as sites 
for the dawn of early Chinese.485 Fei also adheres to the “indigenous” nature of Chinese 
civilization, maintaining that “China is one of the world’s centers where mankind 
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originated.”486 Fei’s insistence on Chinese civilization’s formation and development in 
isolation, entirely independent of foreign (read Western) influences, corroborates the 
PRC’s official biography of the nation487 but also stands in stark contrast to Li Chi’s 
diffusionism. And where Fei’s definition of “Chinese” includes all fifty-six ethnic groups, 
Li’s concept of Chinese was narrower – the Descendents of the Yellow Emperor who 
became the Han. 
 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Fei Xiaotong’s ideas. Western 
scholars have drawn from Fei’s several English language works for decades. His focus on 
the Han heavily influenced Taiwan’s foremost ethnologist, whose lengthy career guided 
the discipline there and gradually turned attention from the island’s aborigines to the 
Han.488 But of course Fei exerted a marked influence in the PRC, where his narrative 
remains orthodox.489  
 
III. THE HAN IN OFFICIAL NARRATIVES 
 
A United Multi-Ethnic Nation: White Papers and the Official PRC Narrative 
 
 Although a century ago the story of the Han began with the Yellow Emperor, 
subsequent revisions gradually erased him from the narrative in the PRC. In fact, Han as 
race—the idea of the Han as a pure lineage or biological construct—is gone. The five 
races vanished, replaced by fifty-six ethnic groups. The Han are still the majority, but 
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now quantifiable—91.96% among a total national population of 1.2 billion, with the rest 
collectively referred to as “minorities” (since only ethnologists can distinguish among the 
other fifty-five ethnic groups).  
 Ironically, despite the bafflingly complex taxonomy, the Chinese are officially 
“united.” Today the PRC’s White Papers, a kind of state-of-the-union report, reflects the 
influence of Fei’s duoyuan yiti narrative. In both cases an almost paranoid stress on 
solidarity prevails, with some form of the word ‘unity’ appearing no fewer than twenty-
one times in the three-page passage on ethnic groups from the White Papers.490 
According to this document: “China as a united multi-ethnic country was created by the 
Qin Dynasty and consolidated and developed by the Han Dynasty.” It was during the Han 
dynasty that “the most populous ethnic group in the world, the Han, emerged.” Since then 
the unity of the Chinese people came of historical interaction—they “migrated and 
mingled,” with “economic and cultural exchanges” that brought them together in 
“interdependence” and “cooperation.” Due to these interconnections, “all ethnic groups in 
China have shared common destiny and interests in their long historical development, 
creating a strong force of affinity and cohesion.” After a thorough retelling of Chinese 
history, one can only conclude that “unity has always been the mainstream in the 
development of Chinese history.” Fei’s account generated two decades earlier we find 
even the wording strikingly similar: “Some 200 years before Christ Qingshihuang 
(Chinshihuang), the first emperor, accomplished the historic mission of founding a 
centralized, unified state. This marked a great beginning. Since then, China’s various 
nationalities have lived together in a unitary country. This has improved unity, promoted 
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growth and is in the vital interest of the people of all China’s nationalities. National 
solidarity and unification of the country have been the main current in China’s 
history.”491 But again, just as the PRC’s current version of history draws from Fei’s 
account, Fei himself seems to have revised Chiang Kai-shek’s wartime narrative, 
although acknowledgment of any such connections would have been tantamount to 
political suicide.   
 According to the PRC’s official autobiography, the Party not only perpetuated this 
legacy of unity but superceded it by providing equality for all ethnic groups. This recent 
revision in fact writes equality into the story, since now all groups, including minorities, 
participated equally in creating Chinese civilization. While such a narrative turn does 
have precedents, beginning with Sun Yat-sen’s idea of wuzu gonghe and including 
Chiang Kai-shek’s trope from China’s Destiny, it also has a contemporary analogue in 
the field of archaeology. Lothar von Falkenhausen has recently traced the development of 
an “interaction sphere” theory, whereby all regions and peoples found within China 
contributed to the making of Chinese civilization and are now considered indispensable 
constituents of the nation.492 The new formula involved archaeology in the periphery (i.e. 
outside the central plains) to explain how minority peoples contributed to the formation 
of the Chinese nation. The inclusionism of this theory, which developed gradually in the 
works of archaeologists Su Bingqi and K.C. Chang, appealed to the PRC state for its 
theoretical reining in of the margins. But this interaction sphere had well-defined borders 
coterminous with the state. The idea that any historical influences may have originated 
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outside of the PRC’s contemporary borders was not acceptable to the PRC’s national 
narrative. China as a melting pot received official sanction, but the PRC only 
acknowledged domestic, not international, melting.493  
 Still, despite attempts to overcome the traditional core/periphery division through 
inclusion and equality, ironically the Han, as the primordial core of the Chinese nation, 
remain the crux of the PRC narrative to which the minorities are dependent for national 
cohesion. 
 
Alternative Views: Official Narratives of Han in the Chinese Periphery 
 
 Having examined the history behind the PRC’s official narrative for the Han we 
may now examine counter-narratives generated by other Chinese political regimes. If we 
accept the thesis of the preceding chapters—namely, that political, social, and heuristic 
elements determine one’s view of the Han in a particular context—then it would stand to 
reason that Chinese outside of the PRC in differing circumstances would naturally view 
the Han in a different light. In fact, an examination of the official status of Han in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Macao, all of which until very recently operated as Chinese 
communities politically independent of the PRC, confirms this thesis. Despite PRC 
claims to these regions as inalienable parts of one China, the residents of all four 
communities subscribe to different visions of the Chinese nation. 
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Macao 
 
 Macao, a small peninsula and surrounding islands just west of Hong Kong in the 
Pearl River delta, became part of the Peoples Republic of China in 1999. This transition 
brought to a celebrated close Portuguese administration of Macao, the last and longest-
running foreign possession in China. Over four and a half centuries earlier Portuguese 
traders had begun arriving in Macao and by 1557 they had established a permanent 
settlement, erecting European-style houses and administrative buildings that remain a 
part of Macao’s architectural landscape to this day. In the seventeenth century Portugal 
began leasing the territory and in 1887, as part of the infamous “unequal treaties” forced 
on China by the Western nations, the Beijing Treaty ceded to Portugal the right to 
perpetual occupation and government of Macao. A full century later Portugal and China 
began negotiating the transfer of Macao’s sovereignty back to Chinese jurisdiction, which 
occurred on December 20th of 1999.494 
 Nearly all residents of Macao consider themselves Chinese, but given the history 
outlined above one would correctly assume that the colonial legacy has not disappeared. 
Even today, nearly a decade after transition, Portuguese remains the official language in 
Macao (though Chinese was added at reversion) and its residents use the pataca rather 
than Chinese RMB. Macao, like Hong Kong, is administered by Beijing as a Special 
Administrative Region which allows it to retain autonomy from Beijing. The upshot of 
this current system is that, although Macao and Hong Kong now belong to the PRC, they 
have yet to adopt the official PRC definition of the Han; in fact, there is no identification 
with or recognition of Han at all in either region, whether officially or popularly. A look 
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at Macao’s most recent census report provides insights into the former while the latter, 
popular conceptions of Han, are explored in the chapter following. 
 Every five years the Documentation and Information Centre (DSEC) of Macao’s 
Statistics and Census Service conducts and issues an official census report, the results of 
which appear in a trilingual (Portuguese, Chinese, and English) publication. In the most 
recent of these reports, the Global Results of By-census from 2007, the government of 
Macao SAR breaks its population down into zuyi or descent groups,495 a term rendered 
into English as “ethnicity.”496 The vast majority of Macao’s residents, 94.3% to be 
precise, are designated “pure Huayi.”497 Although the official translation of Huayi is 
simply “Chinese,”498 a more literal translation of Huayi would be “those of Hua descent” 
or Chinese in the broadest sense (as opposed to the more narrow Han, who constitute the 
core of the many Hua groups). As discussed earlier, Zhonghua includes all of China’s 
minorities, including Taiwan’s aborigines. Macao’s census figures do not include any 
categories for Han; in other words, Han as an ethnic or any other type of group does not 
receive official recognition. The tendency to identify Chinese as Hua rather than Han 
may be due at least in part to the prolonged Western presence in Macao and the 
subsequent tendency to divide the colony’s population into broad categories of Chinese 
and Portuguese—whereas in China proper, in the absence of Westerners, the tendency 
was to distinguish Han from minorities. In Hong Kong and Macao Westerners served as 
the Other, while in China proper the so-called minorities became the Other. The slim 
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remainder of Macao’s population includes various combinations of descent from Chinese 
(Hua), Portuguese, and miscellaneous “others.”  
 The predilection for Hua in lieu of Han may also stem from geography—both 
Macao and Hong Kong are located in the southernmost region of China, far from the 
traditional political epicenter and therefore far removed from the Central Plains, ancestral 
homeland of the Han. In spite of a shared polity, distinctions between northerners and 
southerners have historically been quite strong. The Hakka, a distinct Han subgroup with 
large numbers in southern China, believe themselves to be early emigrants from the 
Central Plains who devoutly maintain the original culture and civilization of China.499 
Meanwhile Cantonese emigrants from south China made up the bulk of Huaqiao, or 
“overseas Chinese,” literally translated as “Hua bridges.” It was these immigrant 
Cantonese speakers who established communities in the US and elsewhere known as 
“Tangrenjie,” or “streets of the Tang [dynasty] people”—Chinatown, though in reality it 
is closer to “Tangtown.” It may be that Cantonese eschewed the term Han because it 
privileged the north over the south, and acceptance would be tantamount to uprooting 
their southern heritage and transplanting it in the Yellow River valley. In any case the 
peoples of southern China, whether Cantonese or Hakka, never did adopt the moniker 
Han until establishment of the PRC, and even now outside the mainland it has yet to gain 
acceptance. 
 The case of Macao’s census also clearly illustrates the amorphousness of the 
English term “Chinese,” which depending on context could be “people of Han,” “people 
of Tang,” or “people of Hua,” but each of these carries its own inimitable nuances. 
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Returning to the Global Results of the Macanese government, both Huayi (as ethnicity) 
and Zhongguoji (as nationality)500 are rendered into English as simply “Chinese”—the 
same word but with cultural meaning in one case and clear political meaning in the other: 
In Macao some of non-Chinese ethnicity hold a Chinese passport while some ethnic 
Chinese carry passports of other nations such as Portugal, Thailand, and the Philippines, 
another consequence of the Chinese diaspora.  
 
Hong Kong  
  
 A colonial legacy also factors into the negotiation of Chinese identities in Hong 
Kong, which for a century and a half served as the entrepôt for the British Empire in 
China. At the conclusion of the disastrous Opium War in 1842 the victorious British 
forced the Qing regime to accept the Treaty of Nanjing, which ceded Hong Kong Island 
to the crown in perpetuity. China’s second defeat in the Arrow War of 1860 saw the 
cession of Kowloon Peninsula to the island’s north, and in 1898 Britain succeeded in 
obtaining a lease on the adjacent New Territories. All this comprised the British colony 
of Hong Kong until the lease expired in 1997, at which time the entire territory reverted 
to Chinese (though in this case PRC rather than Qing) control.501  
 Again, while the PRC effectively institutionalized Chinese ethnic identities 
beginning in the 1950s, imbuing the new taxonomy into its citizenry, Hong Kong, like 
Macao, remained in the hands of a Western regime and out of China’s reach; therefore 
the fifty-six ethnic group configuration, including the concept of a Han majority, never 
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took root as it did in the mainland. Even earlier in the Nationalist period, despite close 
contacts between Hong Kong and southern China, there was no official and systematic 
propagandizing of identity as discussed in chapter two. This becomes clear when 
examining the most recent demographic statistics from Hong Kong. Again, like Macao 
and very unlike the PRC, Hong Kong’s official census does not include a category for 
Han, whether defined ethnically or linguistically. 
 Like Macao, the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department is responsible for 
conducting and issuing demography reports, the most recent of which is the bilingual 
2006 Population By-census.502 Table nine in this report provides an official breakdown of 
Hong Kong’s population by “ethnicity,” but again like Macao the use of certain key 
terms reflects the relative insularity of these communities—a detachment from the 
mainland that represents not only geographic but political separation. While Hong Kong, 
Macao, and the PRC all classify their respective populations according to “ethnicity,” this 
is an English translation from original Chinese terms which differ in every territory: 
minzu in the PRC, zuyi in Macao, and zhongzu503 in Hong Kong. Although all three 
phrases appear as “ethnicity,” the conversion to English conceals important nuances in 
their approaches to identity. In Macao the term zuyi connotes blood lineage or what we 
would associate with “race” (indeed one footnote makes clear that zuyi is defined by 
xuetong, literally “blood ties”).504 The Hong Kong report stipulates that “the ethnicity of 
a person is determined by self-identification, normally on a social and cultural basis,”505 
yet the persistent use of such an antiquated term long ago abandoned in the mainland due 
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to its historical association with ideas of physiology and genealogy suggests alternate 
methods of identification (as does Hong Kong’s ethnic category “white,” which is more a 
description of appearance than culture). In contrast, the PRC employs the more current 
phrase minzu, which places greater emphasis on cultural divisions. (More will be said 
about differences in this terminology as the chapter following examines etymology.) 
 More importantly, neither Hong Kong nor Macao employs the official PRC 
taxonomy of fifty-six ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, Macao’s population is simply 
Chinese (Huayi), Portuguese, some combination of the two, or “other.” In stark contrast, 
the population of Hong Kong is broken down into such groups as “White,”506 “Filipino,” 
“Indonesian,” “Indian,” “Japanese,” “Thai,” “Other Asian,” and “Other.” So-called 
“Chinese” constitute 95% of the Hong Kong population,507 but in this case Chinese are 
Huaren,508 not Han, again a much broader conception akin to Macao’s Huayi. Huaren, 
like the Zhonghua minzu, could include not only those the PRC recognizes as Han but 
also China’s minority groups and Huaqiao—overseas Chinese. What is conspicuously 
missing from Hong Kong’s (and Macao’s) “ethnic” taxonomy, as compared with that of 
the PRC, are the divisions among Chinese (Zhonghua minzu) that have been the hallmark 
and raison d’être of ethnology in China. Instead, the finer distinctions among Chinese are 
eclipsed by more obvious differences between Chinese and foreigners.  
 Each of these territories retains its own appellation for the “Chinese” majority—
Hanzu in the PRC, Huayi in Macao, and Huaren in Hong Kong. In each case the 
particular historical background and political milieu led to discrepancies in taxonomy and 
terminology, but beyond this each rubric incorporates substantively different constituents. 
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In other words, demographic differences between territories are not merely a matter of 
semantics; groupings differ in both form and substance. Moreover, radical differences in 
the composition of domestic minorities—groups that ultimately define parameters of the 
majority—means that each territory conceives of its majority very differently. In essence, 
these differences underscore a lack of consensus on the meaning of Chinese. 
 One final point regarding languages and dialects in Hong Kong and their 
relationship to Chinese identity: According to the census, 90% of Hong Kong residents 
claim Cantonese as their “usual language,” with 4.4% reporting “other Chinese dialects” 
as their mother tongue while less than one percent of the population claim Mandarin as 
their usual language (although nearly 40% speak Mandarin as “another dialect”).509 
Significantly “Mandarin” in this case does not refer to Hanyu, or the Han language, the 
dialect spoken throughout northern China, but is rather the English equivalent of 
Putonghua—China’s lingua franca.510 This detail remains consonant with other 
characteristics of Hong Kong—where there is no official recognition of either Han 
ethnicity or Han language.  
 
Taiwan 
 
 In both Macao and Hong Kong there exists no official recognition of Han 
whatsoever, a phenomenon that coincides with popular identities as discussed in the 
chapter following. These are both Special Administrative Regions of China, lost sheep 
only recently returned to the Chinese fold. Ironically the Republic of China (ROC) on 
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Taiwan, which still maintains de facto independence from the mainland PRC, does 
officially recognize a Han category. In this case it is due to a shared political history—the 
ROC regime in Taiwan and the PRC regime in the mainland both share roots in the 
Nationalist (or pre-liberation) period and both look to Sun Yat-sen as the guofu, or father 
of the Chinese nation. The reader will recall the role of Sun and the nationalists in 
mobilizing Han identity from the introduction of this study. While Sun had ties to both 
Macao and Hong Kong, it may be that because these territories were not directly under 
Qing governance at the time that revolutionary ideas of Hanness failed to take root as 
they did within the Qing empire. 
 Unlike Macao and Hong Kong, the ROC Ministry of Interior’s Department of 
Statistics does not engage an analysis of the island’s population by ethnicity. The 
Government Information Office, however, does produce a Yearbook that provides, while 
not statistical data, at least a narrative breakdown of Taiwan’s population. Chapter two of 
the Taiwan Yearbook 2006 introduces People and Language including a lengthy 
treatment of “Taiwan’s ethnic composition,” with Taiwan’s ethnic groups presented in 
three broad categories: indigenous peoples, Han people, and new immigrants. The 
original nine tribes discussed in chapter three have since become twelve “aboriginal 
groups”511 that altogether comprise less than two percent of the overall population, and 
yet they receive primary (and by far the most lengthy) treatment within the report, with a 
section devoted to each of Taiwan’s twelve aboriginal groups as a distinct ethnicity. 
Today the political clout of Taiwan’s aborigines continues to grow even as the currency 
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of Han wanes. For example, the 2000 census questionnaire for the ROC asks not about 
race or ethnicity but only about whether one has “indigenous status,” requesting a simple 
yes or no; an affirmative answer requires that the respondent specify to which of the nine 
aboriginal groups one belongs. In short, there is no consideration of any other category, 
let alone that of Han.512 
 The disproportionate prominence of Taiwan’s aborigines stems from two 
interrelated developments that began in the 1980s: the rise of organized political 
opposition after decades of authoritarian GMD rule; and the aboriginal rights movement. 
These together ushered in a new trend emphasizing Taiwanese identity that undermined 
the PRC and GMD, as both institutions symbolized ties to the mainland. The upsurge in 
Taiwanese identity gave rise to the Democratic Progressive Party (and consequently the 
current presidential administration) which, as part of its platform of independence from 
China, aggrandizes the role of aborigines in Taiwanese history and society and especially 
their cultural and linguistic links to Austronesia.513 As discussed earlier, in the PRC, 
which lays claim to both the island and its inhabitants as part of China, these aborigines 
are known collectively as the gaoshanzu or “mountain people,”514 one of the fifty-five 
minority groups that comprise the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). In neither China 
nor Taiwan are aborigines considered Han; however, in China they are considered 
Chinese while in Taiwan they are not, a testament to the differing visions of the Chinese 
nation on either side of the strait. 
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 Following a thorough treatment of each indigenous tribe, the Yearbook moves on 
to a chapter devoted to explicating Taiwan’s “Han People,” including sections covering 
the Holo, Hakka, and “mainlander” subgroups, each of which represents a particular 
migration wave from the mainland. According to the Yearbook, “the ancestors of 
Taiwan's Han people started to migrate from China's southeastern provinces to Taiwan in 
the seventeenth century. The majority of these early immigrants were composed of the 
Holo (also known as the southern Fujianese or the Minnanese)…and the Hakka (literally 
‘guest people’) from eastern Guangdong province.” Basically, most early migrants to the 
island (after the aborigines) came from the two closest provinces in southern China, 
Fujian and Guangdong. Elsewhere, immigrants with Fujianese heritage typically refer to 
themselves in their native tongue as simply Hokkien, meaning “Fujian,” but Taiwanese 
who trace their ancestry to Fujian are known as Holo or Hoklo,515 which means “beneath 
the [Yellow] river,” a reference to their roots south of the Central Plains. Just as the Holo 
speak a regional vernacular originating from southern Fujian known as Minnan,516 so 
Hakka also retain their own distinct language. The Hakka, historically concentrated in 
southern China but a significant part of the global Chinese diaspora, maintain the belief 
that their ancestors emigrated from the Central Plains and they therefore retain elements 
of China’s traditional culture and civilization.517 As their migrations southward 
encroached upon the established Punti (bendi)518 peoples of the south they became known 
as Hakka (kejia),519 “guest people” or “outsider households,” new arrivals to a long 
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occupied territory. These two groups—Holo and Hakka—“together now constitute about 
85 percent of Taiwan's population, the former outnumbering the latter by a 4:1 ratio.”520  
 The third Han subdivision is mainlander, so-called waishengren, “people from 
provinces outside [Taiwan]” due to their late arrival on the island. Following the earlier 
migration waves, “about three hundred years passed by before Taiwan saw Han moving 
to the island again in large numbers. This immigration resulted from the Nationalist 
government's relocation to Taiwan in 1949, which brought about 1.2 million people from 
China, the majority of whom were in the military, the civil service, and education. Unlike 
earlier immigrants, these people came from every province of China….These immigrants 
brought to Taiwan their own customs and traditions, which are as distinctive and rich as 
those of the Holo, Hakka, and indigenous peoples.” The plurality of Taiwanese society 
receives especial attention in current narratives, as it poses a challenge to the earlier 
GMD (and now PRC) depiction of Taiwanese as simply fellow members of the Han 
fraternity.  
 The final subgroup under the Ethnic Composition section in this chapter considers 
New Immigrants, an infusion that further underscores the diversity of Taiwan’s 
population. Many immigrants come from mainland China, but a large proportion hail 
from nations the world over. Most of these immigrants wed Taiwanese men, and 
according to the Yearbook, “In 2005, these immigrants' marriages with citizens of 
Taiwan accounted for one in every five marriages, and children from these marriages 
made up 12.88 percent of all babies born.” Hence the final pronouncement that “In recent 
years, an increase in marriages between people of Taiwan and citizens from other nations, 
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as well as an influx of guest workers from Southeast Asia, has made Taiwan an even 
more pluralistic society.” 
 In the past decade or so the phrase sida zuqun, or “the four major groups,” has 
gained popularity within Taiwanese society as an epithet for the island’s primary 
population groupings, and includes the three Han subgroups—Holo, Hakka, and 
mainlander—with the addition of aborigines.521 Unlike the revolutionary-era nationalist 
schema of wuzu gonghe or the current fifty-six ethnic group configuration adopted by the 
PRC, Taiwan’s system officially divides the Han into three fully recognized and accepted 
ethnic groups, again an alternative to a more holistic definition of Han prevalent in the 
PRC. And just as the PRC uses the term minzu while Macao employs zuyi and Hong 
Kong uses zhongzu, Taiwan has adopted the term zuqun, yet another alternative means of 
organizing and classifying the population. Although all four terms share the character zu, 
which alone conveys the somewhat nebulous idea of a group united by kinship ties, still 
as one would expect each phrase carries its own unique historical and political 
implications. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 Today Han still serves a political agenda. Although the idea of Han is no longer 
mobilized to underscore the foreignness of a ruling elite as was the case a century ago, 
nor to galvanize the nation in the face of an imperialist threat, nor yet to define China’s 
Other; instead, at the turn of this century, it has become a means of emphasizing links to 
the Chinese diaspora—a tool of unity rather than division, as visualized in Fei’s rolling 
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snowball that lacks borders and draws all into a single Chinese body. But outside the 
PRC, alternative conceptions of the Chinese nation exist that challenge this view, a theme 
picked up in the next chapter as we explore contemporary popular conceptions of Han 
across political boundaries.  
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FRACTURED NARRATIVE: POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF HAN, 2004-2008 
 
 
 
The Republican Era 
 
  
The preceding chapters traced the evolution of the Han narrative among scholars 
and political elites over the course of the modern period, with special focus on how the 
various revisions correspond with contemporary sociopolitical conditions and the 
perceived needs of the nation. These elites propagated their versions of the narrative 
through use of print media, museums, and state policy. But to what extent did their ideas 
reach the general populace? In other words, how do popular conceptions of Han 
correspond with elite definitions? Without pretending to conclusive treatment of this 
question, a look at some social indicators offers a preliminary answer. 
 Dictionaries serve as a useful index for accepted standards of language, and in this 
case lexicographic changes corroborate evolution of the Han narrative. Consider first the 
Qing dynasty Kangxi zidian commissioned by an emperor of the same name and 
completed in 1716. This celebrated tome cited passages from classical texts and provided 
a model for subsequent Chinese dictionaries.522 While it includes an entry for the 
character Han, the definition lacks any reference to a people; instead, it indicates 
geographic place names such as a county, city, and river all sharing the name Han. While 
we know that the term Han served as a category for certain peoples before the modern era, 
it carried dubious meaning until becoming standardized and regularized in the twentieth 
                                                
522 Teng Ssu-yü and Knight Biggerstaff, An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Chinese Reference Works, 
3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
156 
 
century. It was not until the Cihai and Ciyuan523 dictionaries of the 1930’s that precise 
definitions of Han as an ethnic or racial group first appeared, investing an archaic word 
with modern meaning. 
 Subsequent revisions of the Han narrative necessitated revisions in its definition. 
A survey of forty Chinese dictionaries published over the course of the twentieth century, 
including those of the PRC and ROC, provides documentation of this evolution. The 
Cihai and Ciyuan dictionaries mentioned above reveal that Republican-era definitions of 
Han correspond with the racial discourse prevalent at the time, with frequent reference to 
Han as both descendents of the Yellow Emperor and one of the five racial groups within 
China’s borders—Han, Man (Manchu), Meng (Mongol), Hui (Uigur Turk), and Zang 
(Tibetan), a comprehensive taxonomy first articulated by the Qianlong emperor in the 
eighteenth century.  
 The earliest of these dictionaries, published in 1930, defined the Han as a race 
(zhongzu) descended from the Yellow Emperor, now the largest ethnic group in China 
concentrated within the inner eighteen provinces. In other words, Han do not belong to 
the periphery of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, or Tibet; instead, they occupy what is 
often called “China proper,” geographically-defined historical China centered on the 
ancestral homeland of Henan province. 
 The 1938 Cihai dictionary again defines Han as a zhongzu, one of the five peoples 
of greater China (zhonghua minzu). According to this source, the might of the Han 
dynasty was known among foreigners who called “our people” Hanren, and eventually 
the signifier became self-referential. The 1940 Ciyuan dictionary reiterates that Han is a 
zhongzu, the main Chinese minzu since the Yellow Emperor, and until after the Wei/Jin 
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period (circa 220-420) foreigners called Zhongguo (the Central Kingdoms) “Han.” 
Therefore this country’s people call themselves Han. The people of China’s “original” or 
“root area” are called Hanren, as opposed to the five other races.524  
 
Han in Taiwan 
 It is not surprising to find that after the ROC government’s retreat to Taiwan in 
1949 dictionaries there perpetuated earlier definitions of Han, which remained a zhongzu, 
one of Sun’s five races,525 descended from the Yellow Emperor and equivalent to the 
Chinese. The ROC maintained this definition for decades: The 1978 edition of Ciyuan 
reads exactly as the 1940 edition above, and the 1986 edition of Cihai includes the 
definition from the 1938 version. According to the 1967 Encyclopedic Dictionary of the 
Chinese Language, also published in Taiwan, “Han normally refers to China’s original 
territory and the Chinese people.” Speaking in detail about Han as a people, Hanzu means 
the “predominant Chinese ethnic group from the Yellow Emperor, one of our country’s 
five big groups, mostly scattered throughout the interior/core.”526 This general idea of 
Han persisted in Taiwan until the 1980s.  
 A number of significant political events with broad social repercussions occurred 
in the 1970s which eventually led to radical revisions of the Han narrative. Nixon’s 1972 
visit to China paved the road to rapprochement between the US and PRC, culminating 
with the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1978. Mao’s passing in 1976 opened up 
the door for Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and kaifang, a general opening of China to the 
international community. Concurrently when Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975 Taiwan’s 
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dogged adherence to Republican-era ideologies weakened. On both sides of the Strait the 
decades of strictly imposed prohibitions on communication and interaction of any kind 
deteriorated, and gradually correspondence and information passed, albeit circuitously, 
between the island and the mainland. It was this watershed development that enabled a 
parallel revision on either side. 
 In 1981 Taiwan’s Guoyu cidian still referred to Han as one of the five races, but 
this edition offered something new to the story of the Han. Using a tree analogy, Hanzu 
becomes “the name of the group that developed from the main trunk of Huaxia, one of 
the five great nationalities [of China]. During the Han dynasty it included the Huaxia 
family, the Eastern Yi family, the Chu Wu family, the Bai Yue family and other races; 
after the Han dynasty, again it referred mainly to the Han who resided in the central 
plains, who gradually merged with neighboring races. Because of the greatness of the 
two Han dynasties, they [these people] were called Hanzu.”527 In other words, during the 
Han dynasty “Han” as a people referred to anyone under the political rule of the Han 
regime, a disparate group that included Huaxia as well as peripheral barbarians. But 
barbarians were only Han in a political sense. With the demise of the Han dynasty the 
meaning of Han as a people narrowed to those of Huaxia heritage living in the central 
plains area.  
 More importantly, this passage suggests that Han of the present day are not 
simply the direct lineal descendents of Huaxia or the Han dynasty, but a more 
heterogeneous mixture that includes “races” from outside the central plains—the 
barbarians of the classical histories. Now Han heritage extends to peripheral peoples and 
regions. Significantly this definition corresponds very closely with simultaneous 
                                                
527 Italics added. 
159 
 
revisions in the PRC, a phenomenon easily explained by the dramatic shift in 
international politics. 
 
Han in Mao’s China 
 Returning to revisions under the PRC, regime change in the mainland in 1949 
meant re-envisioning the Chinese nation and the role of the Han to accord with the 
Communist Party line. As discussed in chapter four, in the immediate post-liberation 
period the PRC government sponsored and directed the minzu shibie (ethnic 
identification) project, eventually recognizing a total of fifty-six ethnic groups—the Han 
and fifty-five minorities. This development necessitated a major revision of the national 
narrative. While PRC dictionaries came to reflect the new official taxonomy, outside of 
the PRC the five races idea persisted, as reflected in the passage from Taiwan’s Guoyu 
cidian of 1981 cited above.  
   
Han after Mao 
 Minor amendments aside, during the Mao era academic and official definitions of 
the Han remained relatively uniform. It was only in the 1980s, after Mao’s passing and in 
the heyday of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, that the narrative of the Han underwent drastic 
revision.  
 As covered in chapter three, the work of Li Chi and others at Anyang had already 
projected Han origins back to the Shang dynasty. Chapter five discussed the 1959 
discovery of Erlitou, another Henan culture preceding the Shang. Chinese archaeologists 
identified Erlitou as the site of the Xia, China’s earliest dynasty according to classical 
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sources. The assumed but as yet unproven connection between Erlitou and the Xia 
prompted an interesting revision in the story of the Han. Whereas in the past the Han 
narrative typically began with the Yellow Emperor in spite of his dubious authenticity, in 
the 1980s this exalted progenitor of the Han race disappeared entirely from academic and 
official accounts. Updated versions of the story claim that the Han originated from 
Huaxia, an ancient ethnonym for the people of the central plains. Although the term 
Huaxia existed before Erlitou, it was only written into the standard narrative when it 
became more credible than the idea of a Yellow Emperor.  
 Around this same time mainland dictionaries also dropped references to the 
central plains as the Han homeland. The 1986 Modern Chinese Dictionary defines the 
Han as “our country’s most populous ethnic group, scattered throughout every region of 
the entire country.” Earlier editions restricted the Han preserve to the central plains or 
even the eighteen provinces of China proper, yet now the Han dominate all of China.528 
The PRC government did in fact engage in a colonization project which populated the 
fringe areas with Han migrants, so that today Han outnumber Tibetans in Tibet. It could 
be that this revision actually represents a related attempt by the center to claim the 
periphery—after all, if Han belong to the center, what claim would China have to the 
outskirts peopled by foreigners? But with “Chinese” in Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and 
Taiwan, the Chinese government could legitimize its claims to those areas. 
  The preceding passage illustrates another revision—the Han are now China’s 
most populous ethnic group. Chinese dictionaries gradually phased out the term zhongzu 
or “race” in favor of minzu, which in the early twentieth century often meant race also but 
is now formally translated as “ethnic group” or “nationality.” As in the West, WWII 
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ensured that the idea of race was no longer associated with objective science but with 
racism. Use of the word in both languages declined in the postwar period, but in China 
today the word zhongzu has become archaic and obsolete—everyone knows their 
ethnicity but no one is sure of their race or even exactly what zhongzu means.529 By the 
1990s dictionaries always define Han as a minzu, never the politically incorrect zhongzu. 
 Perhaps the most drastic transformation of the Han narrative occurred in the 
1990s. According to earlier accounts China had five “races,” discrete groups of distinct 
lineage genealogies, each with its own culture, language, and geographic region, but also 
bearing unique physiological traits. The gradual acceptance of “ethnicity” and the 
primacy of culture moved definitions away from racial ideas of lineal descent and 
biology. This trend dovetailed with a growing tendency to incorporate the periphery into 
the national narrative while decentering both the central plains and the Han, a 
phenomenon covered in chapter five. In line with this fad PRC dictionaries no longer 
perpetuated a belief in discrete, homogenous groups (whether racial or ethnic) but instead 
began defining the Han as mixed blood descendents of Huaxia and other Chinese groups. 
This latest revision promotes the idea of a Chinese national melting pot wherein all 
citizens, minority and Han alike, share blood lineage and cultural heritage. Just as 
geographically the central plains and the periphery now belong to all Chinese, so too 
does Chinese history, which is no longer exclusively Han history but redefined to include 
the history of traditional subalterns. As suggested in the previous chapter, recasting the 
nation as a familial unit with ties spanning millennia encourages national unity while 
circumventing internecine conflict. 
                                                
529 See the following section on popular conceptions of Han. 
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 The 1990 Hanyu dacidian offers a fairly lengthy and detailed definition of Han 
that exhibits all of the major changes outlined above. This edition alleges that the word 
Han “anciently referred to Huaxia zu” but now refers to the Hanzu, “the most populous 
ethnic group of the Zhonghua minzu.” The passage offers a very politically correct 
declaration from Chairman Mao, who supposedly said that “‘the Hanzu population is 
numerous, and formed from many ethnic groups mixing blood over a long period of 
time.’” The dictionary then elaborates on the Chairman’s quote, stating that the Hanzu 
are “our country’s principal ethnic group. From antiquity Huaxiazu and other zu 
gradually developed. They are spread throughout the entire country, mainly concentrated 
along the Yellow, Yangzi, and Pearl rivers as well as the plains.” Again in 1998 the 
Hanzu are defined as “China’s main ethnic group, they developed gradually from 
Huaxiazu and other ethnic groups mixing blood over a protracted period of time.” They 
are scattered throughout the country, mainly concentrated in the three river valleys and 
plains regions.530 
 
Han Language 
 Another development was a change in the popular term for the Mandarin 
language. China has always exhibited rich linguistic diversity rivaling that of Europe or 
Africa, but use of an official language and script helped the various dynasties maintain 
some semblance of unity. In imperial China the literati, the scholar gentry of the 
bureaucracy, used a lingua franca called guanhua which became key to effective 
governance across a vast and diverse realm. In the Nationalist period this language 
became known as guoyu, the “national language.” Even today Mandarin is called guoyu 
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in Taiwan, another vestige of the Republican era. But under the PRC Mandarin became 
Hanyu, literally the “Han language,” and this is precisely what it means: Hanyu is “the 
language of the Hanzu, the main language of our country. Standard modern Hanyu is 
putonghua,”531 or the official language of the PRC derived from the dialect of northern 
China. In essence, the spoken language that prevails in the central plains is the language 
of ethnic Han. But China’s linguistic diversity defies this claim. Ironically, for many of 
those categorized as ethnic Han, Hanyu is not their mother tongue and some do not speak 
Mandarin at all. This is especially true among Cantonese speakers in the south and 
Taiwanese (or Minnanyu) speakers in Taiwan, where proficiency in the “Han language” 
varies widely.532 
 By 1990, however, dictionary entries circumvent this problem. According to one 
selection, Hanyu means both the language and script of the Han dynasty, but also the 
language of the Hanzu. It is “the main language of China, one of the world’s most 
developed, most rich languages. With an ancient history, it has the greatest number of 
speakers.” The main dialects of Hanyu include the northern dialect, Hakka, Minnan, and 
Cantonese among others, although the Beijing dialect serves as a standard for the 
common language of modern Han. Unlike the earlier excerpt, which simply defines 
Hanyu as the language of ethnic Han, this shrewd choice of vocabulary manipulates rules 
of inclusion and exclusion. Significantly this source glosses over the fact that Hakka, 
Minnan, Cantonese, and Mandarin are mutually unintelligible languages, opting instead 
to call them “dialects” or regional variants of a single language—Hanyu. This would be 
akin to dubbing German, French, Spanish, and English all “dialects” of “European,” a 
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532 See the section following. 
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suggestion which might offend national identities. Likewise emphasizing differences 
among the various “Han” languages may foster the development of splinter identities and 
potentially lead to political independence, something already underway in Taiwan where 
there is growing emphasis on Taiwanese language over guoyu. The segment goes on to 
explain that Hanyu belongs to the Han/Cang (Sino-Tibetan) language family, a broader 
rubric that includes many minority languages under the umbrella of “Chinese.” Again, 
such linguistic taxonomy plays into the political aims of a government bent on promoting 
unity among its citizens. 
 Finally, this entry marks another conspicuous difference with past definitions. 
Consider that the entry on Han in the Kangxi zidian of 1716 did not include any 
references to a people at all. Nearly a century ago Sun Yat-sen had estimated that: “For 
the most part the four hundred million people of China can be spoken of as completely 
Han Chinese.” As of 1990, Han “population exceeds 930 million (from 1982 census), 
standing at 93.3% of the entire national population.”533 A conspicuous absence on the one 
hand and then Sun’s vague assessment on the other both contrast markedly with the 
updated figure given by this dictionary after the benefit of a series of national censuses. 
Clearly over the course of the twentieth century Chinese dictionaries offered definitions 
and figures with increasing detail and precision, a testament to the growing importance of 
understanding the Han people.   
 Conclusion: The concept of Han as an ethnic or racial group became standardized 
only in the twentieth century. This survey of forty Chinese dictionaries published over the 
course of the twentieth century, including those of the PRC and ROC, shows that in the 
Republican period Han was one of China’s five racial (or sometimes ethnic) groups 
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descended from the Yellow Emperor. This definition persisted for decades under the 
ROC regime in Taiwan, with the same scheme of five groups, greater emphasis on race, 
and descent from Huangdi. Meanwhile, shortly after its establishment, the PRC replaced 
the term zhongzu and its accompanying racial overtones with the more culturally oriented 
minzu, meaning nationality or ethnic group. Authorities also gradually phased the Yellow 
Emperor out of the story while the more acceptable Huaxia appeared in his stead. By the 
1990s dictionaries in both the ROC and PRC referred to Han as mixed blood descendents 
of Huaxia and other groups, a development that emerged from post Cold War politics and 
the opening of informal channels between the two countries.  
 
Epilogue/Postscript: Popular Conceptions of Han 
 The survey of dictionaries clearly demonstrates that definitions of Han changed 
over time, but by including dictionaries published in Taiwan and Hong Kong one can 
also see that at any one time the meaning of Han differed regionally depending on 
political context. Thus it seems appropriate to cap a study on the changing meaning of 
Han over the twentieth century with an examination of contemporary popular 
conceptions of Han as we enter the twenty-first century. Crossing both heuristic and 
geographic boundaries in our pursuit of Han identity provides a holistic picture of 
Chinese identities and nationalism, not as a fictionalized monolithic whole, but on a 
regional and individual level. Such an approach recognizes the concept of one China but 
the reality of diverse perspectives on China. 
 Between January 2005 and March 2006, I spoke with a total of forty individuals 
in the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao about what it means to be Han. I initiated 
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discussion using a simple interview questionnaire asking first about personal background 
including race, ethnicity, language, and nation. The document, provided below, then 
poses two open questions: Who are the Han, and what are the special characteristics of 
Han people?534  
 
YZ[Questionnaire 
\]^Clayton D. Brown 
_)`abA&University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
cdeYour Background 
 
fg Age: 
 
)G Country: 
 
#$ Ethnicity: 
 
hV Mother Tongue: 
 
i$ Race: 
 
 
jkQuestions 
 
“%$” lmn? Who are the Han? 
 
%opqrst? What are the special characteristics of Han people?u
 
 
Personal Background 
 I designed the first section, that on personal background, partly for basic 
demographic information but more importantly to better understand certain aspects of 
                                                
534 For the survey I used two versions of the same questionnaire. The one provided here is the PRC version 
with simplified characters, while the version distributed in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan used traditional 
characters. Beyond this the two documents were identical. 
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Chinese identity that, unlike gender, age, and occupation, are often ambiguous and open 
to interpretation. As we shall see, many Han lack consensus on a shared nation, language, 
culture, race, or even ethnicity. 
 For instance, when asking about guojia (country/state), those in the mainland 
responded that they belong to either “Zhongguo” (China) or the full political title 
“Peoples’ Republic of China.” In Taiwan, the same query elicited a response of either 
“Taiwan” or “Republic of China,” never Zhongguo and certainly never the PRC. Those 
in Hong Kong and Macao answered that their country/state is either “Hong Kong,” 
“Macao,” or “China” (Zhongguo), but again never did these respondents answer with 
PRC. Because guojia connotes a political entity it comes as no surprise that these Han in 
Taiwan do not identify with the PRC—the communist government never did control the 
island, and identification with Zhongguo would also infer political ties to mainland China. 
As for Hong Kong and Macao, one could speculate that since 1997 and 1999 respectively, 
the two Special Administrative Regions see themselves as reunited with China but not 
with the PRC government. After all, the two entities were under the control of foreign 
colonial powers when Mao established the People’s Republic. Perhaps in the future, 
when a generation has grown up under the PRC, the people of Hong Kong and Macao 
will identify with that state, but at present this does not seem to be the case. 
 When asked about ethnicity, those in the PRC answered both readily and 
unequivocally that they are Han, sometimes with a degree of incredulity (“what else 
would I be?”). For those in Taiwan ethnicity was either “Han” or “Zhonghua,” but 
generally they were not as certain as those in the PRC and a few individuals, after 
hesitating, explained that they have some “aboriginal blood” (yuanzhumin) in their 
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ancestry which called into question their status as Han. Clearly in this case ethnicity is 
more closely related to lineage than culture, a salient characteristic of responses in 
Taiwan. In Hong Kong and Macao only two individuals claimed to be ethnically Han. 
Instead most reported their ethnicity as zhongguo (curiously not zhonghua), which is 
interesting because elsewhere Zhongguo is considered a polity or geographic territory 
rather than an ethnic group. It could be that in this case zhongguo was short for 
zhongguoren, which would simply mean “Chinese.” In any case, even among those who 
consider themselves Han, little agreement exists about whether this represents ethnicity 
or some other classification. 
 Whereas discussions in the PRC reveal that one’s ethnicity is always assuredly 
clear, asking about race proved far more problematic—after much head scratching and 
requests for me to clarify the difference with ethnicity (which I declined to do), most 
respondents guessed their race was Han or, in a few cases, the antiquated Huangzhong 
(Yellow race) mentioned in chapter one. For those in Taiwan, fully half believed that race 
was the “same as ethnicity” and therefore they are ethnically and racially Han, but three 
individuals thought of themselves as racially Quanzhouren (a region of Fujian province 
in mainland China), one considers himself of the Taiwanese race, and another is racially 
“Chinese.” Among those in Hong Kong and Macao, three abstained from answering the 
question of race because they thought it inapplicable, three answered Zhongguo 
(including one claiming “Han” ethnicity), one considered himself racially “Asian,” and 
one person is racially zhonghua. If dissention exists with reference to ethnicity, the 
question of race is nothing short of bewildering. 
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 Though in northern China everyone consistently claimed Hanyu (Han language) 
as a mother tongue, in southern China this was not the case. For instance, in Guangzhou 
most answered with Cantonese (Guangdonghua or Yueyu) or Cantonese and Hanyu. In 
Xiamen many responded with Fujianese alone (language of Fujian province) or in 
combination with Mandarin. Never did anyone in these southern areas claim Hanyu as 
their sole or primary language. For those in Taiwan, mother tongue was nearly always 
Taiwanese/Minnanyu (a Fujian derivative), sometimes in combination with Guoyu, with 
only one respondent in Taiwan claiming guoyu alone as their mother tongue.535 Among 
those in Hong Kong, mother tongue is solely Cantonese (Guangdonghua or Yueyu), never 
Hanyu nor even Chinese (zhongguohua). Those in Macao also claimed Cantonese as a 
mother tongue, though many also speak Portuguese and English with varying proficiency. 
Clearly few people would agree with the dictionary definition of the “Han language” 
discussed earlier, which suggested Hanyu is a broad category inclusive of Cantonese, 
Fujianese, Minnanyu, and other regional “dialects.” Instead, according to this sample, 
Chinese people tend to see Hanyu more narrowly as an equivalent to Putonghua, the 
official national language used across China but native to the central plains region of the 
north. 
 All these background questions really serve as an exercise in self categorization. 
The opacity of the categories, though somewhat confusing, also demands individual 
interpretation, and the areas of disagreement and difference become just as meaningful as 
any areas of consonance. Overall it suggests that even the Han cannot agree on a single 
trait that unites them—whether ethnicity, race, language, territory, or other identifiers.  
                                                
535 This was in Taipei and environs. In southern Taiwan it is likely that the number of those speaking only 
Taiwanese would have been far greater. 
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Survey in the PRC 
 As already suggested by answers to the background questions, in the PRC, where 
the government codified a system of ethnic groups into law and stamps ethnicity in IDs 
and passports, everyone confidently informed me of their ethnicity without the slightest 
reservation. Nearly half of respondents during the course of our discussion also brought 
up the fifty-six ethnic group configuration unprompted, showing not only an awareness 
and acceptance of the official taxonomy but a real identification with the label and 
category. Beyond that certainty, however, their understanding of Han in general reveals a 
great degree of ambiguity and discord. While minorities exhibit special characteristics, 
the Han are unique in that they lack special characteristics. Most people defined Han by 
population or simply as the majority. They also tended to refer to Han as “normal 
Chinese” who (unlike minorities) lack shared beliefs, foods, customs, language, or 
territory. In fact, rather than listing any defining characteristics of the Han, people were 
more apt to describe minority uniqueness.  
 For instance, one Beijing taxi driver, when asked who the Han are, gestured 
outside the window and said: “Just regular people, like in Beijing.” When asked about the 
people in the countryside versus urban Beijing, whether they too constitute “regular 
people,” he said “all Han are basically the same.” When I persisted by contrasting their 
disparate lifestyles, he explained that they all used to be the same, they all came from the 
same place (zhongyuan), but now differences exist. Nowadays the Chinese people are “all 
mixed together.” This abbreviated account of the Han narrative certainly jibes with the 
current official version discussed in the chapter previous. When I went on to ask this 
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same man about the unique characteristics of the Han, he said they have none. 
“Minorities each have their own beliefs, customs, language, foods, etc. Like the Hui don’t 
eat pork; but the Han have no special beliefs or dietary restrictions.”  
 This tendency to define the Han negatively against minorities pervaded my 
discussions with PRC citizens. Many echoed the prototypical response of another Beijing 
resident, who reported that the Han are the most populous of the ethnic groups. When 
asked what, beyond high population, characterizes the Han, he merely replied that they 
are not Dai or Zhuang or Hui. Another taxi driver, this one in the historic city of Xi’an 
southwest of Beijing, also characterized the Han as “normal Chinese.”536 For him the 
defining characteristic of the Han is that “there are many of them. You get ten Chinese 
people together, nine are Han. The rest are the minority ’cause there are fewer of them.” 
He also defined the Han against the Hui, saying the Hui believe in Islam. When asked 
what the Han believe in, he simply replied: “Whatever they want.”  
 As argued in earlier chapters, the Han/other dichotomy remains a key component 
of Chinese cosmology. According to convention, the civilized (Han) always occupy the 
geographic center, are sedentary, literate, and eat cooked food, whereas the feral 
barbarians reside in the periphery as ignorant nomads who roam the grasslands of the 
steppe and eat their food raw.537 These same familiar motifs appear in many popular 
descriptions of Han (and minority) characteristics. For example, a young female hotel 
clerk in Xi’an defined the Han as one of China’s fifty-six ethnic groups, of which they 
comprise the greater part. When asked about unique characteristics, she replied that “they 
have yellow skin. Most are sedentary, not that nomadic kind of the steppe grasslands. The 
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537 See Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1992). 
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character of most is outspoken and straightforward, honest and kindhearted, and happy to 
help people.” Her coworker reiterated that the Han are indeed one of the fifty-six Chinese 
ethnic groups, with the Han comprising two-thirds of the population. “Their lifestyle is 
pretty much relatively centralized and concentrated [in densely populated areas]. Also 
they are sedentary. They eat cooked food mostly, Han don’t like to eat raw food. Han 
clothing gives one a feeling of simplicity, taste, naturalness, and neatness. Clothing of 
other minorities each has its own unique taste and style.” 
 When questioning a woman in Beijing, I once again received the predictable reply 
that Han are the most populous of the fifty-six ethnic groups, with 96% of the entire 
country’s population. Like the Xi’an hotel clerk, she believed that cuisine plays a part in 
identity, though she was much more explicit about their diet, explaining: “Han like to eat 
pork, mutton, dog, and chicken, but Hui people don’t eat pork.” Also like the Xi’an hotel 
clerk, she believed that fashion plays a part in Han identity, but she specified that “Han 
clothing is primarily the qipao, which was vogue in Tang dynasty times.”538  
 Although discussions on the topic of Han identity in the PRC exhibited a great 
deal of uniformity, I of course also confronted a few deviations. One of the more unique 
responses came from a man in Beijing who, when asked to explain for me who the Han 
are, thought for a moment and suggested it may be best to ask a historian. He was 
completely unaware of the irony that I am a historian who assumed it would be best to 
ask a Han. But his desire to consult a historian again underscores the prominent role that 
academics play in identity formation, both as experts and the source of “truth.” As the 
specialists change their story, the official line and eventually public opinion follow suit. 
                                                
538 The qipao, aside from being a twentieth century creation, is a woman’s dress designed from the 
hybridization of traditional Chinese and modern Western clothing styles. See Patricia Ebrey, China: A 
Cultural, Social, and Political History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 261. 
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 Generally speaking, popular definitions of Han identity in the PRC seldom 
touched on issues of race, whether descent or biology. One exception was the 
aforementioned female hotel clerk in Xi’an, who just said that Han have yellow skin. In 
the only other instance someone brought up Han physiology, our discussion did not 
progress beyond one sentence. When asked about the Han, this Beijing resident gave the 
familiar reply: “Han are one of the fifty-six ethnic groups of the People’s Republic of 
China.” When asked about special characteristics, she replied that they have yellow skin 
and black hair. When I mentioned that Japanese and Koreans also have these traits, she 
had no ready reply.  
 To get at a more academic answer I posed the same set of questions to two 
specialists at the Central University for Nationalities. As both experts in the relevant field 
of anthropology and professors at a university for minorities, I had high hopes for a 
cogent response. After considering my question for several moments they told me with 
some confidence that all Han use Chinese characters. I felt obliged to point out that many 
minorities, including those at their school (where minorities are the majority), also use 
characters and that I too as a foreigner use characters. I also suggested that some Han 
may be illiterate, and wondered if this disqualified them from Han status. They seemed 
aware of this quandary, and agreed that the criteria for being Han poses a complex 
problem with no easy solution, but that the Han Research Society is now in the process of 
exploring this question. 
 Considering all these responses as a whole, it seems that the PRC created a 
specific category with a quantifiable number of Han, and this official taxonomy has 
indeed permeated popular views. But like an empty box, the PRC failed to define Han as 
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a people—a phenomenon Dru Gladney referred to as the “undefined majority” with 
parallels in the official US category “white” or Caucasian.539 
  
Survey in Taiwan 
 But if responses in China seem relatively uniform or even predictable, those 
encountered in Taiwan tended to greater variation. And whereas those in the PRC 
avoided discussion along racial lines, in Taiwan my questionnaire often elicited 
inventories of Han phenotypes. These definitions seem to reflected vestigial ideas of Han 
as race, defined primarily by physical characteristics and lineage stretching back to the 
central plains or the Yellow Emperor, though in Taiwan the Han are also occasionally 
associated with Confucian culture.  
 For instance, in his response to my questions a professional musician suggested 
that “the main race in China we call Han” may be recognized by “[body] size, accented 
features, and face ratio [measurements] including hair, eyes, nose, and mouth” and by 
“character in culture.” The detailed diagram of Han face and skeletal structure 
accompanying these remarks appears below. Likewise a biology lab worker indicated that 
the Han are those whose ancestors lived in the Yellow and Yangzi River valleys. They 
are recognizable by certain physical anomalies including the nail of the smallest toe, and 
by a flat nose. Her twelve year old daughter explained that the Han are a type of race, and 
elaborated on their physical characteristics such as an extra toenail, a flat nose, and a face 
“flat like a pie.” Their artwork appears below as well.  
                                                
539 Dru Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” Journal of 
Asian Studies 53, no. 1 (1994): 92-123. On the fiction of whiteness in America see Ruth Frankenberg, 
Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). 
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 The third illustration resembling a compass came from someone who defined the 
Han geographically. This person employed Sun’s familiar five races configuration, 
explaining that “among the five big races, the Han are principally of the Yellow River 
valley, different from the Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan peoples outside the river 
valleys.” But the Han also exhibit observable physical traits, namely a physique smaller 
than Westerners, a relatively flat facial form, black hair, and black eyes. Culture also 
apparently plays a role, as the Han subscribe to “all sorts of marriage customs.” 
 Several others offered graphic depictions of the Han homeland, but significantly it 
had migrated south of the central plains. One of these individuals, who considers their 
country/state Taiwan, and ethnicity, mother tongue and race all “Taiwanese,” believes 
that the Han lived in “southern China…between the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers,” and 
offered a crude drawing of a region directly across the straits from Taiwan, an area that 
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would be Fujian and Guangdong, surrounded by minority regions of Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
northern China (perhaps Manchuria). Another person, claiming Han ethnicity, assumed 
that race was the same as ethnicity, confessing “I really don’t know the difference.” Han 
characteristics today include a short and small physique, and black eyes. For this young 
woman Han “originally indicated the people who resided in the region of the central 
plains, living south of the Yellow River.”  
 In the past, particularly under the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, the ROC 
government emphasized the Chineseness of Taiwan’s citizens. The Ministry of Education 
imposed a strict regimen of Chinese history, language, and geography in Taiwan’s 
classrooms. Today, however, the ROC Ministry of Education is placing increasingly 
greater emphasis on Taiwanese history, Taiwanese language, and Taiwanese geography, 
the latter oriented toward the Pacific rather than the mainland. This shift may to some 
extent account for erroneously situating the central plains south of the Yellow River or 
even squarely in southern China. But the fact that most Taiwanese share ancestral origins 
in southern China may also influence this misconception—perhaps they equate 
Taiwanese origins with Han origins.   
 For a high school literature teacher, the Han are again those “whose ancestors 
originate from the central plains with genealogy traceable to origins with the Yellow 
Emperor.” Considering her vocation, however, it comes as no surprise that she also 
associates the Han with literacy and Confucianism, explaining that “because of the 
influence of Confucian thought and the lengthy history of cultural traditions, in sum the 
Han are relatively urbane, genteel and cultivated.” Here again, like the professors in the 
PRC, the educated seem inclined to ascribe proficiency in characters exclusively to the 
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Han, and because literacy is the hallmark of civilization, by extension the Han enjoy a 
monopoly on that as well. 
 A businessman with a graduate degree from the prestigious National Taiwan 
University said the narrow definition of Han is simply “Chinese people with Han blood 
lineage, but actually it’s very difficult to discern who has pure Han blood.” A more 
general definition is “Chinese who grow up under Han culture…peripheral ethnic groups, 
we don’t consider them Han, especially because their ancestors are different.” He divided 
the special characteristics of the Han into two types: biophysical and cultural traits. For 
the first, he says only that there are many sayings, such as that the Han have an extra 
crease at the elbow joint, “but I myself am not completely sure whether these sayings are 
correct.” As for the cultural component, it includes “Confucian influence, emphasis on 
the five relationships, language and script, primacy of exams, and [the Confucian values 
of] ritual and propriety.”  
 The tendency of respondents in Taiwan to resort to sketches in order to clearly 
convey their ideas indicates, I believe, a more concrete set of criteria than in the PRC, 
where the Han are instead some nondescript, vacuous entity defined only by what they 
are not. Another salient difference in ROC conceptions of the Han lies with 
Confucianism, and while only about one third of respondents in Taiwan mentioned a 
relationship between Confucianism and the Han, outside of Taiwan it never came up. 
This hardly comes as a surprise, however, since Maoist iconoclasm had roundly 
denounced Confucius and his tradition, thus precluding a return to Confucianism as 
heritage of the Han. In contrast, Chiang Kai-shek had countered the appeal of 
communism with his New Life Movement, which made Confucianism a state religion 
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and Confucius’ birthday a national holiday. Since the 1980s, however, the mainland has 
seen a resurgence of interest in Confucian philosophy, a trend which in the future may 
mean the reintegration of Confucianism into Han identity.540  
 Finally, a Taiwanese doctoral student of anthropology said that the Han are 
“ethnically derived from people who originally lived in the yellow earth plains who since 
migrated to many places in geographic China. They bore the cultural identity which is 
claimed to have a continuous heritage from Xia, Shang, and Zhou.” The special 
characteristics of the Han include: 1) General physical appearances which differ from 
other minorities. 2) The mother tongues of the Han share similar background, traceable to 
a single region. 3) Culturally they are taught to be the Han, bearing the teaching of 
Confucius or other doctrines such as shared historical background and ancestral origins in 
‘zhongyuan.’” 
 Surprisingly, in Taiwan Han identity is not defined against the island’s aboriginal 
population but against the big four minorities in the mainland. Because these definitions, 
whether based on biology, lineage, culture, or territory, all link Han to the mainland, it 
would seem that the persistence of Han identity in Taiwan would serve Beijing’s claim 
on Taiwan and its people. Conversely, it could be that in Taiwan the increasing 
identification with parochial Taiwanese identity is steadily displacing identification with 
the Han and therefore gradually severing ties with China. In any case, Han identity in 
Taiwan carries clear political implications.541 
 
                                                
540 For evidence of the resurgence of Confucianism in the PRC see Guo Yingjie and Baogang He, 
“Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The ‘Zeng Guofan Phenomenon,’” Modern China 25.2 (1999): 142-170. 
541 For further discussion of Taiwan’s Chineseness see Melissa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004). 
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Survey in Hong Kong and Macao 
 In contrast to the PRC and Taiwan, in Hong Kong and Macao the term “Han” 
seldom appears in common discourse, and my questions about the Han elicited quizzical 
looks more often than coherent answers. Individuals consistently identified themselves, 
both racially and ethnically, as Chinese, Hong Konger, or Macanese rather than Han. 
When asked to define the term, most people simply equated Han with the Chinese. The 
only specific traits consistently associated with the Han were decidedly physical—yellow 
skin, black hair, black eyes, etc., and often these were brought up only after some 
cajoling.  
 For instance, when asked who the Han are, one woman in Hong Kong said simply 
“Han are Chinese.” When asked about their unique characteristics, she replied with a 
terse “they have none.” A short while later I posed the same questions to a Hong Kong 
teen, who told me “the Han are Chinese people,” with no distinguishing characteristics. 
When pressed for elaboration, he explained to me: “I am Chinese in Hong Kong.”  
 When respondents in Hong Kong and Macao did describe Han characteristics, 
these usually fell under the rubric of phenotypes but still offered little in the way of 
variation or originality. A twenty year old female in Macao equated the Han with 
zhonghua minzu, a broad category of Chinese encompassing minorities and overseas 
Chinese. She maintained that the Han are primarily defined by physical features, 
including yellow skin, black eyes, black hair, and short frame. But linguistically the Han 
also speak fluent Cantonese and Mandarin (guoyu), which would actually exclude most 
Han by PRC standards. When I pointed out that some people in Taiwan speak only 
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Taiwanese, she added regional “dialects” to her criteria, such as those of Chaozhou and 
Fujian.  
 A Hong Kong resident in his forties also said the Han are simply Chinese, with 
yellow skin and short stature. When I pointed out that this could describe the Japanese, I 
was told that the Japanese came from China. When asked about differences between the 
two, he said “the Japanese have smaller eyes.” A Malaysian man in Hong Kong, also in 
his forties, who considers himself both ethnically and racially Chinese (zhonghua minzu), 
also equated the Chinese with the Han but unlike others, he referred to Sun’s five racial 
groups. He explained that the Han share black hair, brown eyes, and yellow skin. When 
asked how this differs from the Japanese, he insisted that the Japanese are Han who 
moved to the islands during the Tang dynasty. 
 Despite the general confusion surrounding the question of race, some people 
seemed to believe that ethnicity is a racial subgroup. Just as one person in the PRC 
considered herself ethnically Han but racially Huangzhong (Yellow Race), so a college 
student at the University of Macao considered himself ethnically Han but racially 
Chinese (zhongguoren). For him the Han “are one of China’s five great ethnic groups, 
China’s biggest race.” Once again they are characterized by small stature, yellow skin, 
black eyes, but also their industriousness. Another young man in Macao initially 
responded that his country is China, then thought better of it and replaced it with Macao. 
He considers himself ethnically Chinese (zhongguoren), and racially Asian. Perhaps due 
to his position in the periphery he defined Han in the broadest possible terms, calling 
them dazhonghuaminzu, which again would include minorities and overseas Chinese. In 
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his estimation the Han all share yellow skin, black eyes, and speak Huayu, which 
encompasses every Chinese dialect.  
 A college student in Macao also seemed to equate the Han with the Chinese, but 
defined them politically as: “All races living under the rule of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Republic of China.” Whereas cultural definitions were few and far between 
in Hong Kong and Macao, for her the Han share an “emphasis on the family and blood 
lineage.” In contrast, her classmate said that the Han are not simply the same as Chinese 
people but the greater part of the Chinese people. Their uniqueness lies strictly in 
material culture, as “Han clothing is different, and food is different” from minorities, but 
their physical appearance is otherwise the same. 
 In short, it would seem that in Hong Kong and Macao the term Han lacks 
currency—instead residents use the word Chinese, presumably because as a former 
Western colony the most important identity was as Chinese or foreigner. The foreign 
presence, it seems, may have encouraged solidarity within the Chinese community by 
eclipsing any Chinese subdivisions. Although Hong Kong and Macao now officially 
belong to the PRC, this happened very recently and their Special Adminstrative Region 
status keeps Beijing administratively at arm’s length. These factors may explain why 
perceptions of the Han in Hong Kong and Macao significantly differ from those in the 
PRC, where no one mentioned race or biology but everyone is familiar with the system of 
fifty-six ethnic groups and clearly affiliates with one of those groups. 
 In each case, recent political history can explain the divergence of Han identities. 
In Taiwan, the meaning of Han seems to be a remnant of the ROC emphasis on 
Confucianism, race (biology and lineage), and the logic of five races. Meanwhile citizens 
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of the PRC tend to view the Han as simply ordinary people, the banal majority among 
fifty-five exotic minorities. Though the term Han is seldom used in Hong Kong and 
Macao, a vague understanding generally exists that Han means Chinese, a much broader 
meaning than found elsewhere. 
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CONCLUSION: DISAPPEARANCE OF THE HAN 
 
  
Just as Critical White Studies proved that the meaning of White has changed over 
time and space, so an examination of Han in the historiography shows that its meaning is 
dependent on heuristic and political context. While millennia ago Hanren may have 
simply meant “subjects of the Han dynasty,” during the Yuan it meant people of northern 
China; in the early Qing, Hanjun referred to the Chinese-martial unit of Nurhaci’s Eight 
Banners, an eclectic mix of frontier peoples who simply shared a settled lifestyle, yet 
over the course of the dynasty some Hanjun became Manchu while others were 
assimilated into the population at large, thus becoming Hanzu; Qing court policies along 
with later revolutionary rhetoric emphasized genealogies, which when combined with 
Western-derived scientific taxonomies helped to racialize China’s population. Han 
thereafter claimed lineal descent from the Yellow Emperor, the very founder of Chinese 
civilization, making Han heirs to the great civilization that had for eons dominated 
northern China. Thus the ideology of perpetually separate and distinct races helped to 
alienate the Manchus and end their dynasty.   
 But the equation of Han with the Chinese nation, while an easy means of 
advancing national unity, excluded groups that occupied the same political sphere. This 
quandary necessitated a more inclusive paradigm found in the phrase wuzu gonghe, or 
five races united, espoused by Sun Yat-sen and promulgated by the early Republic. The 
advent of anthropology in China then became the key to formulating a cogent narrative of 
the nation that would both substantiate Sun’s vision while maintaining scientific 
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plausibility. Building on revolutionary ideology, China’s first anthropology dissertation, 
submitted by Harvard doctoral student Li Chi in 1923, reified belief in the Han as 
civilizers who kept histories, wall builders with sedentary culture, and as descendents of 
the Yellow Emperor. But it was his training in physical anthropology that enabled Li to 
revise, or rather enhance, earlier narratives by defining the Han in expressly biological 
terms.  
 In the 1920s archaeologists, led by Li Chi, began searching for Chinese racial and 
cultural origins in the Yellow River valley of the Central Plain, fabled homeland of the 
Yellow Emperor and cradle of Chinese civilization. Li’s excavation at Anyang became 
the key to linking prehistoric and historic China into a linear sequence stretching from the 
Bronze Age through millennia of empire to the present nation. Soon he had worked other 
discoveries into the sequence, pushing Chinese origins back to Longshan and Yangshao 
Neolithic cultures and even into the Paleolithic with Peking Man. This descent group, 
which Li termed the “Chinese race,” began with native hominids that evolved in the 
Central Plains to become today’s Han.  
 Meanwhile China’s ethnologists studied non-Han minorities in the rugged and 
remote frontiers, grappling with the question of their relationship to the Han and their 
role in the national narrative. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 sparked a 
movement to rhetorically integrate the periphery into the Chinese nation, and in the years 
that followed, unity through integration and assimilation became a pervasive theme in 
wartime ethnographies. By the end of the war, even Chiang Kai-shek had generated an 
official narrative that drew on these studies, recounting the growth of China’s five clans 
from a single race and their inevitable Hanification over thousands of years. Unlike 
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earlier narratives, those that emerged from WWII emphasized commonality of origins 
and blending of cultures in the history of the Chinese nation. 
 Under the PRC, Han remained the officially recognized majority while minorities 
multiplied tenfold. What had been races at the turn of the century and clans in China’s 
Destiny were now shaoshu minzu, the “minority nationalities,” alternately referred to as 
ethnic groups. Although the PRC actively combated the legacy of “Han chauvinism” by 
declaring equality among the nationalities, ironically Maoism, or the Chinese take on 
Marxism, accepted Han as the vanguard of social evolution, a standard by which to judge 
minority development.  
 In post-Mao China Fei Xiaotong, who had assisted with the minority 
identification project in the 1950s, attempted to overcome the divisive ethnic taxonomy 
he had helped devise for the state by formulating a unifying narrative suspiciously similar 
to China’s Destiny from four decades earlier. In his duoyuan yiti, or “many roots, one 
body” metaphor, Fei too depicted many peoples coming together over time to form a 
single Chinese nation. And like Chiang’s narrative, Fei also saw the Han as an absorptive 
center that attracted outside groups, growing larger like a snowball. But rather than using 
the Yellow Emperor as national progenitor, Fei described how Huaxia, predecessors of 
the Han and early inhabitants of the Central Plain, had in their development both 
absorbed from other groups and contributed to other groups, so that none were pure in 
terms of biology or blood lineage. Whereas for revolutionaries Han and barbarians 
transcend time as discrete groups, for Chiang and Fei Chinese history is rife with 
migrations, intermarriage, trade and other interactions that converted many peoples into a 
single united nation.  
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 The PRC adopted Fei’s narrative as the official national autobiography. Although 
the story of the Han began over a century ago with the Yellow Emperor, subsequent 
revisions gradually erased him from the narrative. In fact, Han as race—the idea of the 
Han as a pure lineage or biological construct—is gone. The five races have vanished, 
replaced instead by fifty-six ethnic groups now united as one people. Nearly a century 
ago Sun Yat-sen attempted to shift primary identification and loyalty from 
ethnonationalism (Hanism) to a more cosmopolitan statist nationalism that sought to 
blend and integrate China’s various groups into a single zhonghua minzu. While the PRC 
has come closer to achieving this than Sun did, the White Papers of the Chinese 
Government make it clear that even today Han ethnocentrism has not entirely died out—
Han is still the protagonist in the national narrative. 
 Beyond the PRC, however, alternative narratives exist in the Chinese 
communities of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao. The PRC claims that all three are 
integral and inalienable parts of “One China,” yet in each region the state categorizes its 
population differently and each maintains its own term for the “Chinese” majority—
Huayi in Macao, Huaren in Hong Kong, “Taiwanese” in Taiwan, and Hanzu in the PRC. 
All four recognize a different majority, and all construct that majority differently, a 
reflection of their divergent visions of the Chinese nation. Discussions with individuals in 
these four regions suggest that popular views largely coincide with official views and so 
differ across political borders. 
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Disappearance of the Han? 
 
In the modern configuration of nation-states, institutions create and enforce 
official identities. Governments promote “nationality” based on state citizenship for use 
in an international context, while within the state institutions oblige us to assume a 
particular racial or ethnic affiliation. Official identities, those printed on paper and 
stamped in passports, seem universally accepted and therefore go largely unquestioned. 
The very act of acceptance and use gives them credence and ensures their perpetuation. 
In reality human diversity resembles refracted light rather than labeled boxes—within the 
chromatic range we can distinguish each color, yet the spectrum lacks any sharp divisions. 
Dividing people into groups is rather like drawing lines in this spectrum to separate one 
color from another. Such artificial borders distract from the free blending of each color 
into the next, creating instead an illusion of uniformity within and difference without. 
Likewise the established schemes of human taxonomy represent a false objectification of 
humanity—the very essence of subjectivity.  
This artificiality becomes clear with a critical examination of how such borders 
are demarcated, a process that ultimately relies on unrealistic ideals. In 1933 the 
notorious Races of Mankind exhibit mounted by the Field Museum in Chicago featured 
over one hundred bronze sculptures, each statue ostensibly representing one of the 
world’s races. Apparently the figure representing “Chinese” was modeled on Hu Shi. The 
curator of the exhibit maintained that the sculptures were “the result of careful selection 
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of subject and long anthropological study,” yet thirty years later the exhibit was 
dismantled and any pretense at being “scientific” was disavowed.542  
Likewise Sun and the revolutionaries believed Han to be the archetypal Chinese, 
biologically, culturally, and otherwise; yet the notion that any single individual, let alone 
a group, can represent the quintessence or standard of Chineseness is simply a platonic 
ideal that no living individual or group could possibly personify.543 Over time, as 
narratives changed, the pure Han imagined by revolutionaries was contaminated by 
revisions that introduced mutability, intermarriage, and migrations. Today the 
revolutionary ideal is so altered and diluted that Han has become virtually meaningless, 
as attested to by the survey of popular conceptions in the PRC. The emergence and 
persistence of Han identity is due to its serviceability or functionality, but as Han lacks 
import outside of the PRC, and within the PRC the narrative is moving in the direction of 
blending and integrating to the point of erasure, one wonders whether in the future Han 
will become obsolete and gradually disappear entirely from future narratives much like 
the Yellow Emperor himself. 
 On February thirteenth of 2007, the Shanghai Evening News carried a headline 
reading “Pure Han No Longer Exist.”544 After noting Han population demographics, the 
piece rhetorically asks what the basis for Han identity is if not in blood. The article went 
on to report that a professor at Lanzhou University had just completed a monumental 
DNA study of migrations in the northwest. After challenging conventional beliefs that 
                                                
542 Tracy Lang Teslow, “Reifying Race” in Sharon Macdonald, ed. The Politics of Display: Museums, 
Science, and Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
543 For a succinct deconstruction of Chinese, see Tu Wei-ming, The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of 
Being Chinese Today (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), vii. 
544uvw^xy()oiz{|}u~i%$o5S 2007-2-13. 
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Han are more concentrated in the Central Plains and descended from the Yellow Emperor, 
Professor Xie suggests that 
Han are only people who, in a certain time period, were differentiated by 
region. Moreover this ethnic group is not specifically defined; it was only 
established to distinguish itself from surrounding periphery. Therefore, 
following changes in China’s history, even though [Han were] previously 
precisely defined as inhabitants of the Hanzu territory, still large-scale 
migrations occurred. Due to military service, evading war, and other factors, 
Han were always migrating southward…The non-existence of a pure Han 
ethnic people in China is related to long-term, large-scale migrations of 
peoples.  
 
The study then concluded that “any pure Han people actually do not exist in China, and 
with DNA analysis even the concept of Hanzu will cease to exist.”  
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